# A2 Protected Areas Aff

## CX/strategy

What do you ban in the protected areas? Might be extra-T

Clarify what they defend – if they’re annoying read the spec shell. If they don’t ban extraction read Must Ban

Best DA is poverty DA by far, but tourism is also a good argument. Fish wars sounds kind of dumb but the evidence is surprisingly good.

Trav: see prepout for evidence indicts. Read the specific CP and the framework-specific impacts.

HW: read east-asia specific CP and disads. The CP is explicitly comparative to their solvency evidence. Read a women’s rights/colonialism disad and make analytics for why it turns levinas

Bwood: mangrove specific DA + extra T + CP.

## Spec

#### Interpretation – If the aff defend the establishment of a protected area, the aff must read evidence in the 1ac or provide evidence when asked for it in CX that explains what approach to regulating resource extraction within the protected area they defend. Agardy 3 clarifies the multiple approaches that are all examples of MPAs

Agardy 3 [(TUNDI AGARDY, Sound Seas; PETER BRIDGEWATER, UNESCO Man and the Biosphere Program; MICHAEL P. CROSBY, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; JON DAY, Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority; PAUL K. DAYTON, Scripps Institution of Oceanography; RICHARD KENCHINGTON, Maritime Policy Centre, University of Wollongong; DAN LAFFOLEY, English Nature, Peterborough; PATRICK McCONNEY, Caribbean Conservation Association; PETER A. MURRAY, Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, Environment and Sustainable Development Unit, Castries, Saint Lucia; JOHN E. PARKS, Biological Resources Program, World Resources Institute, Washington; and LELEI PEAU, Department of Commerce, Government of American Samoa, Pago Pago, American Samoa, USA) “Dangerous targets? Unresolved issues and ideological clashes around marine protected areas” AQUATIC CONSERVATION: MARINE AND FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEMS, Aquatic Conserv: Mar. Freshw. Ecosyst Jan 12] AT

To understand the range of views developing in the international marine conservation community, we must begin with an examination of diﬀering perceptions of MPAs at the most basic level. The term marine protected area arose out of a historic quilt of meanings that was formed as protected areas began to spring up in coastal and marine areas around the world, each with its own label and implications. MPAs are variously deﬁned as purely in-water designations, as coastal management units that include terrestrial and marine areas, as strictly protected reserves, or as any kind of marine managed area (Agardy, 1997b). The most commonly used deﬁnition of MPA internationally is that provided by IUCN, ‘any area of inter-tidal or sub-tidal terrain, together with its overlying water and associated ﬂora, fauna, historical, or cultural features, which has been reserved by law or other eﬀective means to protect part or all of the enclosed environment’ (Kelleher and Kenchington, 1992). This generic description has metamorphosed somewhat in subsequent discussions and treaty negotiations. For example, background documents for the Convention on Biological Diversity state that ‘MPAs are coastal or oceanic management areas designed to conserve ecosystems together with their functions and resources’ (deFontaubert et al., 1996). In the United States, MPAs have been deﬁned as ‘any area of the marine environment that has been reserved by Federal, State, territorial, tribal, or local laws or regulations to provide lasting protection for part or all of the natural or cultural resources therein’ (US Presidential Executive Order 13158, 26 May, 2000). Eichbaum et al. (1996) deﬁne marine and coastal protected areas as ‘areas of the coastal zone or open ocean (or both) that are the target of management for the broad purpose of conservation and sustainable use’. As a result of the diverse deﬁnitions and objectives for MPAs, a profusion of speciﬁc terms to describe various sorts of MPAs have been adopted, including marine park, marine reserve, ﬁsheries reserve, closed area, marine sanctuary, MACPAs/MCPAs (marine and coastal protected areas), nature reserve, ecological reserve, replenishment reserve, marine management area, coastal preserve, area of conservation concern, sensitive sea area, biosphere reserve, ‘no-take area’, coastal park, national marine park, marine conservation area and marine wilderness area. Semantic confusion naturally arises when similar specialized terms are applied to management regimes with diﬀerent objectives and temporal–spatial scales. For instance, the term ‘sanctuary’ as used in the US context is a multiple use MPA that is designated under the jurisdiction of NOAA’s National Marine Sanctuary Programme, as per example the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary. However, ‘sanctuary’ takes on a diﬀerent meaning elsewhere in the world } in Great Britain the term has been used on occasion to refer to strictly protected marine reserves in which extractive use is prohibited (Jones, 1994). Given the literal deﬁnition of the word ‘sanctuary’ (A reserved area in which animals or birds are protected from hunting or molestation. The American Heritage Dictionary, 1985), the Jones (1994) deﬁnition is logical. This is also the sense in which it is used by the International Whaling Commission (ICRW, 1946). In much of the developing world, the use of the word nature sanctuary (both terrestrial and marine) is becoming problematic as people rebel against what they view as elitist or exclusionary protected areas that provide safe havens for nature and tourists who can buy access, but at the same time provide no beneﬁts to local residents. The term ‘reserve’ may also elicit negative reactions where communities sense that something is being taken away from them in order to reserve resources and rights for others (Milon et al., 1997). This reaction is a severe handicap for biosphere reserves, which promote exactly the opposite approach! Attempts to limit access to these resources, especially ﬁshing rights, has the potential to disrupt the socio-economic stability of coastal communities and result in conﬂict among user groups with competing interests over the same limited resources. Although the scientiﬁc evidence supporting more restrictive access management strategies may be strong, access restrictions will not become a reality without signiﬁcant stakeholder support (deFontaubert et al., 1996; Agardy, 1997a). The diverse array of MPA goals, and their order of priority, varies enormously from place to place } so much so that one could almost say that every MPA is unique, having been tailored to meet the speciﬁc circumstances of the place where it is established. ‘Marine protected area’ should be used as a single, general umbrella term which can apply to the wide range of diﬀerent marine habitat protection strategies identiﬁed with each of a broadly accepted typology of terms mentioned previously. Beyond this, however, is the real imperative to focus on what needs to be accomplished for marine biodiversity conservation and then to use the most appropriate tool to achieve that end.

#### Standards

## T – Must Ban

#### Interpretation – Affs that advocate the establishment of a marine or coastal protected area must prohibit the extraction of living resources within the protected area

#### Standards –

#### 1. Approaches that don’t ban extraction preserve resource extraction in the long term by ensuring they are available for future generations

Rees 2 [William E. Rees, School of Community and Regional Planning, University of British Columbia. “Carrying Capacity and Sustainability: Waking Malthus’s Ghost.” A chapter in ‘Introduction to Sustainable Development,’ edited by Bell, David V.J. and Cheung, Y. Annie, for Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS), EOLSS Publishers, Oxford, UK. publ. 2002. Accessed online 2.3.14 SW http://www.mountainskygroup2011.org/supreading/Rees.CarryingCapasityandSustainability-WakingMathusGhost.pdf] SW

1.2 Defining Sustainable Development On one level, ‘sustainable development’, like carrying capacity, seems like a simple idea. In its strongest form it recognizes that people and their economies are an integral part of nature and that they depend for their survival on a steady flow of goods and services – food, water, energy and mineral resources, a stable and predictable climate, etc. – from nature. From this perspective, deteriorating global ecological conditions are seen to pose a threat to human physical well-being and ultimately to geopolitical security. Learning to live sustainably implies taking the measures necessary to ensure that all members of the human family can live satisfying lives within the means of nature (i.e., within the long-term carrying capacity of the earth). Many international scientific and non-governmental organizations concur with this double-barreled imperative. In Caring for the Earth (1991), the World Conservation Union (IUCN), the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) defined sustainable development as “improving the quality of human life while living within the carrying capacity of supporting ecosystems”. Similarly, in their brochure, Action for Global Sustainability, the Union of Concerned Scientists advocates that “humanity must learn to live within the limits of natural systems while ensuring an adequate living standard for all people”. The general idea was extended in 1987 when the United Nations’ World Commission on Environment and the Economy (the Brundtland Commission) published what has become the best- known definition of the sustainability concept: “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” This formulation recognized, that in making legitimate use of the earth, contemporary society has an obligation to leave adequate supplies of essential natural capital – nature’s resources and life support services – intact for use by future generations. In addition to living within ecological constraints and greater intragenerational equity, the Brundtland Commission thus advanced intergenerational equity as a criterion for sustainability.

#### In the case of renewable resources limiting extraction now allows living resource populations to grow, which increases resource extraction in the long run

#### 2 Impacts

#### It isn’t legitimate aff ground since it doesn’t conflict with resource extraction which the resolution requires the aff to do

#### It turns every possible neg argument which is based on why resource extraction is good – no one thinks it’s bad to protect the environment; harms only occur when it trades off with resource extraction, so if the aff doesn’t conflict with extraction there is literally no neg ground

#### 2. Non-prohibitive MPAs are aimed at sustainable resource extraction

Agardy 3 [(TUNDI AGARDY, Sound Seas; PETER BRIDGEWATER, UNESCO Man and the Biosphere Program; MICHAEL P. CROSBY, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; JON DAY, Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority; PAUL K. DAYTON, Scripps Institution of Oceanography; RICHARD KENCHINGTON, Maritime Policy Centre, University of Wollongong; DAN LAFFOLEY, English Nature, Peterborough; PATRICK McCONNEY, Caribbean Conservation Association; PETER A. MURRAY, Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, Environment and Sustainable Development Unit, Castries, Saint Lucia; JOHN E. PARKS, Biological Resources Program, World Resources Institute, Washington; and LELEI PEAU, Department of Commerce, Government of American Samoa, Pago Pago, American Samoa, USA) “Dangerous targets? Unresolved issues and ideological clashes around marine protected areas” AQUATIC CONSERVATION: MARINE AND FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEMS, Aquatic Conserv: Mar. Freshw. Ecosyst Jan 12] AT

The fact that MPAs can accomplish a broad range of objectives and have different meanings to different people, underscores the imperative that MPA planners and advocates work to clearly define targeted objectives for MPA networks and individual MPAs (Jones, 1994; Murray et al., 1999; Agardy, 2000a; Crosby et al., 2000b). Management intent and actions clearly depend upon the objectives for the area to be managed. Within a multiple use MPA, no-take areas are obviously managed differently from those areas aimed at resource utilization. In some MPAs, conservation will be the primary motivating force for a restrictive access strategy. In others, the most important objective may be the preservation of traditional use, sustainable use of a particular resource, or a combination of these. Large multiple use MPAs may be designed to achieve a broad range of objectives for the purposes of ecosystem-based management, where the limits of protection in a geographical sense are based on the extent of movements of organisms and physically linked processes (Eichbaum et al., 1996; Agardy, 1999b). Because specific circumstances vary so widely around the world, no model for MPA management objectives will be universally applicable. Management objectives should be tailored to address the specific ecological, cultural and socio-economic problem(s) that the MPA is meant to address (Bridgewater and Coyne, 1997; Agardy, 2000a; Crosby et al., 2000b). First and foremost, MPA practitioners must recognize that the systems they are managing and studying include people and occasionally unique cultures. Cultural parameters are especially important to consider, and can be protected through MPAs, in areas having significant populations of indigenous peoples with traditional connections to the marine environment (Crosby et al., 2000b; Ward et al., 2001). MPAs that meet their objective(s) can encourage the creation of additional MPAs. The fishing sector’s attitudes toward MPAs in general, and ‘no-take’ fishery reserves in particular, may be changing over time (Agardy, 1999a, 2000b). MPA fisheries reserves introduced in New Zealand in 1977 faced vehement public opposition. However, 10 years later, 78% of the fishermen interviewed favoured designation of additional reserves (Ballantine (1989) in Bohnsack, 1992). A survey of community reactions toward MPAs in New Zealand suggests that community involvement, along with information dissemination, communication and compromise, are the primary strategies for reducing inter-group conflict in the MPA planning process (Wolfenden et al., 1994). Similar acceptance of the need for MPAs was recognized by fisheries organizations in the UK as long ago as 1992 (National Federation of Fishermen’s Organizations, 1992) when they proposed their use together with other measures in response to Government fisheries management proposals. The key to success and broad acceptance, whether for multiple use MPAs or no- take reserves, is a clear articulation of the management problem that the MPA is meant to solve. Such objective setting should be done with scientists working in concert with local communities, user groups, and management authorities}not by scientists in isolation.

#### 2 Impacts

#### A) This approach violates “when in conflict” – it is meant to reconcile growth and environmental protection

Hancock 11 [(Sebastian, School of Social and Political Science from University of Melbourne, works at Energy Targets Division at the Essential Services Commission) “A Right to a Decent Environment: Are Human Rights Sustainable?” slideshare] AT

Throughout the 1970s, and into the early 80s, this ‘growth versus the environment’ dichotomy polarised international debate.14 Of concern, particularly to developing countries, were the implications for justice that a limit to growth implied – industrial development had led to a standard of living in developed countries that others feared they would be prevented from obtaining.15 In response to such concerns the UN convened Bruntland Commission published Our "Common" Future in 1987,16 which advocated the normative framework of ‘sustainable development’ as a compromise between economic and social development on the one hand, and the requirements for sustained environmental protection on the other, now and into the future.17 The Commission defined sustainable development as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. Contained within the definition, as stated by the report, are two concepts – ‘needs’ and ‘limitations’. The former, to which ‘overriding priority should be given,’ specifies the meeting of the ‘essential needs of the world’s poor’ as the condition under which development is realised, while the later recognises the ‘limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs’. 18 Sustainable development, as one possible response to the limits to growth theorem, thus sought continuing industrial development of a level consistent with our ability to expand nature’s carrying capacity for that development.19 By its very nature then, the Bruntland Commission’s compromise between development and environmental protection can only go so far. For, as it is widely recognised amongst international actors, of the two concepts contained in the definition, development (needs) is afforded primacy over the requirements for sustainability (limitations). This is not surprising given that in 1986, one year prior to the publishing of Our"Common"Future, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Right to Development. It stated, in article 1, that the ‘right to development is an inalienable human right,’ and further, in article 2, that the ‘human person is the central subject of development’. 20 Furthermore, development conceived as material growth, as it is in Our"Common"Future, is intimately linked to the dominant structures of industrial society, which developed out of the overexploitation of environmental resources.21

#### “When in conflict” is key – anything else means they can co-opt all neg ground since it allows them to escape the conflict of a resolution which is where the neg gets all their offense.

#### B) Sustainable development requires PRIORITIZING development over environmental protection and meeting the needs of the poor

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#### This destroys the core neg ground on the topic which is about the importance of resource extraction for poor people who rely on it – econ disads don’t apply to all resources which vary in economic importance and ethics NCs don’t apply to the various approaches plans take. Ground is key to fairness since it ensures the neg’s ability to make arguments.

#### Text is an independent impact – it’s the only way for the neg to predict and prep against the aff since the only thing that constrains aff plans is the wording of the topic.

#### 3. Legitimate CP ground – they take the least controversial possible stance on this topic by limiting extraction as little as possible – ground is based on allowing more extraction, which the aff has already done. Their interp incentivizes counterplans that completely ban extraction which is illegitimate and worse for the aff since it shifts closer to environmental protection than the aff itself and kills aff ground – either the neg has zero counterplan ground, or the counterplans are illegitimate which hurts the aff.

#### Every author recognizes that the status quo is unsustainable – the literary discussion compares different approaches to fix it, so CP ground is key to the neg’s ability to access any argument and to have a relevant and nuanced discussion about different approaches that actually clashes with the aff.

## Tourism DA

### 1NC Tourism DA

#### Protected areas increase tourism

Simpson 3/3 [(David, thirty years’ experience in the hospitality, tourism and property industry having started his professional career in 1980 as a management trainee and department head working in a variety of operational roles) “How protected areas can reduce local poverty: the case of Costa Rica” Review of P. J. Ferraro, M. M. Hanauer. Quantifying causal mechanisms to determine how protected areas affect poverty through changes in ecosystem services and infrastructure. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. CABI March 2014] AT

The creation of protected areas is not often welcomed by local communities in developing countries, as it can prevent locals from accessing natural resources they have traditionally used, and restrict land clearance for agriculture in overpopulated areas. But when combined with development of other economic activities, it can sometimes benefit communities as well as the environment. In Costa Rica, new research published last week in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) suggests that protected natural areas reduced poverty by 16 percent in neighbouring communities, mainly by encouraging ecotourism. The authors - Ferraro and Hanauer - use data previously published in PNAS in 2010. Research by Andam et al. had created an asset-based poverty index from the 1973 and 2000 Costa Rican censuses, and measured the effects of protected areas on this index. They estimated that poverty indexes were, on average, 2.39 points lower in protected census tracts than they would have been in the absence of protection. In the current article, "Quantifying causal mechanisms to determine how protected areas affect poverty through changes in ecosystem services and infrastructure," Ferraro and Hanauer, examine three potential causes of poverty reduction linked to the establishment of protected areas: changes in tourism and recreational services changes in infrastructure including roads, health clinics and schools, and changes in ecosystem services such as the pollination and hydrological services a protected area may offer. They find that increased tourism accounts for two-thirds of the reduction in poverty caused by protected areas. Changes in infrastructure and land use had little effect on the poverty in surrounding communities. "Our goal was to show exactly how environmental protection can reduce poverty in poorer nations rather than exacerbate it, as many people fear," said Ferraro. "Our results suggest that by using existing data sets such as poverty estimates from census data, the impacts of conservation programs and policies on human populations can be better defined. Our findings may result in improved conservation programs and policies, and better impacts on the communities adjacent to these sites, locally and around the globe." Related literature A study by Snyman (2013) in Malawi examined the impact of ecotourism employment on poverty reduction, and the flow of ecotourism income into the villages adjacent to Liwonde National Park. Household spending patterns illustrate the flow of income from ecotourism into the local economy and the important impact of this on local socio-economic development. Suggestions for increasing local multiplier effects of ecotourism are put forward. Previously Snyman (2012) reported from study sites in Botswana, Malawi and Namibia on how income from ecotourism employment enabled enable households to invest in assets, education and "luxury" goods, which improved financial security and social welfare in remote, rural areas. A thorough analysis of the various factors impacting attitudes towards conservation and tourism showed that ecotourism employment positively affects attitudes, though level of education showed the largest impact. In a study from Kruger National Park, South Africa, it was found that isolated efforts from individual tourism companies have little tangible impact on the majority of people living in highly populated rural communities but impacts are substantial for the few people who directly benefit (Spenceley and Goodwin, 2007). Implications of these findings for future socio-economic initiatives through tourism, and options to increase net benefits to the poor are explored. Research in Uganda, where gorilla tourism brings large amounts of money into the country, gives a sometimes negative picture for effects on local communities. Tumusiime (2012) found serious inadequacies in the tourism revenue-sharing arrangement that severely constrain the potential for poverty reduction. This also reduces its potential local-support effect for conservation. It is suggested that a household bordering on the park foregoes on average about 6% of its annual income because of restrictions on access to forest resources and on average loses another 10% of its annual income as a result of damage caused by wildlife. Moreover, because of the problems in decision-making and the associated nepotism, tourism revenues often do not accrue to cost victims. Tumusiime and Vedeld (2012) conclude that although tourism revenue sharing is an appealing concept, and its oft-quoted logic of promoting conservation and rural development is difficult to ignore, it is challenging to plan and implement in competent ways. Papers on ecotourism in Costa Rica include Li Jing (2013), who examines the difficulties and principles of establishing sustainable ecotourism based on local communities. Sander (2012) discusses the importance of environmental education as a component of ecotourism using a case study of the Rara Avis ecolodge. Seales and Stein (2012) discuss relationships between commercial success of tourism ventures, conservation behaviour, and provision of benefits to local communities. Broadbent et al. (2012) examine land use change, ecotourism, biodiversity and socioeconomic status of local families around Costa Rica's Manuel Antonio National Park. Sekercioglu (2012) reports on environmental and economic impact of community-based bird monitoring programs in Costa Rica and Ethiopia.

#### Tourism has massive impacts on the environment – causes water shortages and controls the strongest internal link to their impacts

UNEP 99 [(United Nations Environmental Program) “Tourism's Three Main Impact Areas” 1999 is last date cited] AT

Negative impacts from tourism occur when the level of visitor use is greater than the environment's ability to cope with this use within the acceptable limits of change. Uncontrolled conventional tourism poses potential threats to many natural areas around the world. It can put enormous pressure on an area and lead to impacts such as soil erosion, increased pollution, discharges into the sea, natural habitat loss, increased pressure on endangered species and heightened vulnerability to forest fires. It often puts a strain on water resources, and it can force local populations to compete for the use of critical resources. Depletion of Natural Resources Tourism development can put pressure on natural resources when it increases consumption in areas where resources are already scarce. Water resources Water, and especially fresh water, is one of the most critical natural resources. The tourism industry generally overuses water resources for hotels, swimming pools, golf courses and personal use of water by tourists. This can result in water shortages and degradation of water supplies, as well as generating a greater volume of waste water.. In dryer regions like the Mediterranean, the issue of water scarcity is of particular concern. Because of the hot climate and the tendency of tourists to consume more water when on holiday than they do at home, the amount used can run up to 440 liters a day. This is almost double what the inhabitants of an average Spanish city use. Golf course maintenance can also deplete fresh water resources. In recent years golf tourism has increased in popularity and the number of golf courses has grown rapidly. Golf courses require an enormous amount of water every day and, as with other causes of excessive extraction of water, this can result in water scarcity. If the water comes from wells, overpumping can cause saline intrusion into groundwater. Golf resorts are more and more often situated in or near protected areas or areas where resources are limited, exacerbating their impacts. An average golf course in a tropical country such as Thailand needs 1500kg of chemical fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides per year and uses as much water as 60,000 rural villagers. Source: Tourism Concern Local resources Tourism can create great pressure on local resources like energy, food, and other raw materials that may already be in short supply. Greater extraction and transport of these resources exacerbates the physical impacts associated with their exploitation. Because of the seasonal character of the industry, many destinations have ten times more inhabitants in the high season as in the low season. A high demand is placed upon these resources to meet the high expectations tourists often have (proper heating, hot water, etc.). Land degradation Important land resources include minerals, fossil fuels, fertile soil, forests, wetland and wildlife. Increased construction of tourism and recreational facilities has increased the pressure on these resources and on scenic landscapes. Direct impact on natural resources, both renewable and nonrenewable, in the provision of tourist facilities can be caused by the use of land for accommodation and other infrastructure provision, and the use of building materials. Forests often suffer negative impacts of tourism in the form of deforestation caused by fuel wood collection and land clearing. For example, one trekking tourist in Nepal - and area already suffering the effects of deforestation - can use four to five kilograms of wood a day. Pollution Tourism can cause the same forms of pollution as any other industry: air emissions, noise, solid waste and littering, releases of sewage, oil and chemicals, even architectural/visual pollution. Air pollution and noise Transport by air, road, and rail is continuously increasing in response to the rising number of tourists and their greater mobility. To give an indication, the ICAO reported that the number of international air passengers worldwide rose from 88 million in 1972 to 344 million in 1994. One consequence of this increase in air transport is that tourism now accounts for more than 60% of air travel and is therefore responsible for an important share of air emissions. One study estimated that a single transatlantic return flight emits almost half the CO2 emissions produced by all other sources (lighting, heating, car use, etc.) consumed by an average person yearly. (Mayer Hillman, Town & Country Planning magazine, September 1996. Source: MFOE ). Transport emissions and emissions from energy production and use are linked to acid rain, global warming and photochemical pollution. Air pollution from tourist transportation has impacts on the global level, especially from carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions related to transportation energy use. And it can contribute to severe local air pollution. Some of these impacts are quite specific to tourist activities. For example, especially in very hot or cold countries, tour buses often leave their motors running for hours while the tourists go out for an excursion because they want to return to a comfortably air-conditioned bus. Noise pollution from airplanes, cars, and buses, as well as recreational vehicles such as snowmobiles and jet skis, is an ever-growing problem of modern life. In addition to causing annoyance, stress, and even hearing loss for it humans, it causes distress to wildlife, especially in sensitive areas. For instance, noise generated by snowmobiles can cause animals to alter their natural activity patterns. Solid waste and littering In areas with high concentrations of tourist activities and appealing natural attractions, waste disposal is a serious problem and improper disposal can be a major despoiler of the natural environment - rivers, scenic areas, and roadsides. For example, cruise ships in the Caribbean are estimated to produce more than 70,000 tons of waste each year. Today some cruise lines are actively working to reduce waste-related impacts. Solid waste and littering can degrade the physical appearance of the water and shoreline and cause the death of marine animals. In mountain areas, trekking tourists generate a great deal of waste. Tourists on expedition leave behind their garbage, oxygen cylinders and even camping equipment. Such practices degrade the environment with all the detritus typical of the developed world, in remote areas that have few garbage collection or disposal facilities. Some trails in the Peruvian Andes and in Nepal frequently visited by tourists have been nicknamed "Coca-Cola trail" and "Toilet paper trail". Sewage Construction of hotels, recreation and other facilities often leads to increased sewage pollution. Wastewater has polluted seas and lakes surrounding tourist attractions, damaging the flora and fauna. Sewage runoff causes serious damage to coral reefs because it stimulates the growth of algae, which cover the filter-feeding corals, hindering their ability to survive. Changes in salinity and siltation can have wide-ranging impacts on coastal environments. And sewage pollution can threaten the health of humans and animals. Aesthetic Pollution Often tourism fails to integrate its structures with the natural features and indigenous architectural of the destination. Large, dominating resorts of disparate design can look out of place in any natural environment and may clash with the indigenous structural design. A lack of land-use planning and building regulations in many destinations has facilitated sprawling developments along coastlines, valleys and scenic routes. The sprawl includes tourism facilities themselves and supporting infrastructure such as roads, employee housing, parking, service areas, and waste disposal. Physical Impacts Attractive landscape sites, such as sandy beaches, lakes, riversides, and mountain tops and slopes, are often transitional zones, characterized by species-rich ecosystems. Typical physical impacts include the degradation of such ecosystems. An ecosystem is a geographic area including all the living organisms (people, plants, animals, and microorganisms), their physical surroundings (such as soil, water, and air), and the natural cycles that sustain them. The ecosystems most threatened with degradation are ecologically fragile areas such as alpine regions, rain forests, wetlands, mangroves, coral reefs and sea grass beds. The threats to and pressures on these ecosystems are often severe because such places are very attractive to both tourists and developers. In industrial countries, mass tourism and recreation are now fast overtaking the extractive industries as the largest threat to mountain communities and environments. Since 1945, visits to the 10 most popular mountainous national parks in the United States have increased twelve-fold. In the European Alps, tourism now exceeds 100 million visitor-days. Every year in the Indian Himalaya, more than 250,000 Hindu pilgrims, 25,000 trekkers, and 75 mountaineering expeditions climb to the sacred source of the Ganges River, the Gangotri Glacier. They deplete local forests for firewood, trample riparian vegetation, and strew litter. Even worse, this tourism frequently induces poorly planned, land-intensive development. Source: People & the Planet Physical impacts are caused not only by tourism-related land clearing and construction, but by continuing tourist activities and long-term changes in local economies and ecologies. Physical impacts of tourism development Construction activities and infrastructure development The development of tourism facilities such as accommodation, water supplies, restaurants and recreation facilities can involve sand mining, beach and sand dune erosion, soil erosion and extensive paving. In addition, road and airport construction can lead to land degradation and loss of wildlife habitats and deterioration of scenery. In Yosemite National Park (US), for instance, the number of roads and facilities have been increased to keep pace with the growing visitor numbers and to supply amenities, infrastructure and parking lots for all these tourists. These actions have caused habitat loss in the park and are accompanied by various forms of pollution including air pollution from automobile emissions; the Sierra Club has reported "smog so thick that Yosemite Valley could not be seen from airplanes". This occasional smog is harmful to all species and vegetation inside the Park. (Source:Trade and Environment Database) Deforestation and intensified or unsustainable use of land Construction of ski resort accommodation and facilities frequently requires clearing forested land. Coastal wetlands are often drained and filled due to lack of more suitable sites for construction of tourism facilities and infrastructure. These activities can cause severe disturbance and erosion of the local ecosystem, even destruction in the long term. Marina development Development of marinas and breakwaters can cause changes in currents and coastlines. Furthermore, extraction of building materials such as sand affects coral reefs, mangroves, and hinterland forests, leading to erosion and destruction of habitats. In the Philippines and the Maldives, dynamiting and mining of coral for resort building materials has damaged fragile coral reefs and depleted the fisheries that sustain local people and attract tourists. Overbuilding and extensive paving of shorelines can result in destruction of habitats and disruption of land-sea connections (such as sea-turtle nesting spots). Coral reefs are especially fragile marine ecosystems and are suffering worldwide from reef-based tourism developments. Evidence suggests a variety of impacts to coral result from shoreline development, increased sediments in the water, trampling by tourists and divers, ship groundings, pollution from sewage, overfishing, and fishing with poisons and explosives that destroy coral habitat.

#### Water crises cause escalating global conflict

Rasmussen 11 [(Erik, CEO, Monday Morning; Founder, Green Growth Leaders) “Prepare for the Next Conflict: Water Wars” HuffPo 4/12] AT

For years experts have set out warnings of how the earth will be affected by the water crises, with millions dying and increasing conflicts over dwindling resources. They have proclaimed -- in line with the report from the US Senate -- that the water scarcity is a security issue, and that it will yield political stress with a risk of international water wars. This has been reflected in the oft-repeated observation that water will likely replace oil as a future cause of war between nations. Today the first glimpses of the coming water wars are emerging. Many countries in the Middle East, Africa, Central and South Asia -- e.g. Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, Kenya, Egypt, and India -- are already feeling the direct consequences of the water scarcity -- with the competition for water leading to social unrest, conflict and migration. This month the escalating concerns about the possibility of water wars triggered calls by Zafar Adeel, chair of UN-Water, for the UN to promote "hydro-diplomacy" in the Middle East and North Africa in order to avoid or at least manage emerging tensions over access to water. The gloomy outlook of our global fresh water resources points in the direction that the current conflicts and instability in these countries are only glimpses of the water wars expected to unfold in the future. Thus we need to address the water crisis that can quickly escalate and become a great humanitarian crisis and also a global safety problem. A revolution The current effort is nowhere near what is needed to deal with the water-challenge -- the world community has yet to find the solutions. Even though the 'water issue' is moving further up the agenda all over the globe: the US foreign assistance is investing massively in activities that promote water security, the European Commission is planning to present a "Blueprint for Safeguarding Europe's Water" in 2012 and the Chinese government plans to spend $600 billion over the next 10 years on measures to ensure adequate water supplies for the country. But it is not enough. The situation requires a response that goes far beyond regional and national initiatives -- we need a global water plan. With the current state of affairs, correcting measures still can be taken to avoid the crisis to be worsening. But it demands that we act now. We need a new way of thinking about water. We need to stop depleting our water resources, and urge water conservation on a global scale. This calls for a global awareness that water is a very scarce and valuable natural resource and that we need to initiate fundamental technological and management changes, and combine this with international solidarity and cooperation. In 2009, The International Water Management Institute called for a blue revolution as the only way to move forward: "We will need nothing less than a 'Blue Revolution', if we are to achieve food security and avert a serious water crisis in the future" said Dr. Colin Chartres, Director General of the International Water Management Institute. This meaning that we need ensure "more crop per drop": while many developing countries use precious water to grow 1 ton of rice per hectare, other countries produce 5 tons per hectare under similar social and water conditions, but with better technology and management. Thus, if we behave intelligently, and collaborate between neighbors, between neighboring countries, between North and South, and in the global trading system, we shall not 'run out of water'. If we do not, and "business as usual" prevails, then water wars will accelerate.

### MPA Link

#### MPAs increase tourism

Abate 9 [(Randall, Associate Professor, Florida A&M University College of Law. Professor Abate was a Visiting Associate Professor at Florida State University College of Law) “Marine Protected Areas as a Mechanism to Promote Marine Mammal Conservation: International and Comparative Law Lessons for the United States” OREGON LAW REVIEW Vol. 88, 255] AT

MPAs attract visitors to the coast in much the same way national parks attract tourists traveling on land.47 Tourists expect the marine life to be more available in MPAs than in nonprotected areas. If there were more no-take MPAs, food supply could increase and produce a corresponding increase in marine mammal populations, which, in turn, could make it more likely for tourists to encounter marine mammals.48 As a result, MPAs, especially no-take MPAs, can spark an increase in tourism “and in return bring prosperity to an area.”49

### A2 You Increase Tourism

#### It’s a perception-based link – creating protected areas allows the government to sell the region as a pristine wilderness to potential tourists – this is unique to protected areas; tourists don’t want to go to places inhabited and used by indigenous people

#### It’s a question of government promotion of tourism which only occurs in protected areas

Lascurain 96 [(Héctor Ceballos-Lascuráin, Mexican architect and environmentalist. He is currently the Director of Programme of the International Consultancy on Ecotourism (PICE), and is Special Adviser on Ecotourism to IUCN — The World Conservation Union.) “Tourism, ecotourism, and protected areas - 2. Tourism and the environment” IUCN] AT

But more and more governments are now actively promoting tourism to areas that are the best examples — usually protected areas — of their countries' biological and cultural riches. And in the USA, for example, it is not only the federal government that is committed to fostering tourism in protected areas. Alaska, the largest state in the Union — with 60% of the USA's national park acreage and 30% of all state-managed protected areas — lists both recreation and tourism along with protection of significant natural and cultural areas as the objectives of its state park system (Johannsen, 1992). The US Department of the Interior, through its National Park Service (NPS), is also assigning a high priority to nature tourism. For nearly 75 years, the NPS has been trying to ensure that US parks could be enjoyed by the public, and at the same time preserved for the equal enjoyment of future visitors. This is no small task. Yellowstone National Park for instance has been seen as a "pleasure ground" for the enjoyment of the travelling public ever since its creation in 1872. Annual recreation visits to the national park system exceeded 400 million in 1989 (making it the USA's biggest tourist attraction). Annual expenditure for operations, construction and land acquisition exceed US$1 billion each year. Recognizing the importance of tourism, the NPS therefore created a Tourism Department in 1981, the activities of which largely concern park manager training, communications and marketing (Milne, 1990). The NPS has also recognized the need for strengthening partnerships with the private sector. In Australia, the Tourism Commission of New South Wales is very much aware of the importance that national parks, state recreation areas and historic sites have as major tourist attractions. Its role is primarily to promote tourism in that state and to coordinate development of tourism-related ventures. But it is very mindful of the need to balance development of tourist assets with conservation of the very values that attract visitors. In 1989, the Commission reviewed its marketing operations. Rather than promoting regions such as the Golden West, the North West Country, or the South Coast, a product-oriented approach was adopted. This involved identifying those products of value to the consumer (through research), and then marketing them. One of the major product lines to be promoted was the "national parks experience" (Crombie, 1989). Tourism in protected areas is also becoming a particularly important component of government policy in many developing countries, since it has tremendous potential as a mechanism for helping to conserve the natural and cultural heritage. For example, in practically every Central American country, National Ecotourism Councils (NECs) have been set up to establish specific ecotourism policies and guidelines. NECs are made up of representatives of the various sectors involved in the ecotourism process: government (especially the tourism and environment boards), private sector, NGOs, university and research organizations, and local communities. The Councils provide these sectors with the opportunity to work together and take decisions jointly on tourism issues. In particular, the tourism and environmental bureaux, which prior to this, were in direct opposition, are now often able to harmonize their different objectives. It is quite likely that many other Latin American and other developing countries will also establish NECs. The Central American countries (with the assistance of WTO, UNDP and IUCN) also recently drew up a regional ecotourism strategy, for the entire Central American isthmus, as well as Mexico and the Caribbean. This strategy incorporates marketing, planning and regulation and is a sign of the trend towards regional approaches to trade. Tourism (including ecotourism) cannot ignore this trend and must explore international linkages and regional promotional strategies. In Central America, three projects of international scope with important ecotourism components have recently been carried out: Paseo Pantera, Mundo Maya and the WTO/UNDP Ecotourism Strategy for Central America (Ceballos-Lascuráin, 1993b). What are protected areas? Generally, a country's prime areas of natural and cultural interest have been assigned protected area status at national and sometimes also international level. Therefore, much tourism, and particularly ecotourism, involves visits to protected areas.

#### CP delinks the disad – indigenous communities would not agree to allow tourism

### A2 Plan Bans Tourism

#### If they did not speak to this issue in the plan they must allow tourism – it’s normal means

Spenceley 1/22 [(Dr Anna, Research Affiliate, School of Tourism and Hospitality at University of Johannesburg, tourism specialist, founder of Spenceley Tourism And Development) “Tourism” World Commission on Protected Areas] AT

For a century, the tourism use of protected areas has developed and increased. After 1945, the increase accelerated due to expanding populations, more affluence and greater availability of parks and protected areas. Worldwide, park managers adapted their policies and management structures as the use evolved. Many countries, for example Australia, Costa Rica, Kenya and New Zealand, attribute a significant portion of their tourism industry to protected area tourism. The size of the industry is so large that a vital public debate has emerged.

#### If the plan bans tourism they’re extra-topical since tourism is non-extractive – you should assume their plan text applies only to the topic if they didn’t explicitly address it in their 1AC

Traun 09 [Max Abensperg-Traun. Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management, Division for Nature Conservation and Species Protection, CITES Management Authority, Austria. “CITES, sustainable use of wild species and incentive-driven conservation in developing countries, with an emphasis on southern Africa.” Biological Conservation. 142 (2009) 948–963]

In the developing nations, use of wild-living natural resources by rural communities is rarely a choice but an economic imperative. Further, use can either be extractive or non-extractive. Extractive use may be lethal (e.g. through trophy hunting, logging, etc.) or through the collection of parts and derivatives without affecting the survival of the specimens involved (e.g. plant products). Non-extractive use refers to all varieties of nature-based tourism. Given the economic circumstances for affected rural communities, a dis- tinction between whether use of species is primarily subsistence or for primarily commercial purposes is largely inseparable and this paper

### A2 Tourism Solves Poverty---Top

#### TURN: Tourism kills growth in other sectors – negatively affects incomes in poor households.

Blake 8 [(Adam, University of Nottingham in the United Kingdom\_ “Tourism and Poverty Relief”. Annals of Tourism Research. 2008] At

Tourism consumption usually leads to increased output, prices and wages in the industries that sell products directly to tourists. Increases in wages in these industries mean that other industries pay higher wages in order to retain labor (the same applying to capital and capital earnings). This increases the costs and, therefore, prices for other products. The overall increase in domestic prices relative to foreign prices is an appreciation of the real exchange rate. This makes it harder for other industries to export, so output falls in other exporting industries. Industries that produce products not directly consumed by tourists or directly exported in significant volume experience a mix of effects. Some of these industries produce goods that are used in the supply chain of tourism industries and expand when tourism consumption expands. Other industries are linked to the supply chain of traditional export goods, and decline. Industries that are not linked to either tourism or other export activities are likely to have a small increase in demand, as domestic income levels and therefore consumption, rise (the induced effect); but also have increased costs because of the competition with tourism sectors for labor and capital. These industries may have small increases or decreases in output. Therefore poor households are likely to be negatively affected via the price channel; rising prices will reduce real income levels.

#### Revenue is distributed unevenly which kills economic benefits

Blake 8 [(Adam, University of Nottingham in the United Kingdom\_ “Tourism and Poverty Relief”. Annals of Tourism Research. 2008] At

Tourism may increase government revenues, but the distribution of the expenditure of the increased revenues is uncertain. The increased revenues are likely to be absorbed into the government deficit (or surplus) in the short run. In the longer run, governments may make discretionary decisions on how to reallocate this income stream; some reduce other taxes, some use the revenues to pay off foreign debts, while others increase spending.

### Dutch Disease

#### Tourism causes the Dutch Disease

Afandiyev 10 [(Emin, Indiana University-Purdue University Fort Wayne) “Causes of Dutch Disease and Ways to Deal with It: Literature Review” Last date cited Aug 2010] AT

Moreover it was found that boom in a tourism sector might have the similar impact on economy as a boom in natural sector, causing by that Dutch Disease. The economy of countries with recreational resources (sunny weather, beautiful nature, beaches, etc.) consists of 3 sectors. Tradable sector represents manufacturing, non-tradable sector represents service and production, and booming sector represents tourism. High profits in tourism sector increase average salary level in this sector. While in others sectors salary level remains the same. It causes shift of work force from tradable and non-tradable sectors to tourism sector, thus reducing productivity in a manufacturing sector. This makes country completely dependable on a tourism sector. For example, because of boom in tourism sector, in Spain, other sectors like agriculture and manufacturing heavily declined. It also caused a decrease in investments into research and development (R&D). As researches show tourism companies are less likely to investment in R&D. There is also evidence that hotel and catering businesses spend 0.715 percent of their profit on employee trainings and innovations, while this number equals to 6.8 in most businesses. The economic theory suggests that the worst scenario is when recreational resources will be depreciated. Recreational resources are nonrenewable type of resources; relying on them will not benefit a country in the long term. For the long time the idea was that resource abundance and sustained economic growth has negative correlation (Amy R. Poteete). However regulatory actions made by government of Botswana to prevent negative effects of Dutch Disease showed otherwise. When diamond mining began Botswana had not had either strong political legitimacy or strong state institutions. Politicians in Botswana wisely used macroeconomic tools to prevent development of Dutch Disease. One of these applications was keeping some money from investments abroad. Botswana kept some portion of money in foreign banks and invested the rest portion. By this action politicians could restrict inflow of foreign currency.

#### Dutch disease reduces development, makes economies vulnerable to price shocks, harms domestic production, and crushes other economic sectors

Paler 11 [(Laura, Prof of Pol Sci at Columbia) “The Subnational Resource Curse: Causes, Consequences and Prescriptions” Prepared for the Open Society Institute Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative (LGI) and the Revenue Watch Institute March] AT

Research on the resource … squeezes the lagging sector.

## Poverty DA

### 1NC

#### The aff increases poverty

Halbert 5 [(Deborah, Associate Professor of Political Science at Otterbein College) “Resistance is Fertile: The Commodification of Life and Environmental Protest in the 21stCentury” Jun9] AT

Mainstream environmental groups tended to ignore the plight of those living in highly polluted urban areas as they concentrated on protecting wilderness from human intervention and destruction. Unfortunately, environmental groups tended to define the protection of the environment against poor communities, many of whom needed access to the natural world to survive.9 The environmental alternative of preserving land and halting the more devastating forms of resource extraction tended to pit environmentalists against rural jobs. For those caught in the middle, the environmental option was not necessarily the best solution. How environmental protection and sustainable living for vast numbers of people around the world can be created is part of the response that has emerged as part of the environmental justice movement.10 In the urban context, poor inner-city areas are organizing to fight for a better environment by merging environmental and social justice issues, something that mainstream American environmental organizations were slow to address.11

#### Confirmed by empirics

López-Feldman 07, Alejandro, Jorge Mora, and J. Edward Taylor. "Does natural resource extraction mitigate poverty and inequality? Evidence from rural Mexico and a Lacandona Rainforest Community." Environment and Development Economics 12.02 (2007): 251-269

Our findings highlight the importance of income from natural resource extraction in alleviating poverty and income inequality in rural Mexico. Results show that the number of poor individuals increases 4.2% and inequality increases 2.4% when natural resource income is not taken into consideration. Inequality in the distribution of natural resource income is relatively high. Nevertheless, an unequally distributed income source may favor the poor. For example, welfare transfers are usually unequally distributed (most households do not receive them), but they are directed disproportionately at poor households. This is the case for natural resource income in all of our samples. A 10% increase in income from natural resources, other things being equal, reduces the Gini coefficient of total income inequality by 0.2% in Mexico. In the South-Southeast region and in Frontera Corozal, a 10% increase in natural resource income reduces the Gini coefficient by 0.36% and 0.11%, respectively.

#### Poverty is the root cause of environment destruction – this means they do not solve

Beckerman 96 [Beckerman, Wilfred, Emeritus Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford, and a former member of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution. “Through Green-Colored Glasses: Environmentalism Reconsidered.” publ. 1996.]

The main reason for …there are comparable statistics).

#### Poverty causes nuclear war.

Caldwell 2000 - Joseph George Caldwell, PhD (Statistics) Consultant in Statistics and Information Technology (“On Human Population, Global Nuclear War and the Survival of Planet Earth,” Foundation Website 10/26/00, <http://www.foundationwebsite.org/arti1000.htm> Accessed 7/10/13)

It would appear … to higher levels.

### Indigenous People

#### Resource extraction is a vital part of the cultural and social existence of indigenous communities

Kuokkanen 11 [(Rauna, Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science and Aboriginal Studies Program at the University of Toronto) “Indigenous Economies, Theoriesof Subsistence, and Women: Exploring the Social Economy Model for Indigenous Governance” U Nebraska Press] AT

This article considers the signiﬁcance of indigenous economic sys-tems in contemporary society. It argues that indigenous economic systems have to be taken into account much more systematically than thus far in considerations of indigenous governance. The article contends that indigenous economic systems need to play a more central role in envisioning and shaping meaningful, comprehensive, and sustainable systems of contemporary indigenous self-governance. If indigenous economies are not taken into account, there is a serious danger of losing the very identities that constitute indigenous peoples. Indigenous economies such as household production and subsistence activities extend far beyond the economic sphere: they are at the heart of who people are culturally and socially. These economies, including the practices of sharing, manifest indigenous worldviews characterized by interdependence and reciprocity that extend to all living beings and to the land. In short, besides an economic occupation, subsistence activities are an expression of one’s identity, culture, and values. They are also a means by which social networks are maintained and reinforced. The article consists of three sections. The first section discusses definitions and contemporary significance of subsistence and indigenous economies. It questions the prevailing narrow, economistic analyses and interpretations of subsistence. Although economic development projects such as resource extraction may improve fiscal independence and strengthen the economic base of indigenous communities, they also present serious threats to indigenous economies.7 The second section examines the relationship between subsistence and wage labor, particularly from the perspective of women. It also considers the “war on subsistence” waged by the development and modernization theories, which continue to contribute to views of subsistence as “primitive” and “premodern.” The third section takes a closer look at the often glossed over roles of indigenous women in subsistence activities. It questions the conventional binary economic roles of man-the-hunter versus womanthe-gatherer and argues for a broader lens when assessing economic roles and divisions of labor along gendered lines. The article concludes with an examination of indigenous economic systems and the concept of the social economy as a foundation for contemporary indigenous governance. subsistence and indigenous economies For many, the term “subsistence” carries negative connotations of primitive ways of life, a low standard of living, or “eking out” a wretched existence in conditions of poverty. For others, it refers to “primitive” societies of the past or rural communities in the developing world. As discussed below, however, these negative views of subsistence have a specific history stemming from discourses of development that have waged a war against subsistence and everything it represents. Subsistence is both an economic and a social system, encompassing various spheres of life that often are inseparable from one another. It is characterized by endless circulation of goods, services, and other products. Subsistence, sometimes also called domestic production, follows the seasonal cycle of available resources—it has also been called the “seasonal, integrated economy”—and it includes hunting, fishing, gathering, trapping, and “other activities which provide income in kind— food, heat, clothing, shelter, and a variety of other subsistence goods and services” consumed by and shared within the family and community.8 The Inuit Circumpolar Conference defines subsistence as a highly complex notion that includes vital economic, social, cultural and spiritual dimensions. . . . Subsistence means much more than mere survival or minimum living standards. It enriches and sustains Inuit communities in a manner that promotes cohesiveness, pride and sharing. It also provides an essential link to, and communication with, the natural world of which Inuit are an integral part.9 Indigenous economies refer to traditional and local economic systems of indigenous peoples. These systems include a variety of land-based small-scale economic activities and practices as well as sustainable resource management. Indigenous economies are often characterized by a subsistence mode of production. At the center of the economic activity is not the exchange for profit or competition but the sustenance of individuals, families, and the community. Surplus is shared at numerous festivals and ceremonies that maintain the social cohesion of the community but also bring prestige to those who give and share their wealth. The subsistence-oriented economy—including various contemporary versions of mixed economies—also ensures the continuation of the traditional social organization. Berger notes: “Subsistence activities link the generations and the extended family into a complex network of associations, rights, and obligations. This network both reflects and re-creates the social order and gives meaning and value to each person’s contributions and rewards.”10 The key principles of indigenous economies—sustainability and reciprocity—reflect land-based worldviews founded on active recognition of kinship relations that extend beyond the human domain. Sustainability is premised on an ethos of reciprocity in which people reciprocate not only with one another but also with the land and the spirit world. Indigenous economies are thus contingent upon a stable and continuous relationship between the human and natural worlds. Knowledge of taking care of that relationship has traditionally been an integral part of social, economic, as well as spiritual structures and practices. In other words, there is a crucial link between subsistence and indigenous knowledge. Eugene Hunn notes that indigenous or traditional ecological knowledge “is a consequence of subsistence-based production” and that “we cannot preserve the one without preserving the other.”11 Individuals and communities acquire special knowledge, skills, and a complex understanding of the local environment through their various subsistence activities. It is this knowledge that “enables the people to live directly from the land.”12 Thus, the protection and promotion of indigenous knowledge requires encouraging “the continuity of subsistence based communities where such knowledge is produced.”13 Besides sustainable practices, subsistence economy is based on customary law: Subsistence activities in Alaska are governed by unwritten laws and beliefs that ensure the survival of families and villages. They include codes of customs and behavior that ensure a proper spiritual relationship between humans and animals and conserve resources. They strictly define the rights and duties and the obligations and privileges of tribal members. These laws operate effectively without any system of patents, land titles, or restrictions except selfimposed restrictions that have their origin in the Natives’ age-old knowledge of and reliance on the natural world.14

### ---Colonialism Rule Util

#### Rule util is true:

#### Ends based standards should achieve their goals by creating inviolable rules rather than evaluate case-by-case scenarios.

Allan [JAMES PLUNKETT ALLAN. “Scepticism, Rights and Utility” Ratio Juris. Vol. 11 No. 4 December 1998 (413–24)] “However, deficiencies in Hare’s…immediate (or short-term) failings.”]

However, deficiencies in …short-term) failings.

#### Intuitions are key-

#### All ethical theories are based on intuitions – even modus ponens, or p leads to q, is an intuition, since there is no way to warrant it so we just accept it – if all moral theories are necessarily based on intuitions, moral theories have to be consistent with intuitions

#### Probability – the simplest framework is the most likely to be true since making additional assumptions increases the likelihood that the whole theory is flawed since only one assumption needs to be false for the whole theory to be false

#### Rule-util coheres with intuitions

Hooker [Brad Hooker. Philosophy Professor at the University of Reading. “Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality.” 2000]

Does rule-consequentialism accord …special duties are plausible.)

#### 2 Reasons indigenous impacts matter most under rule util

#### Cultural vitality is key to resisting colonialism

Kortright 3 [(Chris, Sessional Lecturer and Adjunct Professor of Anthropology, University of California) “Colonization and Identity” The Anarchist Library Jan 1] AT

Colonization and Identity Those …equality, liberty, and mutual aid.

#### The colonial project results in violent genocide

Jayan Nayar, [Professor in the School of Law at the University of Warwick, 1999 “Orders of Inhumanity”, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, Fall, Lexis]

Despite the vision of …much frenzied trumpeting.

#### 2. Social injustice is the root of mass-scale violence

Scheper-Hughes 4 (Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn) (Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at …reversed feelings of victimization).

### More Impacts

#### That turns climate stability and causes extinction.

Robock and Slanina 9 – Prof Climatology @ Rutgers, Alan, Head of Environmental Research @ Netherlands Energy Research Foundation, Sjaak, "Nuclear winter." In: Encyclopedia of Earth. Eds. Cutler J. Cleveland http://www.eoearth.org/article/Nuclear\_winter

Nuclear winter is a …a nuclear environmental catastrophe.

#### Poverty kills millions

Abu-Jamal 98 – Mumia Abu-Jamal, prominent social activist and author, quotes James Gilligan, American psychiatrist and author, director of mental health for the Massachusetts prison system, President of the International Association for Forensic Psychotherapy. (“A Quiet and Deadly Violence,” Al-Ahram Online Sept 19 1998, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/400/in5.htm> Accessed 7/10/13 AT)

We live, equally immersed…decade, throughout the world.

#### Poverty causes terrorism – provides recruits

Japan Times 10/7 [“Eradicating terrorism in Africa”] AT

Afour-day terrorist …sell to urban areas.

#### Bioterrorism causes extinction—no barriers to use and terrorists pursuing now

### 2N Weighing

#### We have the strongest link to poverty –

#### 1. Poor communities are already on the brink now and rely on resources for their livelihood – my impact evidence is about falling into total destitution and not being able to find enough to eat at all so I have the strongest link to the impact

#### 2. My impact happens faster – as soon as the plan is implemented millions of people starve, whereas rebuilding animal populations requires generations to occur, which occurs after the communities have already been devastated by poverty and isn’t relevant to them

# Community CP

## General

### Top level

#### Aff-specific text – the [gov of the country] should establish Locally-managed Marine Areas in [insert location]

#### This involves local management but removes permanent protected areas so it’s mutually exclusive – also all the disads prove why protected areas are bad which means it competes through net benefits.

#### MPAs are failing now – top-down approaches fail because they do not involve local communities. LMMAs perform better with no government interference, multiple examples prove.

Nava et al 2011 [Héctor Nava & M. Teresa Ramírez-Herrera, Center for Research in Environmental Geography, National Autonomous University of Mexico “Government conservation policies on Mexican coastal areas: is "top-down" management working?” Rev. biol. trop vol.59 no.4 San José dic. 2011]

Anthropogenic causes of coral reef degradation are extending along tropical seas, and they are one of the main coral reef threats in coastal areas with poorly planned development. In the Caribbean, for example, indicators of coral reef degradation have coincided with our results: low coverage of living corals, high algae coverage, and high abundance of species indicative of high sedimentation rates are typical in Marine Protected Areas with low governability and community involvement (Camargo et al. 2009). Integrated terrestrial and underwater landscape assessment of both Caleta de Chon and Manzanillo Beach shows their high landscape value and conservation potential, outlining the need for a holistic approach in conservation and management strategies (Ramírez-Herrera et al. 2010). Some difficulties to meet NPAs objectives in "topdown" strategies include the integration of conservation policies at the different government levels that have their own strategies and different jurisdictions (Fig. 1). Moreover, the consolidation of collaborative links with local inhabitants, who usually depend upon natural resources, becomes a recurrent challenge to attain conservation objectives under "top-down" policies around the world (White et al. 1994, Cinner & Pollnac 2004, Bezaury- Creel 2005, McClanahan et al. 2006, Tran 2006, Rodríguez-Martínez 2008, Camargo et al. 2009). In México, Federal and Municipal jurisdictions comprise a frequent barrier to accomplish conservation objectives (Fig. 1). While marine areas are under the jurisdiction of Federal authorities (e.g. SEMARNAT), coastal Ecological Reserves in Zihuatanejo are under Municipal jurisdiction by the Zihuatanejo Bay Fideicomiso (FIBAZI 2005) that exerts the faculty to create and modify the status of Ecological Reserves in order to meet local urban needs. Although both Federal and Municipal administrations can be not coordinated, they are similar in the fact that often they operate ignoring adjacent ecosystems (e.g. terrestrial and marine) and involvement of local communities. Our results on coral reef state of conservation show that this approach is proven inadequate to accomplish complete conservation objectives. Moreover, the use of natural spaces needs to be analyzed considering all their economic, sociological, geological, landscape and ecological aspects. Participation of local communities has been significant in the success of NPA’s conservation objectives (Mascia 2003, McClanahan et al. 2006, Tran 2006, Rodríguez-Martínez 2008). It has been generally recognized that conventional, "top-down" coastal protection and management approaches do not meet the needs of communities in developing countries (Cohelo & Manfrino 2007, Harborne et al. 2008, Camargo et al. 2009, Stamieszkin et al. 2009). It is also recognized that in countries where a substantial share of the Earth’s marine biodiversity is found, top-down coastal protection and management efforts are too costly, both financially and in terms of scarce human resources, to be of much practical value for broad-scale national application (Govan et al. 2008). Recent studies advocate for the move from "top-down" (state or agency control) to more "bottom-up" (controlled by local communities) or locally-managed approaches for coastal protection and management, particularly in situations where little data are available (White et al. 1994, 2000, Johannes 1998a, b, Pomeroy & Rivera-Guieb 2006, Ramírez-Herrera et al. 2010). This case has been confirmed in the Philippines and New Guinea, where marine resources (valuable commercial species) were more abundant in locally managed areas, without the intervention of government and market initiatives (McClanahan et al. 2006). This joint or ‘comanagement’ leads to better-informed decision taking, as traditional knowledge and local sources of information are integrated in such processes (White et al. 2000, Cinner et al. 2005, McClanahan et al. 2006, Walker et al. 2006). This approach also promotes enforcement and adaptive management of marine resources by and for the local users (Govan et al. 2008). ¶ In the Pacific Ocean, the sustainable use of marine protected areas and reserves is being strengthened by application, modification, and merging of contemporary marine protection efforts with traditional conservation practices through a process of Community-Based Adaptive Management (CBAM). CBAM, in the simplest terms, is a management cycle whereby local stakeholders make a plan, implement the plan, check how it is going, revise the plan (if necessary), and carry on. The outcome is now commonly described as "locally-managed marine areas (LMMA)". LMMAs are areas of near shore waters that, together with their coastal resources, are largely or wholly managed at a local level by the coastal communities, landowning groups, partner organizations, and/or collaborative government representatives who reside or are based in the immediate area (White et al. 2000, Cinner et al. 2005, McClanahan et al. 2006, Walker et al. 2006). LMMAs differ from what is commonly known as a Marine Protected Area (MPA) in that LMMAs are characterized by local ownership and/or control, whereas MPAs are typified by top-down management approaches (LMMA Network 2008). Our results on coral reef state of conservation and landscape value in Zihuatanejo demonstrate that current "top-down" conservation policies do not support sustainable methods for ecosystem conservation in coastal areas subjected to increased urban development. Coral reefs conservation would require mitigation initiatives be taken in Zihuatanejo. First, land urbanization that encourages deforestation must be forbidden. This way soil erosion could be considerable reduced on this coastal area. Second, recreational scuba and snorkeling activities must be controlled and regulated by local stakeholders. Third, the carrying capacity of coral reefs must be considered in any coastal projects and resource use plans, and strategies for resource use must be developed involving the local community (Hawkins & Roberts 1997, Zakai & Chadwick-Furman 2002, Barker & Roberts 2004). Finally, such information must be provided to the local community and choices of resource use must be taken by the local community, considering that resultant initiatives must be a complement of the complex livelihood strategies of local stakeholders (Cinner & Pollnac 2004). Successful LMMA experiences strongly suggest that this approach must be promoted more extensively to manage effectively marine resources leading towards healthy ecosystems, abundant fish and other marine resource stocks, sustainable fisheries, and vibrant human communities.

#### This also proves mutual exclusivity – LMMAs require ownership of the resources which conflicts with public restrictions used in MPAs.

#### The Nava evidence outweighs

#### Their studies analyze regional areas’ effectiveness but this evidence proves the problem occurs when regional areas are scaled up to a national level like the plan – their evidence doesn’t prove the plan is effective

#### It cites multiple studies to confirm that MPAs fail and LMMAs are better which is better since it brings in a wider range of evidence that applies to more cases and is independently verified by multiple methodologies so it’s more accurate

### A2 LMMAs Aff

#### Either they include government action, which all the card I’ve read are a disad to, or they don’t include enforcement by government, and they’re not topical – this is true because “country” requires them to defend the government of a country

Rosenberg 11 [(Matt, award-winning professional geographer; former adjunct university faculty member in geography, city planning and GIS intern for local government; newspaper columnist; disaster manager for the American Red Cross; awarded the Excellence in Media Award from the National Council for Geographic Education; master's degree in geography from California State University, Northridge; member of the Association of American Geographers and the National Council for Geographic Education) “Country, State, and Nation” October 5] AT

While the terms country, state, and nation are often used interchangeably, there is a difference. A State (note the capital "S") is a self-governing political entity. The term State can be used interchangeably with country. A nation, however, is a tightly-knit group of people which share a common culture. A nation-state is a nation which has the same borders as a State.

#### Key to neg ground – it’s based in politics and government obligations NCs which are the only stable neg ground

### Explanation/competition

#### CP’s mutually exclusive – here’s an explanation of why all the disads are net benefits

Kareiva 06 [Peter Kareiva, Chief scientist for The Nature Conservanc “Conservation Biology: Beyond Marine Protected Areas” Current Biology. Volume 16, Issue 14, 25 July 2006.]

As they report in this issue of Current Biology, Tim McClanahan of **the W**ildlife **C**onservation **S**ociety and colleagues [4] have **just completed** the most compelling **multi-site** comparison **of different approaches to** marine **conservation, including marine protected areas, yet** to be conducted. They contrast three different marine conservation approaches, two of which represent a form of marine protected area. The two marine protected area approaches are either traditional ‘top-down’ government established National Parks, or ‘bottom-up’ co-management agreements in which local communities and non-governmental organisations enforce no-fishing zones. **The alternative to m**arine **p**rotected **a**reas t**ook the form of community-based fishery management without permanent protected** areas, but with a wide variety of temporary restrictions on fishing effort. **The analysis** by McClanahan's team [4] **was** **applied** only **to coral reefs and thus benefited from having a common ecosystem as a baseline**.

### Biomass Study

#### A direct comparison proves that locally managed areas perform better than MPA’s by a margin of 40% more biodiversity versus 2%

Kareiva 06 [Peter Kareiva, Chief scientist for The Nature Conservanc “Conservation Biology: Beyond Marine Protected Areas” Current Biology. Volume 16, Issue 14, 25 July 2006.]

As they report in this issue of Current Biology, Tim McClanahan of **the Wildlife Conservation Society** and colleagues [4] have **just completed** the most compelling **multi-site** comparison **of different approaches to** marine **conservation, including marine protected areas, yet** to be conducted. They contrast three different marine conservation approaches, two of which represent a form of marine protected area. The two marine protected area approaches are either traditional ‘top-down’ government established National Parks, or ‘bottom-up’ co-management agreements in which local communities and non-governmental organisations enforce no-fishing zones. **The alternative to m**arine **p**rotected **a**reas t**ook the form of community-based** fishery **management without permanent protected areas**, but with a wide variety of temporary restrictions on fishing effort. The analysis by McClanahan's team [4] was applied only to coral reefs and thus benefited from having a common ecosystem as a baseline. These studies took place in Indonesia and Papua New Guinea ( Figure 1), areas that have suffered from overfishing and destructive blast fishing, and that are noted for tremendous biodiversity as well as economically valuable fisheries. **Other conservation scientists have attempted to draw generalizations by comparing management approaches as reported by different research teams and using different methods [5]. But this is the first time that different management approaches** applied to several different coral reefs **have** **been examined by a** standardized **and common** approach. Within each management area or its paired matched control site, fish were sampled along transects and data were analyzed so that fish biomass was effectively a measure of catch per unit effort. Nonetheless, the comparisons between coral reefs made by McClanahan and colleagues [4] are apples and oranges. The standard National Park protected areas were large (6,600–111,625 hectares), whereas the community-managed areas were small (33–58 hectares), and the co-managed protected areas were also small (12–60 hectares). Keeping in mind the confounding effect of size, however, **the results are astonishing**. The measure selected to quantify effectiveness was **the percent increase in total biomass for targeted fish** inside the managed area compared to outside the management area. This increase never exceeded 10% for the large National Park protected areas, and **was** typically dismally low **(averaging less than 2%** over four different National Parks). Small co-managed marine protected areas did much better — averaging over a 15% increase in fish biomass for a collection of four of these ‘bottom-up’ marine protected areas. **The** small **community management areas without any permanent protection or harvest closures did best by far —** averaging **over a 40% increase in the targeted fish biomass** as compared to outside the management zone. Clearly there are problems with these analyses. The contrasts are inside versus outside management areas after the management areas were established. To be rigorous, one really needs data comparing inside versus outside, before and after the management areas were established. Secondly, even if there is more fish biomass inside the management areas, that does not speak to benefits flowing to the fishery community.¶ In spite of its limitations, **the** McClanahan et al. [4] **study is compelling** because it draws our attention to the most important aspect of marine conservation — the social context. In addition to collecting biological data on targeted fish, the researchers also collected socioeconomic data on the stakeholders and local communities interacting with the marine protected areas or management zones. The National Park marine protected areas tended to have low compliance, were not in sight of any village, and had well over 80% of the harvested fish sold to market. In contrast, the community-based management areas without marine protected areas were all in sight of local villages and averaged only 35% of the fish being sold to market (the rest being used by the fishermen's households and families). Using all eleven fishery management areas and categorizing each management effort in terms of socioeconomic attributes produced a clear picture of the factors that lead to effectiveness. Higher visibility of reserves to local communities and higher compliance were associated with higher overall increases in fish biomass. There are no surprises there. On the other hand, larger human populations, a greater percentage of fish sold to market, a greater percentage of households involved in salaried employment, and greater local wealth made it less likely that the management areas would be effective. If one wanted to develop a narrative about these indicators, it seems that the best managers of fisheries are the poorer communities that depend upon fish for their own food source, compared to wealthier communities that exploit fisheries for economic gains and may not reside in close proximity to the managed areas.

Prefer my study because

#### it is the only study that creates a common baseline to directly compare marine conservation strategies – all other evidence is inapplicable and flawed

#### it’s comparative to the perm since it compares a co-managed MPA strategy to LMMAs

#### It compiles evidence from a variety of sources so it prevents flaws in singular data sets and is more comprehensive than their evidence

#### Reject their evidence if it only deals with co-managed approaches – this evidence contrasts the multiple approaches – if their evidence doesn’t directly compare the approaches this evidence delineates then it isn’t responsive

#### O/w McClanahan study

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As they report in this issue of Current Biology, Tim McClanahan of the Wildlife Conservation Society and colleagues [4] have just completed the most compelling multi-site comparison of different approaches to marine conservation, including marine protected areas, yet to be conducted. They contrast three different marine conservation approaches, two of which represent a form of marine protected area. The two marine protected area approaches are either traditional ‘top-down’ government established National Parks, or ‘bottom-up’ co-management agreements in which local communities and non-governmental organisations enforce no-fishing zones. The alternative to marine protected areas took the form of community-based fishery management without permanent protected areas, but with a wide variety of temporary restrictions on fishing effort. **The** analysis by McClanahan's team [4] **was** applied only to coral reefsand thus benefited from having a common ecosystem as a baseline. 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### Blackman Study---Forests

#### Mixed-used zones solve better – they have better actors and studies confirm their effectiveness

Blackman 14 [February 2014  RFF DP 14-03 Strict versus Mixed Use Protected Areas Guatemala’s Maya Biosphere Reserve Allen Blackman (Thomas Klutznick Senior Fellow)] RT

A number of studies based on simple comparisons of deforestation rates and anecdotal ¶ evidence conclude that within the MBR, the MUZ has been significantly more effective than the ¶ CPA in stemming deforestation and forest fires (Lundin 2010; Hughell and Butterfield 2008; ¶ Cronkleton et al. 2008; Nittler and Tschinkel 2005; Radachowsky et al. 2004). For example, ¶ Hughell and Butterfield (2008) present data indicating that between 1986-2007, the rate of ¶ clearing in the CPA was 20 times higher than in forest concessions inside the MUZ. ¶ Explanations for such findings often focus on differences in the management capacity and political will of the two sets of agents managing these zones: undermanned and underfunded ¶ state park authorities in the CPA and local entities in the MUZ, particularly local communities ¶ managing forest concessions. However, to my knowledge, the hypotheses that the MUZ has ¶ outperformed the CPA, and that this performance is attributable to community forestry, have yet ¶ to be subjected to rigorous analysis that controls for the non-random siting of the two policy ¶ regimes.1 ¶ To help fill that gap, this paper uses detailed spatial data—including high resolution land ¶ cover data derived from satellite images—along with statistical techniques that control for the nonrandom siting of policy regimes to generate estimates of the relative effectiveness of the CPA and MUZ, and the relative effectiveness of local community-led forest concessions within the MUZ. Our results run counter to the conventional wisdom that owing to a reliance on forest concessions managed by local communities, the MUZ has dramatically outperformed the CPA. By contrast, we find that the MUZ has been only slightly more effective than the CPA. In addition, we find the effectiveness of the MUZ is attributable the strong performance of non-concession land and concessions managed by entities other than local communities.

#### Mixed-use areas perform better than protected areas – all previous studies use flawed data

Blackman 14 [February 2014  RFF DP 14-03 Strict versus Mixed Use Protected Areas Guatemala’s Maya Biosphere Reserve Allen Blackman (Thomas Klutznick Senior Fellow)] RT

¶ Although protected areas, or “parks”, are among the leading policy tools used to stem tropical ¶ deforestation, rigorous evaluations of their effectiveness—that is, evaluations that control for the tendency of parks to be sited in remote areas with relatively little deforestation—have only recently begun to appear. An important open question is how the stringency of protection mediates park effectiveness: how do mixed use parks that allow sustainable extractive activities perform relative to strictly protected parks? In addressing this question, it is particularly important to control for park siting since different management regimes tend to be sited in areas with different preexisting characteristics. To date, most rigorous studies of this issue have focused on scores of parks in one or multiple countries, a strategy that in principle could be undermined by unobserved park heterogeneity. This paper uses high resolution land cover data derived from satellite images along with statistical techniques that control for non-random siting to examine the relative effectiveness of mixed use and strict protection in a single large park: the two million hectare Maya Biosphere Reserve (MBR) in Guatemala. Our results run counter to the ¶ conventional wisdom that owing to a reliance on forest concessions managed by local communities, mixed use protection in the MBR has dramatically outperformed strict protection. By contrast, we find that mixed use protection has been only slightly more effective than strict protection. In addition, we find the effectiveness of the mixed use protection is attributable to the strong performance of non-concession land and concessions managed by entities other than local communities.

#### Only our evidence is comparative – it post-dates theirs and compares its methodology to previous studies explicitly. Reject evidence comparison that isn’t done in the evidence itself – it’s the only evidence comparison done by the experts themselves which is much more valid since only they have a background in complex and field-specific statistical analysis – other evidence comparison will not be in-depth and don’t deeply analyze how certain aspects of methodology affect the study’s validity

#### All their studies are flawed since they don’t account for confounding factors

Blackman 14 [February 2014  RFF DP 14-03 Strict versus Mixed Use Protected Areas Guatemala’s Maya Biosphere Reserve Allen Blackman (Thomas Klutznick Senior Fellow)] RT

A common feature of all of these studies is that they have an expansive geographic scale: ¶ each analyzes scores of parks in multiple countries, an entire country, or a large part of one. This ¶ approach certainly has advantages—variation across parks helps identify the effect of protection ¶ types. But it also has disadvantages. Variation in unobserved drivers of deforestation across large ¶ areas can bias identification. For example, say strictly protected parks in a certain country are ¶ located in areas with tree species that have relatively low stumpage values and where regulatory resources for the ¶ enforcement of land use change restrictions is relatively stringent. Furthermore, say these ¶ characteristics are unobserved. In an econometric evaluation, these unobserved confounding factors could drive a finding that strict protection outperforms mixed use protection, even after controlling for observed confounding factors such as distance to population centers. In principle, a smaller geographic scale—within which there is likely to be less spatial variation in such unobserved confounding factors—could mitigate this problem.

#### Only our evidence avoids selection bias by using a control group – their evidence cherry-picks data to build a contrived conclusion

Blackman 14 [February 2014  RFF DP 14-03 Strict versus Mixed Use Protected Areas Guatemala’s Maya Biosphere Reserve Allen Blackman (Thomas Klutznick Senior Fellow)] RT

As noted above, the main challenge we face in attempting to accurately measure the effect on deforestation of the CPA, the MUZ, and various policies within the MUZ, is that these management regimes were not randomly sited. Rather, as illustrated below, plots of land with certain pre-existing climatological, geophysical, and socioeconomic characteristics were disproportionately selected into different regimes. Therefore, measuring the effect on deforestation of each regime by simply comparing the average deforestation rate for plots subjected to that regime and for a control group of plots not subjected to it—with the latter average serving as the counterfactual, that is, what would have happened absent the regime—is likely to generate a biased result. To control for such selection bias, we use a covariate matching estimator (Appendix 1). That is, following Andam et al. (2008) and Joppa and Pfaff (2010a) among others, we construct a sample of matched control plots outside of a treatment area—alternatively, the CPA, the MUZ, and various parts of the MUZ—that are very similar to the plots inside the treatment area in terms of observable characteristics that affect deforestation. We measure each policy regime's impact as the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT)—the difference between the average rate of deforestation on plots in the treatment area and on the sample of matched control plots outside of that area.

#### [conclusion of the article]

Blackman 14 [February 2014  RFF DP 14-03 Strict versus Mixed Use Protected Areas Guatemala’s Maya Biosphere Reserve Allen Blackman (Thomas Klutznick Senior Fellow)] RT

Past evaluations of the MBR have found that MUZ is a very significant deterrent in ¶ deforestation in the MBR while the CPA has a much smaller effect (Lundin 2010; Hughell and ¶ Butterfield 2008; Cronkleton et al. 2008; Nittler and Tschinkel 2005; Radachowsky et al. 2004). ¶ Moreover, they have attributed the MUZ’s superior performance to differences between the ¶ CONAP rules and standards in the two zones, and in particular to the agency’s reliance on ¶ community forest concessions in the MUZ. The policy implication is that in at least some ¶ situations, mixed use protection, and in particular mixed use protection managed by local ¶ communities, may be more effective strategy for conserving forests than strict protection. ¶ The premise of the present paper is that such attributions and the policy implications that ¶ flow from them are unreliable because they do not control for the nonrandom siting of the MUZ ¶ and CPA that may have resulted in the two policy zones facing very different deforestation ¶ pressures for reasons that have little, or nothing, to do with CONAP policies. Simple summary ¶ statistics demonstrate that there are indeed significant differences in the pre-existing ¶ climatological, geophysical, and socioeconomic characteristics of the average unprotected, ¶ MUZ, and CPA plot. As noted above, research has long established that such factors have ¶ significant effects on deforestation (Boucher et al. 2011; Chomitz 2007; Kaimowitz and ¶ Angelson 1998). We have used covariate matching to control for these confounding factors. ¶ Having done that, our results run counter to the received wisdom about the MUZ and ¶ CPA. We find that the MUZ has had a far more modest effect on deforestation than commonly ¶ believed and one that is only slightly greater than that of the CPA. Specifically, we find that ¶ between 2001-2006, the MUZ cut deforestation by roughly five percentage points, which is significant to be sure, but only one-half to one-third of the effect generated by naïve estimators. ¶ These MUZ effects are only about a fifth larger than those for the CPA. Finally, we find that, ¶ contrary to conventional wisdom, the effect of the MUZ on deforestation is not attributable to the ¶ use of concessions granted to resident communities, which had no measurable effect on 2001-¶ 2006 deforestation. Rather, the policy areas inside the MUZ with the strongest track record of ¶ cutting deforestation were non-resident and industrial forest concessions, and areas with no ¶ concessions at all. ¶ Our results add to the thin but quickly growing body of rigorous evidence on the ¶ deforestation effects of strict versus mixed use protection in developing countries. As noted ¶ above, to our knowledge, ours is among the first case studies that control for the nonrandom ¶ siting of strict and mixed use protection focusing on a single park or small set of parks..

### Adaptive Management Key

#### Only our approach solves – a permanent MPA approach that cannot be changed over time fails

Agardy 3 [(TUNDI AGARDY, Sound Seas; PETER BRIDGEWATER, UNESCO Man and the Biosphere Program; MICHAEL P. CROSBY, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; JON DAY, Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority; PAUL K. DAYTON, Scripps Institution of Oceanography; RICHARD KENCHINGTON, Maritime Policy Centre, University of Wollongong; DAN LAFFOLEY, English Nature, Peterborough; PATRICK McCONNEY, Caribbean Conservation Association; PETER A. MURRAY, Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, Environment and Sustainable Development Unit, Castries, Saint Lucia; JOHN E. PARKS, Biological Resources Program, World Resources Institute, Washington; and LELEI PEAU, Department of Commerce, Government of American Samoa, Pago Pago, American Samoa, USA) “Dangerous targets? Unresolved issues and ideological clashes around marine protected areas” AQUATIC CONSERVATION: MARINE AND FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEMS, Aquatic Conserv: Mar. Freshw. Ecosyst Jan 12] AT

1. While conservationists, resource managers, scientists and coastal planners have recognized the broad applicability of marine protected areas (MPAs), they are often implemented without a ﬁrm understanding of the conservation science } both ecological and socio-economic } underlying marine protection. The rush to implement MPAs has set the stage for paradoxical diﬀerences of opinions in the marine conservation community. 2. The enthusiastic prescription of simplistic solutions to marine conservation problems risks polarization of interests and ultimately threatens bona ﬁde progress in marine conservation. The blanket assignment and advocacy of empirically unsubstantiated rules of thumb in marine protection creates potentially dangerous targets for conservation science. 3. Clarity of deﬁnition, systematic testing of assumptions, and adaptive application of diverse MPA management approaches are needed so that the appropriate mix of various management tools can be utilized, depending upon speciﬁc goals and conditions. Scientists have a professional and ethical duty to map out those paths that are most likely to lead to improved resource management and understanding of the natural world, including the human element, whether or not they are convenient, politically correct or publicly magnetic. 4. The use of MPAs as a vehicle for promoting long-term conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity is in need of focus, and both philosophical and applied tune ups. A new paradigm arising out of integrated, multi-disciplinary science, management and education/outreach eﬀorts must be adopted to help promote ﬂexible, diverse and eﬀective MPA management strategies. Given scientiﬁc uncertainties, MPAs should be designed so one can learn from their application and adjust their management strategies as needed, in the true spirit of adaptive management. 5. It is critical for the conservation community to examine why honest diﬀerences of opinion regarding MPAs have emerged, and recognize that inﬂexible attitudes and positions are potentially dangerous. We therefore discuss several questions } heretofore taken as implicit assumptions: (a) what are MPAs, (b) what purpose do MPAs serve, (c) are no-take MPAs the only legitimate MPAs, (d) should a single closed area target be set for all MPAs, and (e) how should policymakers and conservation communities deal with scientiﬁc uncertainty? The need for increased protection of the world’s marine environment has been the source of much recent scientiﬁc consideration (ICRS, 2000; National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis, 2001; Society of Conservation Biology, and Marine Conservation Biology Institute [SCB/MCBI], 2001). To that end, marine protected areas (MPAs) are fast becoming a mainstream management tool for conserving biodiversity in virtually all the world’s oceans and seas. Several international, national and local level initiatives and mechanisms serve to advance MPAs as vehicles for promoting the long-term conservation and sustainable use of marine resources and biodiversity (Agardy, 1997a; Crosby et al., 2000b; National Research Council, 2001). The ﬁrst marine protected areas were proclaimed early in the 20th century. Silva et al. (1986) listed 430 marine protected areas created by 1985 but most of those covered relatively small coastal areas. By 1995, there were at least 1306 subtidal marine protected areas worldwide, with a median size of 1584 h (Kelleher et al., 1995). This ﬁgure is now likely a signiﬁcant under-estimate given rapid and accelerating progress in MPA establishment, with virtually every coastal country having implemented some form of MPA. Sectors of society that once opposed such habitat protection have now begun to embrace their use as resulting beneﬁts for conservation and broader societal interests become more evident (Ward et al., 2001; Agardy, in press). In promoting MPAs it is important that there is a good understanding of the conservation science underlying marine protection in terms of the factual foundation and long-term implications. Ignoring this may lead resource managers and policymakers to make ill-informed decisions regarding MPAs, resulting in poor MPA design and performance. We are concerned that signiﬁcant polarization of views regarding diﬀerent MPA management approaches is occurring, leading to discord and potentially impeding the use of MPAs to conserve marine biodiversity. As with many popular trends, the fervor to proclaim sometimes untenable policy prescriptions, the tendency to decree as many MPAs as possible, an eagerness to do so without a clear understanding of many of the complexities or balanced framework required, and a zealous ‘one size ﬁts all’ approach may inadvertently impede success. A policy backlash against the popular use of marine protection tools may loom at the time when MPAs are needed most.

### Community Key---Social Trust

#### Community involvement generates “social licensure,” which fosters greater cooperation and sustainable operations.

White 13 [Rob White (Professor of Criminology, School of Sociology and Social Work, University of Tasmania, Australia). “Resource Extraction Leaves Something Behind: Environmental Justice and Mining.” International Journal for Crime and Justice. IJCJ 2013 2(1): 50-64. [www.crimejusticejournal.com](http://www.crimejusticejournal.com)] AJ

But what kind of action, specifically and concretely, can or should be undertaken in regards to these issues? In part this will be determined by particular local contexts, involving particular communities, particular companies, and particular extractive processes. The relationship between corporations and communities will be influenced by specific economic and political contingencies, including the nature of regulatory structures and approaches, the ebbs and flows of community composition and participation, and local cultures and attitudes (of resistance and of collaboration). In some instances, community opposition is more than warranted given the real and perceived costs of mining development; in others, there is scope for industry and community to work together in pursuit of a range of social, ecological and economic objectives. More generally, there is also greater scope to more directly link environmental justice concerns with the notion of ‘social license to operate’ (SLO). The pursuit of environmental justice can be practically addressed to some degree by critical application of SLO principles. Industry representatives are already sensitive to the importance of obtaining a modicum of social license, through building trust relationships with local communities and integrating this into contemporary business practice (Lacey et al. 2012). Commentators warn that the SLO must be more than a cover for business-as-usual, an imagined strategy of buying community acceptance and/or not be too focussed on risk at the expense of collaboration (Black 2012; Owen and Kemp 2012). They argue that a robust SLO is measureable, takes hard work and demands a willingness to collaborate with stakeholders. Increasing the expectations surrounding social license may well provide avenues for developing relationships that ensure more equitable and sustainable outcomes. This is vital to the project of environmental justice.

### Communities Key---Fishing

#### Only the neg solves because community involvement is the key to effective conservation.

Baragona 12 [(steve, journalist; cites Indiana University political science professor Elinor Ostrom) “Study: Giving Local Fishermen Control Prevents Overfishing” Voice of America April 05] AT

Saving threatened coral reef ecosystems may be best handled by the people who make their living from them, according to a recent study. In many tropical countries, overfishing by small-scale fishers threatens offshore reefs, which are some of the oceans’ most important ecosystems. The new study confirmed what a growing body of research has shown: giving local fishers more control over how, when and where to fish usually results in better incomes, more cooperation with the rules, and more fish on the reef. But not always. The new research also found out why these fisher-managed systems sometimes fail. Exponential decay Tropical coral reefs are fertile fishing grounds for some 200 million small-scale fishers around the world. But many of these reefs are in decline. Tim McClanahan with the Wildlife Conservation Society has followed the catch from one coastal fishing community in Kenya for more than a decade. “It was going down every year. It was just one of those beautiful exponential decay curves,” he says. The question was, what could they do to stop that decline before it crashed the whole reef ecosystem? Such a crash would not just be bad for the fish. The fishers who make their livelihoods from the reef would suffer as well. Central control Since no one owns the oceans, most countries put fisheries management in the hands of the central government. But it’s a complicated business, with a huge number of fishers, catching many different species, with a wide range of equipment, brought ashore in many different places. “Trying to manage that from an under-resourced ministry of fisheries in the capital city is basically an impossible task,” says Tim Daw at the University of East Anglia. Faraway authorities setting the rules but lacking the funds to enforce them are a major reason why fisheries around the world are in decline, he says. But Daw says that is changing. In the last decade or so, civil society groups and researchers have been helping fishing communities come together to set their own rules and enforcement mechanisms. “Rather than a centralized state actor trying to manage fisheries, it’s a cooperation between the state and the local people, with much more emphasis on the local people,” he says. Community rules Communities may decide to close off certain areas to fishing, for example, or restrict what kinds of equipment can be used. The Kenyan community McClanahan worked with decided to ban the use of very-fine-mesh nets that catch almost any kind of fish, large or small. “And sure enough, within months - six or seven months - the catch started to slowly rise, and it’s actually been rising since that happened,” McClanahan says. And as the catch rose, so did incomes. Getting everyone to follow the rules was not easy. But now the community elders tell him they will never go back. However, McClanahan says, there is more to the story.

### Regulations Bad---Adler

#### The aff trades off with a property rights approach to environmental protection – only this can solve since it encourages private investments in protecting and not exploiting the environment, while government protections create perverse incentives that increase exploitation

Adler 5 - JONATHAN ADLER Prof. of environmental law at Case Western, writes for the Case research series: [“Back to the Future of Conservation: Changing Perceptions of Property Rights & Environmental Protection” Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies Working Paper 05-16, July 2005]

The problem with the dominant approach to environmental policy is its reliance upon centralized political mechanisms. The limitations of such mechanisms-whether regulations, fiscal instruments, or direct management of environmental resources-hamper the effectiveness of existing environmental programs. As environmental problems become ever more complex, these limitations will only become more severe. The answer is not greater government control or manipulation of the marketplace, but a greater reliance upon property rights and voluntary arrangements. By encouraging a more efficient use of resources, responsible stewardship, and technological innovation, property rights in environmental resources provide a sounder foundation for the advancement of environmental values than the modem regulatory state.¶ Property-based environmental protection- commonly referred to as "free market environmentalism" 60 or "FME"- rejects the "market failure" model. "Rather than viewing the world in terms of market failure, we should view the problem of externalities as a failure to permit markets and create markets where they do not yet - or no longer - exist." 61 Where environmental problems are most severe it is typically a lack of markets, in particular a lack of enforceable and exchangeable property rights, that is to blame. Resources that are privately owned or managed and therefore are incorporated into market institutions are typically well-maintained. Environmental problems, therefore, are "essentially property rights problems" which are solved by the extension, definition, and defense of property rights in environmental resources. 62¶ Resources that are unowned or politically controlled, on the other hand, are more apt to be inadequately managed. In his seminal essay on the [a] "tragedy of the commons," Garrett Hardin gave an illustration of this principle, stating that there is no incentive for any individual to protect the commonly owned grazing pasture in a rural village. Indeed, it is in every shepherd's self-interest to have his herd overgraze the pasture and before any other herd. Every shepherd who acquires additional livestock gains the benefits of a larger herd, while the cost of overusing the pasture is spread across all members of the village. The benefits of increased use are concentrated, while the costs are dispersed. Inevitably, the consequence is an overgrazed pasture, and everyone loses. The shepherd with foresight, who anticipates that the pasture will become barren in the future, will not exercise forbearance. Quite the opposite: he will have the added incentive to overgraze now to capture gains that otherwise would be lost. Refusing to add another animal to one's own herd does not change the incentive of every other shepherd to do so. The world's fisheries offer a[n] contemporary example of the tragedy of the commons. Because oceans are unowned, nofishing fleet has an incentive to conserve or replenish the fish it takes, but each has every incentive to take as many fish as possible lest the benefits of a larger catch go to someone else.64¶ Efforts to control access through prescriptive regulations do relatively little to change this equation.0 Shorten the fishing season, and the fishing merely becomes more intense. Limit the use of certain gear, and fishermen will simply employ more hands to maximize the catch. Private ownership overcomes the commons problem because owners can prevent overuse by controlling access to the resource. As Hardin noted, "The tragedy of the commons as a food basket is averted by private property, or something formally like it."66 In the case of fisheries, the creation of property rights, whether in fisheries themselves or portions of a given catch, promotes sustainable fishing practices.' With property rights, the incentives faced by fishing fleets are aligned with the long-term sustainability of the underlying resource. As conservation scholar R.J. Smith explains: Wherever we have exclusive private ownership, whether it is organized around a profit-seeking or nonprofit undertaking, there are incentives for the private owners to preserve the resource.... [P]rivate ownership allows the owner to capture the full capital value of the resource, and self-interest and economic incentive drive the owner to maintain its long-term capital value.0¶ For incentives to work, the property right to a resource must be definable, defendable, and divestible. Where property rights are insecure, owners are less likely to invest in improving or protecting a resource. In many tropical nations, for example, the lack of secure property rights encourages deforestation as there is no incentive to maintain forest land, let alone invest in replanting. 69 Where existing environmental regulations undermine the security of property rights, they discourage conservation. The foremost example of this is the ESA, which effectively punishes private landowners for owning habitat of endangered species by restricting land-use. As Sam Hamilton, former Fish and Wildlife Service administrator for the State of Texas, noted, "The incentives are wrong here. If I have a rare metal on my property, its value goes up. But if a rare bird occupies the land, its value disappears."" This economic reality creates a powerful incentive for landowners to destroy present or potential habitat on private land. Thus, in North Carolina, timber owners are dramatically shortening their cutting rotations and cutting trees at a much younger age-at significant economic cost-so as to avoid regulatory proscriptions that could force them to lose their investments altogether.'

#### Economic regulation creates monopolies which increases environmental harm since the company has no accountability to its consumers

Adler 5 - JONATHAN ADLER Prof. of environmental law at Case Western, writes for the Case research series: [“Back to the Future of Conservation: Changing Perceptions of Property Rights & Environmental Protection” Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies Working Paper 05-16, July 2005]

If public sector management places environmental resources¶ at the mercy of public sector employees and the incentives they¶ face, it also makes such resources vulnerable to special interest[s]¶ groups that seek to use government power to their advantage.¶ Attempts "to gain a competitive advantage through¶ manipulation of the regulatory process" are "occurring with¶ increasing frequency," according to former Environmental Protection Agency Deputy Administrator A. James Barnes.54¶ This inefficient interference by special interests, known as "rent-seeking," is facilitated by the fact that firms have the ability to receive concentrated benefits through government action, whereas the costs are dispersed throughout the whole of society.55 In the regulatory context, rent-seeking typically' consists of pursuing those government interventions that will provide comparative advantage to a particular industry or subsector. By restricting entry or reducing output, regulations can serve to reduce competition and cartelize an industry and potentially increase returns. Rent-seeking has become rather pervasive in regulatory programs-provisions that benefit specific politically influential interests are relatively easy to hide from public scrutiny in the Code of Federal Regulations. Environmental regulation is a particularly attractive venue for rent-seeking¶ 56¶ because environmental protection is so popular. Special interest policies become more politically palatable when given a green veneer. In other cases, existing regulations are tweaked to advantage one firm or industry over another. Yet as environmental policies get manipulated to serve narrow interests, their ability to meet environmental goals is compromised, if not sacrificed altogether. To take one prominent example, the EPA proposed changes to the reformulated gasoline program in 1994 to increase the use of "renewable" fuel sources by mandating that a minimum percentage of oxygen-enhancing fuel additives from ethanol or ethanol-derived sources. This rule would have done nothing to improve environmental quality. Indeed, the EPA "even conceded that use of ethanol might possibly make air quality worse."57 The EPA knew the problems with the rule, but pushed ahead anyway. Why? Because the ethanol lobby would benefit.5 Unfortunately, this is hardly an isolated example. 9 Worse, as the pages in the Federal Register devoted to environmental regulation proliferate, so will the opportunities and incentives for rent-seeking.

### Inclusion Impact

#### Inclusion respects the rights of local populations – the plan excludes and disrespects their right to be heard

Finamore et al 12 [Özkaynak, B., Rodriguez-Labajos, B., Arsel, M., Avcı, D., Carbonell, M.H., Chareyron, B., Chicaiza, G., Conde, M., Demaria, F., Finamore, R., Kohrs, B., Krishna, V.V., Mahongnao, M., Raeva, D., Singh, A.A., Slavov, T., Tkalec, T., Yánez, I., Walter, M., Živčič, L., 2012. “Mining Conflicts around the World: Common Grounds from Environmental Justice Perspective.” EJOLT (Environmental Justice Organizations, Liabilities and Trade). Report No. 7. September 2012] AJ

All in all, an overview of the conflicts discussed here effectively indicates that mining is widely regarded as an environmentally and socially disruptive activity. However, mining conflicts arise not only from physical impacts and distributional concerns. As Bridge (2004) notes, the problem is not always one of “cleaner production” or “environmental standards” but more of recognition of rights, closely linked to the second dimension of justice in Schlosberg’s categories. As in other social movements, recognition as a legitimate partner in the debate is as important as the distributional outcome. What are the requisites to recognise a Union in an industrial labour dispute or in a peasant struggle? In environmental mining conflicts, lack of recognition would be expressed through the devaluation of individual and collective rights of the communities by the promoters of the mining projects. Affected communities in Adatepe, for instance, demand their right to be heard as a peasant livelihood and agricultural production; in Esquel or Mount Ida, people claim respect for the right to a healthy environment and ecological integrity; or in the case of el Mirador, locals demand respect for their communitarian lifestyles and for indigenous territorial integrity. The work conditions in mines are a source of struggle particularly in the case of uranium mining; both in Namibia and in Caetité, people claim a right to healthy work conditions. Table 21 lists the rights-based arguments collected from the case studies, according to some emergent categories. Interestingly enough, such categories also allow portraying the evolution of the environmental justice debate, from consideration of fundamental rights of disregarded minorities and communities to the recognition of rights, such as Nature. We also notice some overlaps in arguments, cases (e.g. uranium mining in Namibia) of working class demands for health. This is quite common in mining conflicts. As indicated in Table 21, recognition here also refers to the right for alternative local visions of development, or for alternatives to development10 that are not compatible with mining. In the case of Esquel, for instance, the conflict revolved largely around two opposing views on mining and development. While one group of stakeholders saw mining as a beneficial local activity, other Esquel residents deemed the small size and quiet lifestyle of the city to be very valuable. The latter mainly wanted to choose strong, long-term sustainability over a project of uncertain environmental sustainability that privileged pecuniary income in the short-run. This brings us to the third dimension of environmental justice, which focuses on the political and institutional order for decision-making and the ability of the community to participate in decisions about local development with prior informed consent. As in the cases of Intag, Conga and el Mirador, in several of the conflicts reported by EJOs, participatory procedures proved to be insufficient in terms of taking local views and concerns into account (see Box 7). The Conga project was suspended by the company and the state of emergency was lifted by the government in Lima when an opinion poll in August 2012 showed that a majority of the population of Cajamarca was against it. The many demonstrations, the general strikes, the police violence that had led to five deaths of opponents and the persistent outspoken critiques against the project by the elected regional authorities were not enough. The government and the company wanted to show until the end that they were in control; there was a very explicit attempt to downgrade regional and local participation. When Esquel’s citizens realised that the decision-making processes excluded local values and interests, they focused on promoting alternative deliberation and participation spaces. The successful call for a local referendum reflected well the local communities’ participation concerns and their determination in this respect. The recognition and participation dimensions of justice are visible in particular with regard to water claims (Table 22). In naturally dry, water-scarce areas, for instance, such as Los Pelambres, Esquel, Adatepe or Namibia, affected communities claim access to water and demand clean water by prioritising surface water use for drinking and irrigation purposes and not for industrial interests. Even in cases where there is enough water available, such as in Pascua Lama, el Mirador, or Cerro Blanco, people are concerned by potential overuse of underground water or glacier damage, and demand more control over such natural resources that guarantee agricultural production and hence their livelihoods. In addition to the unequal distribution of burdens and risks, lack of recognition and few opportunities to participate via official channels leads communities to protest mining activities as well. But how exactly do people protest? The following section will offer an overview of the various ways people have protested in the cases reported and discuss their effectiveness.

#### Social injustice is the root of mass-scale violence

Scheper-Hughes 4 (Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn) (Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematic- ally and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, theundeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide areborn, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

### Indigenous People Net Benefit

#### The plan excludes indigenous people – we must give them a say

Ford Foundation 10 [Ford Foundation, international non-profit organization for social justice “Expanding Community Rights Over Natural Resources” Initiative Overview, September 2010] AT

Realizing this potential requires innovative new ways of thinking. Many current approaches to managing forests, grasslands, and other areas unsuited to intensive agriculture are based on a myth: that these areas are pristine, unpopulated wilderness, or that they are wastelands ripe for industrial use. In fact, they are home to more than a billion people. Our work seeks to make rural, ethnic-minority, and indigenous people the stewards of these lands and the managers of their own livelihoods. We believe that giving them a say in land-use management, planning, and development has multiple benefits. It is good for the communities. It promises to reduce conflict and illicit activities. And it is very good for the health and sustainability of the environment.

### Trolly Dualism Weighing

#### The idea that complete sanctuaries from human interference are necessary to protect nature pits nature against humanity, as if humans are entirely unnatural – this breeds environmentally irresponsible behavior – we must recognize that humans and nature and coexist because humans are part of nature

Foreman 7 [(David, US environmentalist and co-founder of the environmental movement Earth First) "Around the Campfire: Wilderness Areas and Human/Nature Dualism” The Rewilding Institute www.rewilding.org Issue 3 January 21, 2007] AT

The beating heart of the 1964 Wilderness Act is the definition of Wilderness Areas as places “where man is a visitor who does not remain.” This idea of uninhabited solitudes upsets some intellectual critics of the Wilderness Idea – the so-called wilderness deconstructionists – and their resource exploitation allies. Strangely, they are troubled that the standard of visitors-only separates humans from Nature and leads to “environmental” harm. In 1994, for example, a top environmental philosopher referred to “the received wilderness idea, that is, the idea that wilderness is ‘an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man is a visitor who does not remain.’”[1] He further wrote that “the wilderness idea perpetuates the pre-Darwinian myth that ‘man’ exists apart from nature.”[2] And, in 1996 an environmental historian wrote that “wilderness embodies a dualistic vision in which the human is entirely outside the natural.”[3] He also claimed, “Any way of looking at nature that encourages us to believe we are separate from nature – as wilderness tends to do – is likely to reinforce environmentally irresponsible behavior.” [4] (I acknowledge that these specific quotations are ten years old or more. I use them because they so well sum up the matter in question, and because such notions are still used by wilderness foes.)

## SE Asia MPAs Specific

### Solvency Advocate

#### Aff-specific text – the [gov of the country] should establish Locally-managed Marine Area’s in [insert location]

Leisher 7 [(Craig Leisher, Pieter van Beukering, Lea M. Scherl) “Nature’s Investment Bank: How protected areas contribute to poverty reduction” This study was funded by The Nature Conservancy, the Australian Government Department of the Environment and Water Resources, and the Poverty Reduction and Environment Management Program at Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam] AT

How can marine protected areas in general contribute more to poverty reduction? The main tools for marine protected areas contributing more to poverty reduction are an approach and some key policy incentives. The approach is simple enough: give local communities a strong voice in the marine protected area’s management. It is the policy incentives, though, that are crucial for maximizing the benefits of a marine protected area to poor people. Marine protected areas can contribute to coastal poverty reduction when they include policies for: Investing in marine protected areas. Like a school or a health clinic, a marine protected area needs financial support, particularly at start up. But also like a school or health clinic, a marine protected area brings proportionally greater benefits than its costs. The investment, for example, in the Navakavu marine protected area over the five years since start up has been less than US$12,000 equivalent, and this modest investment has helped to double the incomes of about 600 people. This is why more than 120 new locally managed iv Nature’s Investment Bankmarine areas have been started in Fiji since 2004. In all four marine protected areas studied, it was an external donor agency that provided the transformative funding. A large fund that provides modest grants to coastal communities to establish marine protected areas could bring dramatic benefits to local fisheries and in some cases tourism. Funding support for marine protected areas has to be for five years or more. Establishing a marine protected area can take considerable time—several years from conception to start up is not unusual. It may take an equal amount of time for the ecological and socio-economic benefits to materialize. Marine protected areas do not always fit well with the short-term cycle of politics. In Apo Island, it took six years for total financial benefits to exceed costs since start up.Empower local communities. Government policies that provide legal recognition for community management of local marine resources clearly supported community participation in three of the four study sites. The benefits of community management can be further strengthened by linking marine protected area communities together via peer-learning networks such as the Locally Managed Marine Area Network in the Pacific and SE Asia. Such networks enable cross-pollination of best practices and provide specialized training and technical resources for local communities. Community-led marine resource management is easier if a neutral actor such as a university or external NGO helps the marine protected area stakeholders reach consensus about the distribution of costs and benefits

#### [This ev deals with Indonesia/Fiji/Solomon/Philippines too]

Leisher 7 [(Craig Leisher, Pieter van Beukering, Lea M. Scherl) “Nature’s Investment Bank: How protected areas contribute to poverty reduction” This study was funded by The Nature Conservancy, the Australian Government Department of the Environment and Water Resources, and the Poverty Reduction and Environment Management Program at Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam] AT

This study is one of the first to empirically analyze the link between biodiversity conservation initiatives and poverty reduction. From November 2006 to May 2007, 68 people in four countries helped conduct more than 950 household interviews and more than 50 focus group discussions and key informant interviews. In total, approximately 1,100 local people were consulted to determine whether four particular marine protected areas have contributed to poverty reduction, and if so, why. The four study sites do not represent a random sample but were deliberately chosen because local experts believe they have contributed to poverty reduction. The four marine protected areas are in Fiji (Navakavu), the Solomon Islands (Arnavon Islands), Indonesia (Bunaken) and the Philippines (Apo Island). This portfolio of sites is roughly representative of small, one-community local marine protected areas (Fiji), medium-sized, multi-community local marine protected areas (Solomons), big collaboratively managed national marine protected areas with lots of people (Indonesia), and small, co-managed national marine protected areas with few people (Philippines). In terms of area, 95% of marine protected areas globally fall between the largest marine protected area in the study (Bunaken) and the smallest (Apo Island). The four sites also have a good mix of population size and age of the marine protected area.

### Specific Empirics

#### A direct comparison proves that locally managed areas perform better than MPA’s by a margin of 40% more biodiversity versus 2% - this is specific to your countries

Kareiva 06 [Peter Kareiva, Chief scientist for The Nature Conservanc “Conservation Biology: Beyond Marine Protected Areas” Current Biology. Volume 16, Issue 14, 25 July 2006.]

As they report in this issue of Current Biology, Tim McClanahan of **the Wildlife Conservation Society** and colleagues [4] have **just completed** the most compelling **multi-site** comparison **of different approaches to** marine **conservation, including marine protected areas, yet** to be conducted. They contrast three different marine conservation approaches, two of which represent a form of marine protected area. The two marine protected area approaches are either traditional ‘top-down’ government established National Parks, or ‘bottom-up’ co-management agreements in which local communities and non-governmental organisations enforce no-fishing zones. **The alternative to m**arine **p**rotected **a**reas t**ook the form of community-based fishery management without permanent protected areas**, but with a wide variety of temporary restrictions on fishing effort. **The analysis** by McClanahan's team [4] **was** **applied** only **to coral reefs and thus benefited from having a common ecosystem as a baseline**. These studies took place in Indonesia and Papua New Guinea ( Figure 1), areas that have suffered from overfishing and destructive blast fishing, and that are noted for tremendous biodiversity as well as economically valuable fisheries. **Other conservation scientists have attempted to draw generalizations by comparing management approaches as reported by different research teams and using different methods [5]. But this is the first time that different management approaches** applied to several different coral reefs **have** **been examined by a** standardized **and common** approach. Within each management area or its paired matched control site, fish were sampled along transects and data were analyzed so that fish biomass was effectively a measure of catch per unit effort. Nonetheless, the comparisons between coral reefs made by McClanahan and colleagues [4] are apples and oranges. The standard National Park protected areas were large (6,600–111,625 hectares), whereas the community-managed areas were small (33–58 hectares), and the co-managed protected areas were also small (12–60 hectares). Keeping in mind the confounding effect of size, however, **the results are astonishing**. The measure selected to quantify effectiveness was **the percent increase in total biomass for targeted fish** inside the managed area compared to outside the management area. This increase never exceeded 10% for the large National Park protected areas, and **was** typically dismally low **(averaging less than 2%** over four different National Parks). Small co-managed marine protected areas did much better — averaging over a 15% increase in fish biomass for a collection of four of these ‘bottom-up’ marine protected areas. **The** small **community management areas without any permanent protection or harvest closures did best by far —** averaging **over a 40% increase in the targeted fish biomass** as compared to outside the management zone. Clearly there are problems with these analyses. The contrasts are inside versus outside management areas after the management areas were established. To be rigorous, one really needs data comparing inside versus outside, before and after the management areas were established. Secondly, even if there is more fish biomass inside the management areas, that does not speak to benefits flowing to the fishery community.¶ In spite of its limitations, **the** McClanahan et al. [4] **study is compelling** because it draws our attention to the most important aspect of marine conservation — the social context. In addition to collecting biological data on targeted fish, the researchers also collected socioeconomic data on the stakeholders and local communities interacting with the marine protected areas or management zones. The National Park marine protected areas tended to have low compliance, were not in sight of any village, and had well over 80% of the harvested fish sold to market. In contrast, the community-based management areas without marine protected areas were all in sight of local villages and averaged only 35% of the fish being sold to market (the rest being used by the fishermen's households and families). Using all eleven fishery management areas and categorizing each management effort in terms of socioeconomic attributes produced a clear picture of the factors that lead to effectiveness. Higher visibility of reserves to local communities and higher compliance were associated with higher overall increases in fish biomass. There are no surprises there. On the other hand, larger human populations, a greater percentage of fish sold to market, a greater percentage of households involved in salaried employment, and greater local wealth made it less likely that the management areas would be effective. If one wanted to develop a narrative about these indicators, it seems that the best managers of fisheries are the poorer communities that depend upon fish for their own food source, compared to wealthier communities that exploit fisheries for economic gains and may not reside in close proximity to the managed areas.

## East Africa Mangroves

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### Text

#### The Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, and the Republic of Mozambique should implement the community management approach with respect to the mangroves.

Mansur 3 [(Forestry Officer, FAO) “FROM POLICIES TO PRACTICES: LESSONS FROM COMMUNITY FORESTRY IN MOZAMBIQUE” Submitted to World Forestry Congress, 2003] AT

A first list of CFWM arrangements being used in Mozambique has been systematized by Mansur and Cuco (2002) and includes: a) participatory and simplified management plans; b) guarantee of community access to the resources (e.g. through a land tenure certificate); c) assistance for the establishment and training of interest groups for forest management, including community scouts and small forestry based enterprises; d) provision of adequate incentives and credit, preferably through a community managed rotation fund; e) selection of appropriate, easy to introduce techniques for improved forestry and forest products; and f) strengthening of local cultural values, as the linkage between indigenous knowledge, nature conservation and cultural aspects are very strong in rural Mozambique. Using the arrangements as the variables of a conceptual model, UMC is trying to define ways to disseminate "benefit oriented" CFWM initiatives. The models are not intended to be a recipe or a "blue print", but should provide sufficient guidance to short cut the long path of trial and errors that have been characterizing the interventions in the pilot areas, usually causing community fatigue and lack of motivation to proceed with the initiatives. The expected output of the conceptual models is the generation of tangible benefits for the local communities involved. If really produced and shared with equity, this result would serve as the main motivator for community participation. The expected outcome of the models is the community voluntary engagement and long-term, self-reliant participation in forests and wildlife management. Table 2 below illustrates the design of some of the conceptual models as they stand today, based on the lessons learned in the pilot areas of the Mozambique/FAO/Netherlands project "Support for community forestry and wildlife management". The models are not completed, and differ from each other on their degree of available information for dissemination. They are separated in three blocks: community led, government led, and private sector led processes, depending on which stakeholders can detain the major right of access to the forests. It is the intention of UMC to follow up on the development and testing of the conceptual CFWM models, bringing to the debate the academic and research community interested in rural development in Mozambique, together with the direct beneficiaries. Hopefully the jump from donor funded pilot areas into self reliant community managed forests is not too distant in the future.

### A2 Perm

#### Even the perm causes poverty which kills CP solvency; also the perm is hard to implement which kills solvency

Mansur 3 [(Forestry Officer, FAO) “FROM POLICIES TO PRACTICES: LESSONS FROM COMMUNITY FORESTRY IN MOZAMBIQUE” Submitted to World Forestry Congress, 2003] AT

Participatory management of natural resources is understood as a key strategy to address food security and poverty alleviation problems in rural Mozambique. However, and no matter how supportive the policy environment is at present, there is a concrete challenge for CBNRM to evolve from the pilot stage into a more consistent multiplication of initiatives, away from donor support and led by the stakeholders. The answer to this challenge seems to lie in the local communities themselves, who are eager to embrace participatory forestry and to engage in responsible management of natural resources whenever clear and tangible benefits can be envisaged from this activity. On the same way, these very communities would reject or abandon the initiatives that only give them the responsibility for nature conservation without concrete - even if small - benefits accrued from the management of natural resources. The examples below are illustrations: Benefits for community scouts The community of Senhote in Monapo district of Nampula province organized with the support of a project, a voluntary group of 14 community scouts, men and women, to assist in law enforcement and control of use of their 3,300 ha of natural forests, which have been neglected in the past. In their first intervention, around 12 logs of valuable tree species - Pterocarpus angolensis, Milletia stuhlmanni, and others, were confiscated from outsiders who have been exploiting these resources without license. The scouts immediately informed the local government authorities, who arranged the transfer of the apprehended products to the District Directorate of Agriculture (DDA), in Monapo. According to the regulations, confiscated products are property of the State and funds resulting from its auction must revert entirely to the State. The community scouts were left only in the possession of the hand tools taken from the illegal loggers. Knowing the value of the logs (estimated at a minimum of USD 1,000), but not benefiting from them, the community scouts lost their motivation to continue supporting law enforcement in that forest area (Mansur and Cuco, 2002). Another example from Nampula: Goats X wildlife To revert the predatory hunting made by neighbouring communities in the Mecuburi Forest Reserve, a project decided to promote livestock raising and provided goats for some families in the villages. As the beneficiaries were not the hunters themselves, the goat production did not affect their activity and illegal hunting continued. In this case, the goat production did not contribute to the expected change of the attitude of the villagers towards the reserve. Arrangements and models As stated by Gilmour (2002), "the current policy focus for forest management generally translates as the dual goals of sustainable forest management and improved human well-being (even though the linkage between the two can be tenuous)". This is particularly true in Mozambique, where the use of the forest resources must contribute to poverty alleviation, hopefully without posing a threat to the resources for their use by the future generations. As observed above, since 1995 the country is testing various approaches to promote CFWM. These experiences are undoubtedly needed in the goal-oriented action-learning process adopted. But sometimes this pluralistic, diverse approach is one of the reasons why the processes get stuck in the piloting phase, not reaching a regular and wider implementation scale. An attempt is being made by the Community Management Unit (UMC) of the National Directorate of Forests and Wildlife of Mozambique (DNFFB) to address this issue: Based on the testing and learning of different methods, approaches and tools, UMC is trying to select the key arrangements - the ones that are fundamental to generate clear benefits for the local communities, and make them easy to apply.

### A2 CP is Squo

#### This is not the squo

Bandeira 4 [(Salomao Bandeira 1\*, Carlos Bento 2 , Jose Rafael 3 & Davide Samussone 1 1 Department of Biological Sciences, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo, Mozambique. 2 Natural History Museum, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo, Mozambique. 3 Department of Geography, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo, Mozambique.) “Title/Name of the area: ZAMBEZI RIVER DELTA (CENTRAL MOZAMBIQUE)” 2004] AT

The Zambezi Delta is an extensive system with the triangular shape. The system is flat and alluvial. It covers an approximate area of 1.2 millions of hectares on the central coast of Mozambique. Along the coast, the Delta covers 200 Km of coastline from Quelimane City south to the Zuni River. The North bank has its limit Morrumbala escarpment and on the southern bank is bordered with the Cheringoma escarpment. The Delta is divided by two banks: North and South Bank. The North bank located in Zambezia Province and is characterized by an extensive area developed for agriculture. The south bank is best known as the Marromeu Complex, includes The Marromeu Buffalo Special Reserve and the four hunting concessions, including countadas 10, 11, 12 and 14 (Beilfuss and Brown 2006). The complex supports diverse and abundant populations of mammals and waterfowl (Bento and Beilfuss 1999). The floodplain is home to 120 pair’s endangered Wattle Crane and a critical refuge for 30% of the global population of this species in years of extreme drought in the region (Bento 2002). Zambezi delta waters are estuarine or with brackish waters to around 50 Km inland the remaining 50Km or so is totally freshwater. Mangrove forests is a dominant feature in the Zambezi delta. Statistics indicate that Africa contains approximately 21% of the mangroves in the world (Murdiyarso and Kauffman, 2011). The current estimate of mangrove forest area in Mozambique varies from 396,100 ha (Barbosa et al 2001, Beentje & Bandeira, 2005) to 291,146 ha (Fatoyimbo et al., 2008). Based on a recent assessment, 28% of Mozambique mangroves occur in the Zambezi delta (81,521 to 110,908 ha). Globally, Mozambique ranks 13th in mangrove coverage; equivalent to approximately 2.3% of the global mangrove forest area (Giri et al. 2011). 1 Location The Zambezi Delta is 200 kilometers north of the city of Beira along the Indian Ocean. From the mouth of the River Cuacua (in Quelimane City) and Zuni River in South. The delta apex is border with Mopeia village and Southern Bank is bounded by Chiringoma Plateau and the Northern Bank by Morrumbala plateau. Feature description of the proposed area The delta is characterized by extensive mangrove forest papyrus Swamp, one of the largest on the east coast of Africa. The grassland is very productive and supports a diversity of wildlife, including the African Buffalo, African Elephant, Lichtenstein's hartebeest, sable antelope, eland, zebra, hippopotamus, waterbuck, and reedbuck. Among the carnivores have lions, leopards, wild dog and spotted hyena (Dutton et al. 2001). The birds diversity and numbers is the highest in Mozambique, including large breeding colonies of pelicans, open billed stork, glossy ibis and white breasted cormorants. Other species that require special attention internationally and that occur in the delta include gray crown crane, saddlebill stoks, woolynecked Storks, goliath herons, african skimmers, Pratincoles Redwing and the Caspian tern. On the coast we have humpback and minke whales and even the bottlednosed dolphin, dolphin and humpback dolphin roughtoothed. Mangroves are the most extensive on the east coast of Africa and supports the most lucrative shrimp industry and fish of the Sofala Bank, including shrimp. Mangrove habitats area grouped into 6 larger communities, that is, 6 different types of mangrove forest: Ceriops tagal, Avicenia-marina, Rhizophara-mucronata, Soneratia-alba, Xilocarpus-granatum, Avicenia- mucronata; the most dominant depicted in the Fig 1. There are 8 mangrove tree species in Mozambique: Avicennia marina (Forssk.) Vierh., Bruguiera gymnorhiza (L.) Lam., Ceriops tagal (Per.) C.B. Robinson, Rhizophora mucronata Lam. and Sonneratia alba Smith, Heritiera littoralis Aiton, Lumnitzera racemosa Willd. and Xylocarpus granatum Koenig. The fern mangrove, Acrostichum aureum L., is also common. Other plant associates found close to the mangrove areas include Barringtonia racemosa (L.) Roxb., Hibiscus tiliaceus L., Phoenix reclinata Jacq., Thespesia populnea (L.) Soland. ex Correa. The transition zone, between mangroves and terrestrial vegetation is occupied by grasses and herbs such as Chenolea diffusa Thunb., Salicornia perrieri A. Chev., Suaeda maritima Dumont, Paspalum distichum L., Sporobolus virginicus (L.) Kunth, Arthrocnemum sp. The herb Sesuvium portulacastrum L. occurs in saline areas (salt deserts) and is occasionally harvested as vegetables. Feature condition and future outlook of the proposed area Here is presented the data obtained from recent interviews to communities in Zambezi delta regarding valuation of mangrove habitats. Mangrove wood cut is practiced in the region both for commerce and domestic consumption. The main products are wood (for housing, boat construction and production of various domestic utensils) and poles. Non woody uses include medicinal and extraction of dye. Ceriops tagal was indicated by 62.5% of the interviewed as the preferred species, while 31.25% also pointed Avicennia marina (together with Ceriops tagal) and the remaining 6.25% indicated Ceriops tagal and Xylocarpus granatum. It is interesting to note that Ceriops tagal showed to be the most abundant species in the area (see structural report), what can partially explain this preference. Besides, its wood is described as one of the most durable, being thus a species with multiple uses. Wood and poles are sold in bundles, and depending on the size, species and quality, the price may vary between 2-75 MT (up to 3 USD).The diameters at breast height (DBH) of trees selected for cut vary greatly, depending on the use. For construction, 57% of the interviewed preferred trees with a DBH between 5-10 cm, and other 25% would prefer a diameter between 10-15 cm. The remaining 18% do not have a preference, as size would depend on use.Mangrove cut was described by 75% of the interviewed as mainly a male activity. Other 18% mentioned that both women and men cut mangroves, while 7% regarded it as a female activity. Most of the people (75%) have a perception that the pressure over mangroves has increased in the last 20 years; 19% think it has decreased while the other 6% have no perception. There is also a slight perception that the presence of big companies might increase the pressure over the mangroves. Such are the cases of Sena Sugar, (perception of 37.5% of the interviewed), Madal (6%), and Chinde Port (12.5%). Sena Sugar is a sugar factory that was installed since the colonial era, though production was interrupted during the years of civil war. The factory started re-operating in 2001, based in Sofala province, and having settlements in Zambezia province. Grupo Madal is an agro-industrial company based in Zambeze province since 1903. Its core business is extraction and export of coconut oil, but has other interests that include timber exploitation, animal ranching and game management and jatropha. Chinde Port is an important tertiary port in northern Mozambique, with seasonal or occasional activity. Main cargo include wood, building material and a variety of goods. Most of the interviewed however could not tell if these companies actually increase pressure over mangroves (44%). On what respects to the ecological importance of mangroves, locals are able to make a connection between mangroves and their role as nurseries for many marine species (87.5%) and source of fish (87.5%). protection of the coast line was perceived as mangrove role by only 12.5% of the interviewed. Mangrove community management is not practiced in the area, and 87.5% of the interviewed would be willing to embark in mangrove replantation activities and protection.

### A2 Solvency Advocates Theory – Africa Cards

Just for trav <3

#### CP is SUPER predictable – communities are looking to expand current community-managed approaches

Mansur 3 [(Forestry Officer, FAO) “FROM POLICIES TO PRACTICES: LESSONS FROM COMMUNITY FORESTRY IN MOZAMBIQUE” Submitted to World Forestry Congress, 2003] AT

Community forestry and wildlife management (CFWM) is one of the strategies that the government of Mozambique has adopted to promote the sustainable use and conservation of the country's forest resources. Under new polices and legal framework, local communities are recognized as legal entities responsible for the use and conservation of forests and wildlife resources in their areas of influence. This enabling environment has promoted the creation of 61 community-based natural resources management (CBNRM) pilot initiatives in the ten provinces of the country, since the approval of the new Forests and Wildlife Policy in 1997. The approach is proving attractive and challenging for donors, government officials, technicians and local communities, which are now facing the question of how community forestry can be consolidated and further disseminated, if there is still a lack of clear mechanisms for benefit-sharing from people's participation in forest management.

#### Seriously I have one

Mansur 3 [(Forestry Officer, FAO) “FROM POLICIES TO PRACTICES: LESSONS FROM COMMUNITY FORESTRY IN MOZAMBIQUE” Submitted to World Forestry Congress, 2003] AT

A first list of CFWM arrangements being used in Mozambique has been systematized by Mansur and Cuco (2002) and includes: a) participatory and simplified management plans; b) guarantee of community access to the resources (e.g. through a land tenure certificate); c) assistance for the establishment and training of interest groups for forest management, including community scouts and small forestry based enterprises; d) provision of adequate incentives and credit, preferably through a community managed rotation fund; e) selection of appropriate, easy to introduce techniques for improved forestry and forest products; and f) strengthening of local cultural values, as the linkage between indigenous knowledge, nature conservation and cultural aspects are very strong in rural Mozambique. Using the arrangements as the variables of a conceptual model, UMC is trying to define ways to disseminate "benefit oriented" CFWM initiatives. The models are not intended to be a recipe or a "blue print", but should provide sufficient guidance to short cut the long path of trial and errors that have been characterizing the interventions in the pilot areas, usually causing community fatigue and lack of motivation to proceed with the initiatives. The expected output of the conceptual models is the generation of tangible benefits for the local communities involved. If really produced and shared with equity, this result would serve as the main motivator for community participation. The expected outcome of the models is the community voluntary engagement and long-term, self-reliant participation in forests and wildlife management. Table 2 below illustrates the design of some of the conceptual models as they stand today, based on the lessons learned in the pilot areas of the Mozambique/FAO/Netherlands project "Support for community forestry and wildlife management". The models are not completed, and differ from each other on their degree of available information for dissemination. They are separated in three blocks: community led, government led, and private sector led processes, depending on which stakeholders can detain the major right of access to the forests. It is the intention of UMC to follow up on the development and testing of the conceptual CFWM models, bringing to the debate the academic and research community interested in rural development in Mozambique, together with the direct beneficiaries. Hopefully the jump from donor funded pilot areas into self reliant community managed forests is not too distant in the future.

## 2N Answers

### A2 Perm

# Marine Protected Areas

## Fishing DA

### 1NC

#### The plan destroys community access to critical resources which destroys their means of subsistence and is a return to colonialism – this also turns aff solvency

De Santo 11 [(E De Santo, Assistant Professor of Environmental Studies, Franklin and Marshall College; P Jones, Senior Lecturer Department of Geography University College London) Fortress conservation at sea: a commentary on the Chagos MPA. Marine Policy 35(2), 258-260, 2011] AT

In the run up to the 2012 deadline for the establishment of networks of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) set by inter alia the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and World Summit on Sustainable Development, it is worth reflecting on the recent rush for ‘bigger is better’ and ‘no-take is best’ designations [1] that lack clear management/enforcement frameworks, as well as related implications for the access and benefit sharing provisions of the CBD. In particular, the April 2010 declaration of the world’s largest no-take MPA (210,000 square miles) surrounding the Chagos archipelago in the British Indian Ocean Territory was met with mixed feelings on the part of conservationists and some criticism in the press [2, 3, 4, 5]. These critiques focus on the fact that the designation was put in place whilst a legal decision regarding the native Chagossians’ right to return to the islands was ongoing. Should the islanders return to the archipelago, they could be prohibited by the MPA from partaking in fishing or any other marine resource exploitation activities that could provide for their subsistence and enhance their livelihoods. The decision to designate the Chagos MPA followed a consultation process run by the Overseas Territories Directorate of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the UK Government, whereby a consultation document was disseminated through websites, representative groups and directly to representatives of parties with a known interest. Over a quarter of a million people responded to this questionnaire, although 249,500 of these came through as petitions, which offered only limited opportunity for any substantive comment from individual respondents. Nonetheless, of all those that registered a response, more than 90% supported greater marine protection of some sort, recognising the conservation potential of protecting a marine environment that is deemed to be the healthiest and most resilient in the world [6, 7]. The subsequent designation of the MPA was therefore welcomed by many, including nine of the world's largest environment and science bodies such as Greenpeace, the Pew Environment Group and the Royal Society, with the event described as ‘inspirational’ and a ‘global benchmark for responsible ocean stewardship’ [8]. It has also been recognised as part of Gordon Brown’s ‘green legacy’ upon leaving office [9], and a “cost-effective demonstration of the UK government’s commitment to environmental stewardship” [6 at p.4]. However, with the conservation benefits acknowledged, this case has also drawn widespread criticism in the press and from the governments of Seychelles and Mauritius, as well as members of the Chagossian community, because it came about whilst the European Court of Human Rights is still debating the native Chagossians’ right to return to the islands, following more than 40 years of exile in Mauritius, the Seychelles and the UK [2, 3, 4, 5, 10]. A significant body of response, including most members of the Chagossian community, raised objections to such strict conservation measures during the consultation process. Participants in meetings in the Seychelles proposed instead that exceptions be made for Chagossians’ fishing projects to ensure their livelihood potential on their return [7]. In spite of these objections, the declaration of a full no-take MPA went ahead, with a caveat that “should circumstances change, all the options for a marine protected area may need to be reconsidered” [7 at p.7]. The new coalition government has since supported this designation and the rights of the Islanders remain unresolved [11]. What lessons can be learned from terrestrial examples of conservation? The answer is not encouraging given the case described above. The critical relationship between people and protected areas is obvious: without stakeholder engagement and support, long-term viability of a protected area is at serious risk, though it should also be recognised that it is all too easy for societal economic goals to outweigh conservation objectives. In addition, whilst the UK is promoting a more ‘bottom-up’ approach to the designation of Marine Conservation Zones (MCZs) within its waters, this ‘top-down’ manoeuvre in the British Indian Ocean rings of colonialism. Looking at previous experiences with terrestrial conservation and in particular the history of protected areas, ‘fortress conservation’ without the engagement of local stakeholders has long been recognized as an approach that is both unjust and ineffective. In contrast, ‘new conservation’ approaches, such as community-based conservation, treat conservation as simply one of many forms of natural resource use and acknowledge the role that markets play in the achievement of conservation goals [12]. In considering how protected areas have evolved over the past half century, a paradigm shift can be seen, as outlined by Phillips [13], whereby local engagement and wider societal benefits have become more of a driving force in protected area designation and management than complete exclusion. However, there are still arguments for exclusionary approaches [14], and indeed there is often an inherent conflict between nature conservation objectives and community development objectives which leads to mixed successes [15]. It must also be recognised that fortress conservation approaches in Africa have in some cases transformed the way local communities frame their relationship with nature; whereas they once accepted wildlife in their midst, they now view animals as intruders and conservation as a threat [16]. With regard to MPAs, it is important to consider the marine environment’s unique ecological and management challenges [17], coupled with the fact that the majority of protected areas have been designated in nations where governance is weak [18], resulting in the creation of numerous ‘paper parks’. Governance, defined as the interactions among structures, processes and traditions that determine direction, how power is exercised, and how the views of citizens or stakeholders are incorporated into decision making, is a critical aspect of effective conservation and a prominent component of the CBD’s work on protected areas [19, 20]. Discussions regarding the access and benefit sharing (ABS) provisions of the CBD to date have dealt more with the ‘benefit sharing’ component than ‘access’, including heated debates over the exclusion of local people from protected areas and related equity issues (e.g. the distribution of benefits gained from genetic resources derived from biodiversity, such as pharmaceuticals). An exclusionary fortress approach to conservation as implemented via no-take MPAs raises equity concerns regarding ‘access’ as well, in this case to marine living resources. It is this ‘all or nothing approach’ that alienates stakeholders and breeds fear and mistrust towards MPAs. The conservation of resources through MPAs must strike a balance between providing for restrictions on exploitation activities that are unsustainable and incompatible with conservation objectives, and providing sustainable livelihoods for local communities. ‘Paper’ MPAs are imbalanced in this respect, allowing, by default, resource exploitation activities that are often unsustainable and driven by increasing demand from global markets. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the ‘pendulum of protection’ should swing so far as to completely ban all access to marine resources, including subsistence and small-scale commercial fishing, defined as being restricted to supplying local markets to feed local people and visitors. Whilst it must be ensured that such fishing does not creep towards large-scale commercial fishing to supply global markets, it must also be accepted that there must be reasonable provisions for subsistence and small-scale commercial fishing in order to conserve the well-being of local communities. Ensuring the effectiveness of MPAs must be balanced with ensuring the well-being of local people. MPA governance should be both effective and equitable [21], including the careful balancing of top-down and bottom-up approaches to governance [17]. The CBD includes ‘access’ obligations to “as far as possible and appropriate... respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity” (Art. 8(j)) and to... “protect and encourage customary use of biological resources in accordance with traditional cultural practices that are compatible with conservation or sustainable use requirements ” (Art. 10(c)). The Papahānaumokuākea Marine National Monument in the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands accordingly provides for indigenous people to exploit marine resources for sustenance and subsistence purposes and to maintain traditional practices1 . Whilst the local communities of the Chagos islands were forcibly removed by the UK government to make way for a military airbase over 40 years ago, the legal question as to whether they have the legal right to return to the islands is still being considered by the European Court of Human Rights. It is arguably premature to foreclose the option of subsistence and small-scale commercial fishing by re-settled communities through the designation of a completely no-take MPA around the Chagos archipelago whilst this legal question is still being considered. It would seem reasonable to keep the option open of providing for subsistence fishing by local communities, drawing on the example of the Papahānaumokuākea Marine National Monument, and even of providing for small-scale commercial fishing to supply markets on the island. Without this option, there is arguably little for the people to return to, recognising that ‘you cannot eat the scenery’ and that it would arguably be unsustainable to import the food that local fisheries could provide. It is very challenging to achieve the inter-related balances of providing for effectiveness and equity and for combining top-down and bottom-up approaches. The tendency for creeping if not rampant commercial exploitation in paper MPAs has led MPA advocates to resort to calling for completely no-take MPAs that exclude all human exploitation, even that related to subsistence and small-scale commercial fishing. With regards to the Chagos MPA, it is argued, however, that it would seem reasonable to provide for and carefully control such fishing, as the Papahānaumokuākea Marine National Monument does, and premature to preclude this option when a legal decision as to whether ‘local communities’ forcibly removed from the islands can return is pending. An MPA designation that precludes the return of local people to the Chagos archipelago will, from a human rights perspective, also sustain the injustice that the previous removal of these people represents. An over-zealous focus on ensuring the effectiveness of the Chagos MPA and the neglect of providing for equity and human rights could signal that fortress conservation is alive and well at sea, rather than having been relegated to colonial history.

### Ilaw Impact

#### The Convention on Biological Diversity mandates access to marine resources

De Santo 11 [(E De Santo, Assistant Professor of Environmental Studies, Franklin and Marshall College; P Jones, Senior Lecturer Department of Geography University College London) Fortress conservation at sea: a commentary on the Chagos MPA. Marine Policy 35(2), 258-260, 2011] AT

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### Indigenous Rights

#### Use of marine resources is key to indigenous community rights

Agardy 3 [(TUNDI AGARDY, Sound Seas; PETER BRIDGEWATER, UNESCO Man and the Biosphere Program; MICHAEL P. CROSBY, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; JON DAY, Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority; PAUL K. DAYTON, Scripps Institution of Oceanography; RICHARD KENCHINGTON, Maritime Policy Centre, University of Wollongong; DAN LAFFOLEY, English Nature, Peterborough; PATRICK McCONNEY, Caribbean Conservation Association; PETER A. MURRAY, Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, Environment and Sustainable Development Unit, Castries, Saint Lucia; JOHN E. PARKS, Biological Resources Program, World Resources Institute, Washington; and LELEI PEAU, Department of Commerce, Government of American Samoa, Pago Pago, American Samoa, USA) “Dangerous targets? Unresolved issues and ideological clashes around marine protected areas” AQUATIC CONSERVATION: MARINE AND FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEMS, Aquatic Conserv: Mar. Freshw. Ecosyst Jan 12] AT

In many areas of the world the cultural identity of the local peoples is intimately linked with traditional uses of the marine environment. As a member of the US Coral Reef Task Force (CRTF), Governor Sunia of American Samoa expressed his concern for the rights of traditional uses of marine resources in the islands. The Governor made a formal request that the specific multiple use MPA design presented in Figure 1 be the preferred option for implementing the 20% no-take coral reef MPA policy of the CRTF, in order to protect the rights of indigenous peoples to periodic cultural and subsistence use in some areas within MPAs (see http://coralreef.gov/Mtg5.pdf for the complete multiple use MPA design motion proposed by Governor Sunia and approved by the CRTF at their August 2000 meeting). Governor Sunia was particularly concerned with ensuring that indigenous peoples have access to conduct traditional extractive uses within a broader multiple-use MPA context. In another example of the values of multiple use MPA with no-take zones, the Kaho’olawe Island Reserve Commission has developed a two-zone management strategy that allows for subsistence gathering of marine resources for specifically approved cultural, religious and education activities by ‘Native Hawaiians’ (Crosby et al., 2000b). Trans-boundary, multiple use MPAs are also proving a unique vehicle for improving Middle East regional coordination and cooperation in addressing common goals with clear benefits well beyond conservation of marine biodiversity (Loya et al., 1999; Crosby et al., 2000a). The Soufriere Marine Management Area, St Lucia (a multiple use area including no-take marine reserves, fishing priority zones and other use zones) was initially established as a tool to resolve conflicts among that area’s users (i.e. fishermen, tourists, yachters, sea bathers, divers) and is considered a success in this regard (P. Murray, pers. comm.).

#### Resource extraction is a vital part of the cultural and social existence of indigenous communities

Kuokkanen 11 [(Rauna, Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science and Aboriginal Studies Program at the University of Toronto) “Indigenous Economies, Theoriesof Subsistence, and Women: Exploring the Social Economy Model for Indigenous Governance” U Nebraska Press] AT

This article considers the signiﬁcance of indigenous economic sys-tems in contemporary society. It argues that indigenous economic systems have to be taken into account much more systematically than thus far in considerations of indigenous governance. The article contends that indigenous economic systems need to play a more central role in envisioning and shaping meaningful, comprehensive, and sustainable systems of contemporary indigenous self-governance. If indigenous economies are not taken into account, there is a serious danger of losing the very identities that constitute indigenous peoples. Indigenous economies such as household production and subsistence activities extend far beyond the economic sphere: they are at the heart of who people are culturally and socially. These economies, including the practices of sharing, manifest indigenous worldviews characterized by interdependence and reciprocity that extend to all living beings and to the land. In short, besides an economic occupation, subsistence activities are an expression of one’s identity, culture, and values. They are also a means by which social networks are maintained and reinforced. The article consists of three sections. The first section discusses definitions and contemporary significance of subsistence and indigenous economies. It questions the prevailing narrow, economistic analyses and interpretations of subsistence. Although economic development projects such as resource extraction may improve fiscal independence and strengthen the economic base of indigenous communities, they also present serious threats to indigenous economies.7 The second section examines the relationship between subsistence and wage labor, particularly from the perspective of women. It also considers the “war on subsistence” waged by the development and modernization theories, which continue to contribute to views of subsistence as “primitive” and “premodern.” The third section takes a closer look at the often glossed over roles of indigenous women in subsistence activities. It questions the conventional binary economic roles of man-the-hunter versus womanthe-gatherer and argues for a broader lens when assessing economic roles and divisions of labor along gendered lines. The article concludes with an examination of indigenous economic systems and the concept of the social economy as a foundation for contemporary indigenous governance. subsistence and indigenous economies For many, the term “subsistence” carries negative connotations of primitive ways of life, a low standard of living, or “eking out” a wretched existence in conditions of poverty. For others, it refers to “primitive” societies of the past or rural communities in the developing world. As discussed below, however, these negative views of subsistence have a specific history stemming from discourses of development that have waged a war against subsistence and everything it represents. Subsistence is both an economic and a social system, encompassing various spheres of life that often are inseparable from one another. It is characterized by endless circulation of goods, services, and other products. Subsistence, sometimes also called domestic production, follows the seasonal cycle of available resources—it has also been called the “seasonal, integrated economy”—and it includes hunting, fishing, gathering, trapping, and “other activities which provide income in kind— food, heat, clothing, shelter, and a variety of other subsistence goods and services” consumed by and shared within the family and community.8 The Inuit Circumpolar Conference defines subsistence as a highly complex notion that includes vital economic, social, cultural and spiritual dimensions. . . . Subsistence means much more than mere survival or minimum living standards. It enriches and sustains Inuit communities in a manner that promotes cohesiveness, pride and sharing. It also provides an essential link to, and communication with, the natural world of which Inuit are an integral part.9 Indigenous economies refer to traditional and local economic systems of indigenous peoples. These systems include a variety of land-based small-scale economic activities and practices as well as sustainable resource management. Indigenous economies are often characterized by a subsistence mode of production. At the center of the economic activity is not the exchange for profit or competition but the sustenance of individuals, families, and the community. Surplus is shared at numerous festivals and ceremonies that maintain the social cohesion of the community but also bring prestige to those who give and share their wealth. The subsistence-oriented economy—including various contemporary versions of mixed economies—also ensures the continuation of the traditional social organization. Berger notes: “Subsistence activities link the generations and the extended family into a complex network of associations, rights, and obligations. This network both reflects and re-creates the social order and gives meaning and value to each person’s contributions and rewards.”10 The key principles of indigenous economies—sustainability and reciprocity—reflect land-based worldviews founded on active recognition of kinship relations that extend beyond the human domain. Sustainability is premised on an ethos of reciprocity in which people reciprocate not only with one another but also with the land and the spirit world. Indigenous economies are thus contingent upon a stable and continuous relationship between the human and natural worlds. Knowledge of taking care of that relationship has traditionally been an integral part of social, economic, as well as spiritual structures and practices. In other words, there is a crucial link between subsistence and indigenous knowledge. Eugene Hunn notes that indigenous or traditional ecological knowledge “is a consequence of subsistence-based production” and that “we cannot preserve the one without preserving the other.”11 Individuals and communities acquire special knowledge, skills, and a complex understanding of the local environment through their various subsistence activities. It is this knowledge that “enables the people to live directly from the land.”12 Thus, the protection and promotion of indigenous knowledge requires encouraging “the continuity of subsistence based communities where such knowledge is produced.”13 Besides sustainable practices, subsistence economy is based on customary law: Subsistence activities in Alaska are governed by unwritten laws and beliefs that ensure the survival of families and villages. They include codes of customs and behavior that ensure a proper spiritual relationship between humans and animals and conserve resources. They strictly define the rights and duties and the obligations and privileges of tribal members. These laws operate effectively without any system of patents, land titles, or restrictions except selfimposed restrictions that have their origin in the Natives’ age-old knowledge of and reliance on the natural world.14

### Women’s Rights

#### Marine regulations harm women’s rights and well-being

Matthews 12 [(Elizabeth Matthews, Wildlife Conservation Society Advisor on Coastal Fisheries; Jamie Bechtel, Co-Founder and CEO of New Course and is a highly regarded leader in international conservation; Easkey Britton, PhD in Marine Science; Karl Morrison, Lessing Professor Emeritus of History and Poetics at Rutgers; and Caleb McClennen, Vice President for Species Conservation) “A Gender Perspective on Securing Livellihoods and Nutrition in Fish-dependent Coastall Communities” Report to The Rockefeller Foundation from Wildlife Conservation Society, Bronx, NY., Dec 2012] AT

Fisheries management and conservation approaches tend to benefit one sector of society and can have unintended, negative consequences for poverty, livelihoods, and human well-being. When conservation or development goals are implemented that benefit a single sector of a community, this does not necessarily translate into achieving development goals or benefitting all sectors within the community. It also disrupts household dynamics and further suppresses women’s ability to deliver food, water, and energy to their families. Conservation initiatives (i.e., MPA designation or fishing right allocation) have taken advantage of and often exacerbated unequal social power dynamics within communities. For example, in the Maldives, men were engaged in fishing and women in small-scale fish processing of a product called ‚Maldives fish‛ that was exported to Sri Lanka. Modernization of the fishing industry enabled fishermen to increase their catch and sell it directly to collection vessels that directly exported the fish. This seriously curtailed women’s involvement in processing the fish, and their participation in the labor force dropped from 50% to 19% in 1996.

#### Including women is key to the success of these initiatives – only the counterplan solves

Matthews 12 [(Elizabeth Matthews, Wildlife Conservation Society Advisor on Coastal Fisheries; Jamie Bechtel, Co-Founder and CEO of New Course and is a highly regarded leader in international conservation; Easkey Britton, PhD in Marine Science; Karl Morrison, Lessing Professor Emeritus of History and Poetics at Rutgers; and Caleb McClennen, Vice President for Species Conservation) “A Gender Perspective on Securing Livellihoods and Nutrition in Fish-dependent Coastall Communities” Report to The Rockefeller Foundation from Wildlife Conservation Society, Bronx, NY., Dec 2012] AT

Current community management investments can be leveraged. Rising donor and practitioner emphasis on strengthening community-based fishery management systems offer increased opportunities to more fully integrate and engage women in resource-management decision-making processes. In addition, understanding the gender dynamics within and among communities and how they could potentially impact community-based fishery management processes will help improve the overall likelihood of success of these processes. Gender is a means to new and innovative partnerships. Innovative partnerships that address socioeconomic conditions of fish-dependent communities in a holistic manner create the opportunity for broader funding and implementation strategies. Using a gender lens to design and implement fisheries co-management programs requires partnerships among organizations and individuals with expertise in a myriad of arenas: conservation, fisheries, community development, maternal and child health, nutrition, and business, among others. Broadening the scope of our partnerships will lead to greater innovation through the cross-fertilization of ideas among these different sectors.

#### This turns the case – initiatives that exclude and impoverish half the population will inevitably fail

Matthews 12 [(Elizabeth Matthews, Wildlife Conservation Society Advisor on Coastal Fisheries; Jamie Bechtel, Co-Founder and CEO of New Course and is a highly regarded leader in international conservation; Easkey Britton, PhD in Marine Science; Karl Morrison, Lessing Professor Emeritus of History and Poetics at Rutgers; and Caleb McClennen, Vice President for Species Conservation) “A Gender Perspective on Securing Livellihoods and Nutrition in Fish-dependent Coastall Communities” Report to The Rockefeller Foundation from Wildlife Conservation Society, Bronx, NY., Dec 2012] AT

A complex interplay of social, cultural and political factors influence dynamics between and among people at all levels – households, communities, states. These dynamics result in heterogeneity within and among households and communities and these differences have important implications for health, nutrition, livelihoods, and natural resource management in coastal fishing communities around the world (Weeratunge 2010). Many if not most of the dynamics that shape household and community behavior stem from gendered social constructs that dictate and influence how financial and other resources flow. Our research aimed to consider the distinct roles that men and women play across small scale fisheries to best understand and incorporate strategies and tools that consider gender, variety in local and household dynamics, and the entire fisheries value chain. As a result of this work, several opportunities to improve natural resource management and poverty outcomes emerge. Throughout this report we refer to the terms gender, gender roles, and gender dynamics. We are specifically talking about the roles of both men and women in different societies and how those roles define who has influence, power and the ability to make decisions regarding how resources are allocated and used. Often gender roles and gender dynamics create situations that are inequitable, particularly regarding the status, standing and power of women. As a result programs aimed at incorporating or understanding ‚gender‛ issues tend to be synonymous with empowering women to engage more fully and equitably in decision-making and other processes, because that is where the real needs and gaps are. Our assessment will take this approach to some extent, since in nearshore fisheries as in other sectors, the roles and input of women have not been adequately addressed. However, we will also include the dynamics among both men and women in these processes. ￼This assessment of gender and coastal fisheries was conducted through four primary components: 1. Global review of gender and fisheries; 2. Survey of gender, coastal fisheries and livelihoods issues across 11 sites in 9 countries where WCS works; 3. Regional profiles through site visits in Asia (Aceh, Indonesia) and East Africa (Kenya and Madagascar); and 4. Identification of potential pilot projects. Through this study we have found that an assessment of gender and how women are incorporated in nearshore fisheries management is a useful framework through which to determine how to approach solutions to nearshore fisheries and marine conservation problems so they have maximum benefit to the local communities that depend upon those fisheries for food and income. While researchers disagree on how to calculate poverty, there is consensus on three critical points: 1.The majority of the world’s poor are women; 2. Over half of the world’s poor live in rural and coastal areas and depend heavily on natural resource for survival; 3. Resource degradation is an acute problem in rural and coastal areas, with some 60% of the world’s poorest people living in ecologically vulnerable areas (Angelsen, 1997). The collapse of fisheries and degradation of other natural resources not only undermines food, health, energy and water security (UNDP, 2006), it also increases the vulnerability and decreases the resiliency of rural women and their families to external forces such as rapid demographic shifts, rapid economic growth, and war and conflict (Lambrou, 2000). It has long been recognized that women are the primary users and potential stewards of many natural resources that provide the means for basic survival (Rio Declaration, 1992; Declaration on World Food Security, 1996). In Africa, for example, women are charged with 80% of the food security (Madonsela, 2002) and 90% of the water security in rural and coastal communities (GWA, 2006). With regard to coastal communities specifically, marine species provide food for billions and jobs for hundreds of millions of people: 92% of the world’s fisherfolk are small- scale fishers working to feed families and local communities. As in other communities, women are central to food security in fishing villages around the world. In addition to providing food, women collect fuel for energy in mangroves, rely on plants and herbs for medicine from coastal forests, and use coastal resources to support the economic stability of families and communities from both agriculture and fishing activities. Because the majority of the rural poor are women and because their social roles and responsibilities require them to rely heavily on the coastal goods and services that are provided by the natural world, women are disproportionately impacted by fisheries collapse and the degradation of other coastal natural resources. Despite the vital importance of marine life to human well-being and economic development, marine species face a multitude of threats, all of which are derived from human activity. Despite their reliance on farmland, forests and fisheries for survival and livelihoods, the unique information that women have regarding resource use and management, and the potential stewardship role that they can play, women are not systematically engaged in the planning and implementation of natural resource management and fishing activities. To ensure the sustainability of poverty alleviation and natural resource management efforts in vulnerable rural ecosystems, women must be engaged in planning and implementation and they must share the benefits of management outcomes. The engagement of women is particularly important in coastal communities. Women represent almost 50% of the total workforce engaged in fisheries around the world, and they have generally been overlooked in marine conservation and fisheries management, particularly in developing countries. In fact, they are often omitted from the conservation and resource management process. While the omission of women from planning, implementing, and monitoring of conservation initiatives is sometimes in accordance with cultural norms, the majority of the time this omission is simple oversight. In instances where cultural norms may appear prohibitive, research and best practices have shown that these cultural norms are usually adaptive and accommodate the needs, ideas, and support of women’s engagement in natural resource management. Mounting pressure from unsustainable resource extraction, habitat modification, and impacts from near shore development populations jeopardize the distribution and abundance of near shore fish and invertebrates. These threats are exacerbated by climate-related impacts such as coral bleaching, sea level rise, and changing patterns and intensity of storms which increasingly threaten the integrity and natural resilience of coastal ecosystems. It has become increasingly urgent to address marine conservation and management strategies more effectively. While some notable marine conservation successes have been achieved through establishing protected areas, reforming fishing laws and policies, and zoning to slow or halt the collapse of fisheries, overall these efforts are failing to protect and maintain fish stocks around the world. There is an urgent need to survey a range of small-scale fisheries cases to identify scalable solutions that have already resulted in improved fisheries, biodiversity, and livelihoods as well as to identify innovations that will generate positive impacts leading to increases in marine environmental indicators and to poverty reduction. Successful initiatives must take into account and address the obstacles and constraints that inhibit women from managing their resources sustainably. These issues include insecure land and fisheries resource tenure, time poverty, educational/training opportunities lack of access to financing, increased exposure to health risks and other social, cultural, political, and economic barriers. Importantly, there is overwhelming evidence indicating that when women are engaged in conservation efforts, the results can be tremendous. Conservation outcomes are improved, food security is enhanced, and the cycle of poverty and natural resource degradation is broken. In summary, there is very little risk and potentially very high reward for reexamining marine conservation strategies through a gender lends and adjusting those strategies accordingly, thereby increasing the benefits derived from marine resources for both men and women in fishing communities.

### A2 You can fish elsewhere

#### Still imposes costs that make it impossible for subsistence fishers

Lutchman 5 [(Indrani, Senior Fellow and Head of Fisheries Programme at UNEP) “Marine Protected Areas: Benefits and Costs for Islands” International Coral Reef Action Network, collaborative effort working to halt and reverse the decline in health of the world’s coral reefs, June 2005] AT

The total cost of establishing and managing an MPA is far greater than the operational expenditure alone. MPAs also incur ‘indirect’ costs, which refer, for instance, to the value of the negative impacts of increased numbers of visitors (e.g. increased pressure on biodiversity and local culture) or from increased populations of certain species and their impact on others. There may be a cost of developing related infrastructure, for example, to provide the appropriate foundations for sustainable tourism around which an MPA has been designed. Other types of indirect costs are incurred through compensation payments to those adversely affected by the decision to establish a protected area and an associated management regime (Box 7). Recipients in this case could include fishers, processors and displaced communities. Alternative employment packages or livelihood options may need to be created. Occasionally fishing communities bear the indirect cost, post MPA establishment, of having to spend more time travelling to and from fishing grounds. In many fisheries, a significant component of total variable harvesting costs is the time and fuel spent searching for fish. Search costs might be low if the MPA provides significant spillover. On the other hand, if spillover effects are negligible, search costs might increase after an MPA is established. Displaced fishermen, who have local knowledge of fish concentrations, might need to spend additional time and effort learning about stock concentrations and oceanographic conditions that exist in the remaining non-protected areas. Fuel use may increase and the amount of time that vessels will spend with fishing gear in the water will be reduced. An MPA can, therefore, have the unintended consequence of increasing capital expenditures in the fishery at a time when fishery managers are trying to find ways to reduce capacity.29 Fishing is one of the most dangerous occupations in the world, and certain types of MPA can increase occupational risks. Closing a near-shore environment, like a sheltered lagoon, could force ﬁshermen to venture out to more distant waters. Operating further offshore will increase the time it would take to return to port, placing ﬁshermen at greater risks from storms. These risks could be exacerbated if inshore ﬁshermen, who are displaced by the MPA, are unable to secure the capital needed to make the necessary upgrades to their gear and vessels before heading offshore. The combination of inadequate vessels and lack of experience of the displaced ﬁshermen ‘forced’ to operate in new, riskier environments poses the potential for greater occupational risks and higher costs from increases in search and rescue missions.29

## Fish Wars DA

### 1NC Global

#### MPAs drive fishers into other marine areas, which causes conflict over fish and turns the aff solvency

Sanchirico 2 [(James N. Sanchirico, Professor Environmental Science and Policy University of California, Davis University Fellow Resources for the Future; Kathryn A. Cochran, Adjunct Professor Associate Dean for Student Affairs; and Peter M. Emerson, SENIOR ECONOMIST ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE ON INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTAS) “Marine Protected Areas: Economic and Social Implications” Discussion Paper 02–26 May] AT

Although there is a considerable amount of literature investigating the biological benefits of MPAs, the potential costs have not received much attention. In general, fishing is a complex process that depends on many factors, including the type of vessel and gear used, target species, stock density, and time and areas fished. The inputs into this process affect the costs associated with fishing and, therefore, impact the activity level. One can imagine, for instance, that less congestion at a given fishing ground could lower the cost per unit of catch. Costs could also differ across fishing grounds due to oceanographic conditions, such as stronger currents that increase fuel use and/or geographic features that prohibit the use of certain gear types. Within the current debate, an important question is how could the introduction of MPAs affect these types of costs. Reducing the amount of area open to fishing implies that, at least in the short-run, vessels could experience higher levels of congestion on the remaining grounds. Congestion effects could result in increases in fuel usage and higher capital costs (e.g., fish finding equipment). In addition, significantly reducing the amount of fishable waters could also lead to increased conflicts between users of the resource, such as allocation disputes and gear entanglements. A potential conflict could arise, for example, from a trawler displaced by an MPA venturing into an area traditionally occupied by fixed-gear fishermen only. In this example, the costs of harvesting increase not only for the displaced trawler, but also for the fixed-gear fishermen, who otherwise might not have been affected directly by the closures. Congestion effects might not only be concentrated in the fishery for which the closure was implemented, as establishment of an MPA could shift fishing pressure from one species to another, thereby increasing the competition for the catch of that second species (Sanchirico 2000).

#### These escalate globally – the impact is trade and resource wars

Ovetz 5 [(Robert, Prof of Social Sciences at Marin College, Save the Leatherback Campaign Coordinator) “Fishing: The New Resource War” Synthesis/Regeneration 38 (Fall 2005)] AT

Until the mid-20th century, the ocean was a key watery terrain of conflict between competing states seeking to expand their control over territories and natural resources. Today, the ocean is again a place of conflict. This time it is small-scale subsistence fishermen battling governments and industrial fishing companies for the declining and increasingly precious resource of fish. These battles, raging from Canada to Chile to Scotland to Taiwan, are the newest round of global resource wars. In late 2004 a fish war broke out when Italian boats surrounded and shot out portholes of a Croatian fishing vessel. The armed assault was retribution for the Croatian government’s setting up a “no go” area for foreign vessels. The closure was intended to protect local subsistence vessels and conserve local fisheries. The fish wars are flaring out of control across our planet. The Sri Lankan Navy has attacked Indian fishing vessels; strikes have rocked India; local subsistence fishermen in the Philippines protested the loss of their traditional access rights to foreign vessels; angry clashes have broken out in Chile and Taiwan; a mutiny hit Papua New Guinea; and Australia has seized and burned illegal fishing vessels. Just below the surface, a cold war is emerging as well. Environmental, recreational and industrial fishing groups have filed countless lawsuits over fishing in the US, anger has erupted over the EU’s sweeping changes in its fisheries policies, and a trade war has erupted between the US and Thailand and Vietnam over the former’s higher tariffs on imported farmed shrimp.

#### Resource wars cause extinction

Brown 11 – (Lester R. is the President of the Earth Policy Institute, “The New Geopolitics of Food,” May 2011, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/25/the_new_geopolitics_of_food?page=full>, Accessed Date: 3-15-13

The potential for conflict -- and not just over water -- is high. Many of the land deals have been made in secret, and in most cases, the land involved was already in use by villagers when it was sold or leased. Often those already farming the land were neither consulted about nor even informed of the new arrangements. And because there typically are no formal land titles in many developing-country villages, the farmers who lost their land have had little backing to bring their cases to court. Reporter John Vidal, writing in Britain's Observer, quotes Nyikaw Ochalla from Ethiopia's Gambella region: "The foreign companies are arriving in large numbers, depriving people of land they have used for centuries. There is no consultation with the indigenous population. The deals are done secretly. The only thing the local people see is people coming with lots of tractors to invade their lands." Local hostility toward such land grabs is the rule, not the exception. In 2007, as food prices were starting to rise, China signed an agreement with the Philippines to lease 2.5 million acres of land slated for food crops that would be shipped home. Once word leaked, the public outcry -- much of it from Filipino farmers -- forced Manila to suspend the agreement. A similar uproar rocked Madagascar, where a South Korean firm, Daewoo Logistics, had pursued rights to more than 3 million acres of land. Word of the deal helped stoke a political furor that toppled the government and forced cancellation of the agreement. Indeed, few things are more likely to fuel insurgencies than taking land from people. Agricultural equipment is easily sabotaged. If ripe fields of grain are torched, they burn quickly. Not only are these deals risky, but foreign investors producing food in a country full of hungry people face another political question of how to get the grain out. Will villagers permit trucks laden with grain headed for port cities to proceed when they themselves may be on the verge of starvation? The potential for political instability in countries where villagers have lost their land and their livelihoods is high. Conflicts could easily develop between investor and host countries. These acquisitions represent a potential investment in agriculture in developing countries of an estimated $50 billion. But it could take many years to realize any substantial production gains. The public infrastructure for modern market-oriented agriculture does not yet exist in most of Africa. In some countries it will take years just to build the roads and ports needed to bring in agricultural inputs such as fertilizer and to export farm products. Beyond that, modern agriculture requires its own infrastructure: machine sheds, grain-drying equipment, silos, fertilizer storage sheds, fuel storage facilities, equipment repair and maintenance services, well-drilling equipment, irrigation pumps, and energy to power the pumps. Overall, development of the land acquired to date appears to be moving very slowly. So how much will all this expand world food output? We don't know, but the World Bank analysis indicates that only 37 percent of the projects will be devoted to food crops. Most of the land bought up so far will be used to produce biofuels and other industrial crops. Even if some of these projects do eventually boost land productivity, who will benefit? If virtually all the inputs -- the farm equipment, the fertilizer, the pesticides, the seeds -- are brought in from abroad and if all the output is shipped out of the country, it will contribute little to the host country's economy. At best, locals may find work as farm laborers, but in highly mechanized operations, the jobs will be few. At worst, impoverished countries like Mozambique and Sudan will be left with less land and water with which to feed their already hungry populations. Thus far the land grabs have contributed more to stirring unrest than to expanding food production. And this rich country-poor country divide could grow even more pronounced -- and soon. This January, a new stage in the scramble among importing countries to secure food began to unfold when South Korea, which imports 70 percent of its grain, announced that it was creating a new public-private entity that will be responsible for acquiring part of this grain. With an initial office in Chicago, the plan is to bypass the large international trading firms by buying grain directly from U.S. farmers. As the Koreans acquire their own grain elevators, they may well sign multiyear delivery contracts with farmers, agreeing to buy specified quantities of wheat, corn, or soybeans at a fixed price. Other importers will not stand idly by as South Korea tries to tie up a portion of the U.S. grain harvest even before it gets to market. The enterprising Koreans may soon be joined by China, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and other leading importers. Although South Korea's initial focus is the United States, far and away the world's largest grain exporter, it may later consider brokering deals with Canada, Australia, Argentina, and other major exporters. This is happening just as China may be on the verge of entering the U.S. market as a potentially massive importer of grain. With China's 1.4 billion increasingly affluent consumers starting to compete with U.S. consumers for the U.S. grain harvest, cheap food, seen by many as an American birthright, may be coming to an end. No one knows where this intensifying competition for food supplies will go, but the world seems to be moving away from the international cooperation that evolved over several decades following World War II to an every-country-for-itself philosophy. Food nationalism may help secure food supplies for individual affluent countries, but it does little to enhance world food security. Indeed, the low-income countries that host land grabs or import grain will likely see their food situation deteriorate.

### China/Japan Impact Scenario

#### Fish conflict results in severe Asian instability

Pitlo 13 [(Lucio Blanco, independent researcher on Philippine foreign policy and maritime security issues and is formerly a Research Associate at the University of the Philippines Asian Center) “Fishing Wars: Competition for South China Sea’s Fishery Resources” International Relations and Security Network Jun 10] AT

Initially, fishing across much of the South China Sea was not even a matter of geopolitical concern. For decades, fishermen were oblivious to maritime boundaries and international maritime laws, with littoral states often turning a blind eye to their activities. This has changed, however, in recent years. Dwindling fisheries around coastal areas and long range commercial fishing have pushed the fishing frontier farther into the disputed waters of the SCS. As a result, fishing has now become a politically-sensitive and emotionally-charged national security issue for claimant countries. The politics of fish After years of relative state neglect, fishermen across the region are now receiving increased government and public support. A nascent fishing lobby is emerging in several countries advocating better state assistance and support for fishermen encroaching into territorial waters. However, the growing securitization of the SCS’ maritime and territorial disputes puts the fishermen of the region in a precarious position. No longer are they innocent actors making a livelihood: increasingly they are viewed as agents of their home governments and pawns in the maritime policies of their respective states. This viewpoint is not entirely unjustified, given the significant trend in some countries – most notably China – that has seen marked increase in coordination and physical support between its fishermen and maritime authorities. For instance, in April 2012, Chinese fishermen in the Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal), about to be apprehended for illegal fishing, were able to radio Chinese Maritime Surveillance ships to intercede on their behalf. The fishermen were caught capturing endangered, protected marine species, including giant clams in the area; however the intervention effectively prevented their arrest by the Philippine maritime authorities. China has also increased its SCS patrols significantly in the last decade – this went up from 477 in 2005 to 1235 in 2009. Though the assertion of state presence worked to the fishermen’s advantage in this case, in the long-run such precedents are detrimental to the security of fishing industries in regional states, and those who depend on them. As distinctions between private economic interests and geopolitical objectives grow blurred, private economic activities become politically tainted. Relatively ‘neutral’ projects, such as constructing shelters for protection during typhoons, are now seen with suspicion and alarm: previous experience has shown that such shelters can eventually turn into military bases or be used for dual purposes. A case in point was the Chinese occupation of Panganiban or Mischief Reef, a feature in the Philippines’ Kalayaan Island Group and within its 200 nm-EEZ. Though in 1995 the project was allegedly for the construction of fishermen shelters, by 1998 it had evolved into a military garrison. Fishermen who enter contested waters are now seen as challenging a coastal state’s sovereignty. Such intrusions provoke calls among claimants for stronger penalties for illegal fishing, making it difficult for governments to release foreign offenders for fear of domestic backlash. The passing of domestic laws that formalize maritime claims in the SCS is also a worrying development. Since fishermen are known to migrate in neighboring areas where maritime law enforcement is weaker, this incentivizes aggrieved local fishermen to compel their government to take a tougher stance on the issue. What results is a competitive dynamic between disputants to build up their naval and coast guard assets, exacerbating tensions and contributing to further regional instability. Overlapping EEZ claims and the squabble for resource access has already spurred a regional naval arms race, with China in the lead in constructing patrol, coastal defense, and warships, to be deployed over the next decade.

#### Asian war goes nuclear---no defense---interdependence and institutions don’t check

C. Raja Mohan 13, distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, March 2013, Emerging Geopolitical Trends and Security in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the People’s Republic of China, and India (ACI) Region,” background paper for the Asian Development Bank Institute study on the Role of Key Emerging Economies, <http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2013/10737.pdf>

Three broad types of conventional conflict confront Asia. The first is the prospect of war between great powers. Until a rising PRC grabbed the attention of the region, there had been little fear of great power rivalry in the region. The fact that all major powers interested in Asia are armed with nuclear weapons, and the fact that there is growing economic interdependence between them, has led many to argue that great power conflict is not likely to occur. Economic interdependence, as historians might say by citing the experience of the First World War, is not a guarantee for peace in Asia. Europe saw great power conflict despite growing interdependence in the first half of the 20th century. Nuclear weapons are surely a larger inhibitor of great power wars. Yet we have seen military tensions build up between the PRC and the US in the waters of the Western Pacific in recent years. The contradiction between the PRC’s efforts to limit and constrain the presence of other powers in its maritime periphery and the US commitment to maintain a presence in the Western Pacific is real and can only deepen over time.29 We also know from the Cold War that while nuclear weapons did help to reduce the impulses for a conventional war between great powers, they did not prevent geopolitical competition. Great power rivalry expressed itself in two other forms of conflict during the Cold War: inter-state wars and intra-state conflict. If the outcomes in these conflicts are seen as threatening to one or other great power, they are likely to influence the outcome. This can be done either through support for one of the parties in the inter-state conflicts or civil wars. When a great power decides to become directly involved in a conflict the stakes are often very high. In the coming years, it is possible to envisage conflicts of all these types in the ACI region. ¶ Asia has barely begun the work of creating an institutional framework to resolve regional security challenges. Asia has traditionally been averse to involving the United Nations (UN) in regional security arrangements. Major powers like the PRC and India are not interested in “internationalizing” their security problems—whether Tibet; Taipei,China; the South China Sea; or Kashmir—and give other powers a handle. Even lesser powers have had a tradition of rejecting UN interference in their conflicts. North Korea, for example, prefers dealing with the United States directly rather than resolve its nuclear issues through the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UN. Since its founding, the involvement of the UN in regional security problems has been rare and occasional.¶ The burden of securing Asia, then, falls squarely on the region itself. There are three broad ways in which a security system in Asia might evolve: collective security, a concert of major powers, and a balance of power system.30 Collective security involves a system where all stand for one and each stands for all, in the event of an aggression. While collective security systems are the best in a normative sense, achieving them in the real world has always been difficult. A more achievable goal is “cooperative security” that seeks to develop mechanisms for reducing mutual suspicion, building confidence, promoting transparency, and mitigating if not resolving the sources of conflict. The ARF and EAS were largely conceived within this framework, but the former has disappointed while the latter has yet to demonstrate its full potential. ¶ A second, quite different, approach emphasizes the importance of power, especially military power, to deter one’s adversaries and the building of countervailing coalitions against a threatening state. A balance of power system, as many critics of the idea point out, promotes arms races, is inherently unstable, and breaks down frequently leading to systemic wars. There is growing concern in Asia that amidst the rise of Chinese military power and the perception of American decline, many large and small states are stepping up their expenditure on acquiring advanced weapons systems. Some analysts see this as a structural condition of the new Asia that must be addressed through deliberate diplomatic action. 31 A third approach involves cooperation among the great powers to act in concert to enforce a broad set of norms—falling in between the idealistic notions of collective security and the atavistic forms of balance of power. However, acting in concert involves a minimum level of understanding between the major powers. The greatest example of a concert is the one formed by major European powers in the early 18th century through the Congress of Vienna after the defeat of Napoleonic France. The problem of adapting such a system to Asia is the fact that there are many medium-sized powers who would resent any attempt by a few great powers to impose order in the region.32 In the end, the system that emerges in Asia is likely to have elements of all the three models. In the interim, though, there are substantive disputes on the geographic scope and the normative basis for a future security order in Asia.

### ---A2 Not Worth Fighting

#### No checks on fish wars – the resource is valuable enough that they’ll risk conflict

Mizokami 10 [(Kyle, writes on defense and security issues in Asia, particularly Japan. He is the founder and editor for the blogs Japan Security Watch, Asia Security Watch and War Is Boring. Contributor at Medium, The Atlantic.com, Salon, The Japan Times and The Diplomat) “Resource wars: Japan, Asia, disputed territories, and fish” Japan Security Watch Nov 16] AT

Here’s an AFP article linking territorial disputes with dwindling fishing stocks, and the Asian fishermen who are willing to fish in disputed territorial waters to harvest the “new kind of gold in Asia”: “We have gas and oil people involved as well and this is politically the most sensitive issue, but… fishing companies bring a greater risk of incidents or tensions,” Holslag added. The industry — which is vital in Japan, the region’s key consumer — has the “great potential of becoming a political problem,” he warned. In both the East and South China Seas, white tuna is the most plentiful, and as Holslag explains, the price per kilo — about 13.50 dollars, five times the average price of the most popular fish in China — makes it “worth the risk”. (Link) It also appears that the recent incident involving Minjinyu 5179 hasn’t deterred other fishermen from fishing around the disputed isles. After the arrest by Tokyo of Chinese captain Zhan Qixiong, who was later released, one fisherman told sinovision: “No one said, ‘We won’t go to the Diaoyu anymore.’ “Even Captain Zhan said he would go fishing in the Diaoyus again.”

### ---Fish > Oil

#### Fish is a more likely cause of conflict than oil – overwhelms the alt cause

Pitlo 13 [(Lucio Blanco, independent researcher on Philippine foreign policy and maritime security issues and is formerly a Research Associate at the University of the Philippines Asian Center) “Fishing Wars: Competition for South China Sea’s Fishery Resources” International Relations and Security Network Jun 10] AT

The hydrocarbon potential of the South China Sea (SCS) has become a source of tension between the littoral states of the region and, to a certain extent, a number of outside actors. However, the SCS’s significance to global oil and gas supplies is over-hyped. Instead, it is the region’s fisheries rather than fossil fuels that have the potential to ignite a regional conflict. Fish not fuel Put simply, speculation that the SCS constitutes a ‘second Persian Gulf’ lacks substance. According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), the region’s offshore energy resources – at just over 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas – are comparable to European supplies. Contrary to popular belief, most of SCS’s oil and gas resources are actually located in non-disputed territory, closer to the shores of coastal states. Factors such as technological challenges, inadequate seismic studies, plus huge costs and political risks also place serious limits on deep-water drilling farther into the SCS. But while the value of oil and gas resources in the SCS remains the subject of debate, the potential value of its fishery and aquaculture resources is not in doubt. Currently, the South China Sea accounts for one-tenth of the world’s global fisheries catch, and plays host to a multi-billion dollar fishing industry. Fish protein accounts for more than 22% of the average Asian diet and growing incomes across Asia will inevitably raise demand.

### East Africa Impact Scenario

#### Fish wars empirically escalate in the Horn of Africa/Nile

INIR 12 [INIR News, a service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. “KENYA: Vanishing fish income forces livelihood switch/correction 6/11/12. <http://www.irinnews.org/report/95617/kenya-vanishing-fish-income-forces-livelihood-switch-correction>] AJ

Experts say rising population and overfishing are deepening poverty for millions of residents around Lake Victoria, the world's second largest fresh water lake. "Population explosion around the lake means many people turn to the lake and also destroy the environment around it, and in just a matter of years these people will experience poverty and hunger on a large scale," warned Charles Mboya, a fisheries lecturer at Western Kenya's Maseno University. "International and local demand for fish and its products is on the increase against a backdrop of reducing fish stocks, which might lead to a vicious struggle for it. We might witness fish wars soon," he said. The ministry notes that cross-border fish and trade conflict is one of the industry's challenges; an estimated 3.5 million people depend on the lake for their livelihood, either directly or indirectly in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, the three countries that share the lake (Kenya’s share of the shoreline is 6 percent). In 2009 a diplomatic row broke out between Kenya and Uganda over fishing rights on the tiny disputed island of Migingo, which is near a rich breeding ground for Nile perch.

#### African conflicts cause great power war

Glick 7 (Caroline – senior Middle East fellow at the Center for Security Policy, Condi’s African holiday, p. http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/home.aspx?sid=56&categoryid=56&subcategoryid=90&newsid=11568)

The Horn of Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place. Small wars, which rage continuously, can easily escalate into big wars. Local conflicts have regional and global aspects. All of the conflicts in this tinderbox, which controls shipping lanes from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea, can potentially give rise to regional, and indeed global conflagrations between competing regional actors and global powers. Located in and around the Horn of Africa are the states of Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Kenya. Eritrea, which gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after a 30-year civil war, is a major source of regional conflict. Eritrea has a nagging border dispute with Ethiopia which could easily ignite. The two countries fought a bloody border war from 1998-2000 over control of the town of Badme. Although a UN mandated body determined in 2002 that the disputed town belonged to Eritrea, Ethiopia has rejected the finding and so the conflict festers. Eritrea also fights a proxy war against Ethiopia in Somalia and in Ethiopia's rebellious Ogaden region. In Somalia, Eritrea is the primary sponsor of the al-Qaida-linked Islamic Courts Union which took control of Somalia in June, 2006. In November 2006, the ICU government declared jihad against Ethiopia and Kenya. Backed by the US, Ethiopia invaded Somalia last December to restore the recognized Transitional Federal Government to power which the ICU had deposed. Although the Ethiopian army successfully ousted the ICU from power in less than a week, backed by massive military and financial assistance from Eritrea, as well as Egypt and Libya, the ICU has waged a brutal insurgency against the TFG and the Ethiopian military for the past year. The senior ICU leadership, including Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and Sheikh Sharif Ahmed have received safe haven in Eritrea. In September, the exiled ICU leadership held a nine-day conference in the Eritrean capital of Asmara where they formed the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia headed by Ahmed. Eritrean President-for-life Isaias Afwerki declared his country's support for the insurgents stating, "The Eritrean people's support to the Somali people is consistent and historical, as well as a legal and moral obligation." Although touted in the West as a moderate, Ahmed has openly supported jihad and terrorism against Ethiopia, Kenya and the West. Aweys, for his part, is wanted by the FBI in connection with his role in the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Then there is Eritrea's support for the Ogaden separatists in Ethiopia. The Ogaden rebels are Somali ethnics who live in the region bordering Somalia and Kenya. The rebellion is run by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) which uses terror and sabotage as its preferred methods of warfare. It targets not only Ethiopian forces and military installations, but locals who wish to maintain their allegiance to Ethiopia or reach a negotiated resolution of the conflict. In their most sensationalist attack to date, in April ONLF terror forces attacked a Chinese-run oil installation in April killing nine Chinese and 65 Ethiopians. Ethiopia, for its part has fought a brutal counter-insurgency to restore its control over the region. Human rights organizations have accused Ethiopia of massive human rights abuses of civilians in Ogaden. Then there is Sudan. As Eric Reeves wrote in the Boston Globe on Saturday, "The brutal regime in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, has orchestrated genocidal counter-insurgency war in Darfur for five years, and is now poised for victory in its ghastly assault on the region's African populations." The Islamist government of Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir is refusing to accept non-African states as members of the hybrid UN-African Union peacekeeping mission to Darfur that is due to replace the undermanned and demoralized African Union peacekeeping force whose mandate ends on December 31. Without its UN component of non-African states, the UN Security Council mandated force will be unable to operate effectively. Khartoum's veto led Jean-Marie Guehenno, the UN undersecretary for peacekeeping to warn last month that the entire peacekeeping mission may have to be aborted. And the Darfur region is not the only one at risk. Due to Khartoum's refusal to carry out the terms of its 2005 peace treaty with the Southern Sudanese that ended Khartoum's 20-year war and genocide against the region's Christian and animist population, the unsteady peace may be undone. Given Khartoum's apparent sprint to victory over the international community regarding Darfur, there is little reason to doubt that once victory is secured, it will renew its attacks in the south. The conflicts in the Horn of Africa have regional and global dimensions. Regionally, Egypt has played a central role in sponsoring and fomenting conflicts. Egypt's meddling advances its interest of preventing the African nations from mounting a unified challenge to Egypt's colonial legacy of extraordinary rights to the waters of the Nile River which flows through all countries of the region.

### ---Empirics

#### International policy in Africa confirms likelihood of war

Azikiwe 9/24 [(Abayomi, Editor, Pan-African News Wire) “US Wants to Stop China in Africa” The 4th Media 2013] AT

A political commentator says the United States has escalated military interventions in Africa in order to prevent China from gaining influence in Africa and maintain its dominance over the continent. The Pentagon, along with the Central Intelligence Agency as well as the National Security Agency, want to prevent China and other countries from gaining influence in Africa and “in a vain attempt to maintain US dominance” over the continent, Abayomi Azikiwe, editor of the Pan-African News Wire, told Press TV on Monday. “This of course, in the long run will not work because the US will be faced crises, as we see today in Somalia and as we see also in Kenya,” he added. “The United States, under both the previous government of George W. Bush, as well as the current regime of President Barack Obama, have started, and also escalated the intervention of the Pentagon in various African states,” the analyst said. A recent study has revealed even deeper US penetration in the African continent, Azikiwe said. “All of these interventions by the United States are clearly related to the strategic interest of the US in regard to the African continent,” he said. The Pentagon is reportedly preparing a list of targets for possible military strikes in Kenya and some other African countries aimed at targeting militants involved in Sunday’s deadly attack on a shopping mall in the Kenyan capital city of Nairobi. Somalia’s Al-Shabab fighters have reportedly claimed responsibility for the attack, saying it is in retaliation for Kenya’s military actions inside Somalia. Azikiwe also said that the US and other European powers have been “exploiting” East Africa’s oil and gas resources in recent months. He said these natural resources are “guiding US military policy towards the continent.”

### Southeast Asia Impact Scenario

#### Escalates in the context of Southeast Asia

Ahmed 6 [(Mahfuzuddin Ahmed, Principal Social Scientist and Director for Policy, Economics and Social Science of the WorldFish Center, President and Chair of the Board of the International Institute for Fisheries Economics and Trade; Nerissa D. Salayo, graduate student in the School of Economics, Griffith University; K. Kuperan Viswanathan, Professor of Resource and Environmental Economics Management; Len R. Garces, employed with the Worldfish Center in Manilla, Philippines; Michael D. Pido, Palawan State University, Philippines) “Management of Fishing Capacity and Resource Use Conflicts in Southeast Asia: A Policy Brief” The WorldFish Center (Malaysia) August] AT

Conflicts over resource use in fisheries have been escalating all over the world. This is particularly true in Southeast Asia (SEA). Its productive fisheries resource systems provide the much needed employment and protein requirements of the population. Increasing fishing pressure and over-harvesting of fishery resources, however, have resulted in tense competition for resource between small-scale and large-scale fishing operations, as well as the reduction and/or collapse of important viable fish populations. These, in turn, have led to high levels of conflicts among different users over remaining stocks. The rapid population growth rate – in a societal context of reduced income, increased poverty and an overall decline in the standard of living – often drive users to employ more effective, but destructive, fishing technologies.

#### Asia war causes global warfare

Rudd 9 [Kevin Rudd MP, Prime Minister of Australia, Keynote Address at Shangri-La Dialogue – Singapore, May 2] AT

The choice was how to shape their region; how to look beyond their own borders and to build a region that would support their ambition to grow in peace, stability and prosperity. The nations of South East Asia – including of course our hosts Singapore chose, actively chose cooperation. They chose to shape their common future together. They chose to form the Association of South East Asian Nations. At its core was the notion that through cooperation, rather than conflict or competition, all members, all members would be better off. Implicit in the choice made by those farsighted leaders in the 1960s is the notion of interdependence – that the future of a nation depends on the future of the nations around it; that by building communities of nations, all members of the community reap greater rewards than they could working alone. The results of course speak for themselves. ASEAN has played an important role in building a stable strategic foundation for South East Asia, when before its creation this was far from the case. And that stability has enabled its member nations to grow from strength to strength. It has also allowed the influence of South East Asia to be felt in the region and beyond. Tonight I want to draw on the great example of ASEAN and talk about the future of our wider region in this the Asia Pacific century. I want to draw on the lessons of ASEAN and argue that as a wider region we also have long-term choices before us. The choice is whether we seek actively to shape the future of our wider region – the Asia Pacific region – by building the regional architecture we need for the future, if we are together to shape a common regional future. Or whether instead, we will adopt a passive approach – where we simply wait and see what evolves, whether that enhances stability or whether in fact it undermines stability. Do we sit by and allow relations between states to be buffeted by economic and strategic shifts and shocks. Or do we seek to build institutions to provide anchorages of stability able to withstand the strategic stresses and strains of the future, when they inevitably arise. In the first half of the 20th century, we saw the tragic consequences of rampant nationalism as nations competed for power. Great powers in Europe bumped up against each other without the benefit of regional institutions to smooth problems as they arose. The result was devastating conflict. For our own region, we cannot simply assume that peace and prosperity are the inevitable products of human progress. Will we make choices for cooperation or conflict? Will we make active choices for cooperation; or allow drift to set in that takes us in the reverse direction. Will we seek a framework of shaping the institutions of common security for our region; or will we allow traditional interstate tensions to evolve and in some cases escalate. It will take us time to make the choices before us. But the first step in this process is that we need to have the regional conversation about our trajectory for the future – about what sort of region we want to be in 2020 and beyond. We need to have a discussion about what we have. We need to have a discussion about what we want to be. And, if there is agreement on this, what steps might be useful in realising our common regional future. History tells us that cooperation delivers benefits in strategic stability, not just in economic growth. The truth is we must work hard at peace and stability because the possibilities of miscommunication, of miscalculation, and misadventure are always great. And that cooperation, transparency and common endeavour represent the exception, which means our conscious efforts to enhance cooperation must always be the greater because the natural default position tends to be suspicion rather than cooperation. Within East Asia there are also other particular dynamics at play. South-East Asian growth is altering traditional strategic, strong East Asian growth is altering relativities making the management of regional security even more complicated. America’s capacity for economic re-invention and renewal should never be underestimated. And, while China’s remarkable development will continue, we should not underestimate the challenges China faces in balancing its engines of growth from exports to domestic consumption, potentially a turning point in East Asia’s future economic growth. Managing major power relations – particularly in the context of the rise of China and India – will be crucial for our collective future. This will place a premium on wise statecraft, particularly the effective management of relations between the United States, Japan, China and India. Over the last half century the United States has underwritten stability in the Asia Pacific. This stability has allowed nations in the region to prosper. And our common interest is for this stability to continue into the future. But just as economic cooperation cannot be assumed, strategic cooperation too is also a matter of choice. Asia includes the world’s two most populous countries; the world’s largest holders of foreign exchange reserves; two of the world’s top three economies; and three of the world’s five largest militaries, there’s a lot going on in our neighbourhood. The centre of global geo-strategic and geo-economic gravity is shifting to our region. So not only do the countries of our region have an interest in the region’s future stability, so too does the world at large. The simple truth is this; that much of the critical history of the 21st century will be written, shaped and lived out here in our own region. Together therefore we shoulder great responsibilities both regional and global. Also in our region we have the United States, which will remain for the foreseeable future the single most powerful strategic actor through a combination of military, economic and soft power, and the only nation capable of projecting power globally. This strategic primacy of the United States will continue to be vital in the maintenance of stability. As other countries become more affluent, their military spending will also increase. Strategically therefore, our region will be dynamic, not static, adding further to the uncertainties we confront in the future. And in a rapidly changing region, we will therefore face a wide range of emerging security challenges – both traditional and non-traditional.

### ---More Impact Cards

#### The brink is now

IFF 11 [(Institute For The Future) “Water Conflicts at a Boiling Point in Southeast Asia” Catalysts for change, nonprofit] AT

"Though land has historically been the focus of resource conflict, increasing water shortages combined with the insatiable demands of burgeoning populations, industry and agriculture are likely to prompt new conflicts. Ismail Serageldin, the first chairperson of the Global Water Partnership, declared in 1995, 'If the wars of this century were fought over oil, the wars of the next century will be fought over wchange our approach to managing this precious and vital resource.' "Changing river basin hydrology presents especially grave threats to agriculture, food security and livelihoods of marginal farmers. The recent drastic drop in water levels in the Mekong River, blamed by many on Chinese dam-building on upstream tributaries, has led to rising political tensions among the countries of the Mekong Basin, and threatens to destabilize the entire region. Yet, despite this stark warning of things to come, more dams are planned in China, Lao PDR and Thailand. It seems inevitable that water conflicts in the region are set to intensify." Implications from Institute for the Future: Conflict resolution experts agree that inter-state conflict has been on a sharp decline since at least the end of the Cold War, possibly earlier depending on what figures you look at. However, as Noviscope explains, resource conflicts tend to be inter-state. This places the future of conflict resolution (a relatively young field) at the cusp of potential major change. Some conflict resolution experts worry that the field has lost much time focusing on inter-state resolution techniques when these conflicts have been in decline, but perhaps they will be well trained for coming inter-state resource conflicts. What is potentially new for these conflicts however is having to disentangle the interests of both government powers and indigenous groups. While the governments of the Mekong River Region may be in dispute over proper use of the river with each other, each of these governments may in turn face opposition from indigenous groups. Having to meet the interests of so many different groups will make finding a lasting resolution that much harder, if not impossible.

#### Global nuclear war – interdependence and conflict management can’t check

C. Raja Mohan 13, distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, March 2013, Emerging Geopolitical Trends and Security in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the People’s Republic of China, and India (ACI) Region,” background paper for the Asian Development Bank Institute study on the Role of Key Emerging Economies, <http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2013/10737.pdf>

Three broad types of conventional conflict confront Asia. The first is the prospect of war between great powers. Until a rising PRC grabbed the attention of the region, there had been little fear of great power rivalry in the region. The fact that all major powers interested in Asia are armed with nuclear weapons, and the fact that there is growing economic interdependence between them, has led many to argue that great power conflict is not likely to occur. Economic interdependence, as historians might say by citing the experience of the First World War, is not a guarantee for peace in Asia. Europe saw great power conflict despite growing interdependence in the first half of the 20th century. Nuclear weapons are surely a larger inhibitor of great power wars. Yet we have seen military tensions build up between the PRC and the US in the waters of the Western Pacific in recent years. The contradiction between the PRC’s efforts to limit and constrain the presence of other powers in its maritime periphery and the US commitment to maintain a presence in the Western Pacific is real and can only deepen over time.29 We also know from the Cold War that while nuclear weapons did help to reduce the impulses for a conventional war between great powers, they did not prevent geopolitical competition. Great power rivalry expressed itself in two other forms of conflict during the Cold War: inter-state wars and intra-state conflict. If the outcomes in these conflicts are seen as threatening to one or other great power, they are likely to influence the outcome. This can be done either through support for one of the parties in the inter-state conflicts or civil wars. When a great power decides to become directly involved in a conflict the stakes are often very high. In the coming years, it is possible to envisage conflicts of all these types in the ACI region. ¶ Asia has barely begun the work of creating an institutional framework to resolve regional security challenges. Asia has traditionally been averse to involving the United Nations (UN) in regional security arrangements. Major powers like the PRC and India are not interested in “internationalizing” their security problems—whether Tibet; Taipei,China; the South China Sea; or Kashmir—and give other powers a handle. Even lesser powers have had a tradition of rejecting UN interference in their conflicts. North Korea, for example, prefers dealing with the United States directly rather than resolve its nuclear issues through the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UN. Since its founding, the involvement of the UN in regional security problems has been rare and occasional.¶ The burden of securing Asia, then, falls squarely on the region itself. 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#### Causes regime instability that has global impacts

Buzan and Foot 4 [(Barry Buzan, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science; Rosemary Foot, Professor of International Relations at St. Anthony College) “Does China Matter? A Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal”, ed. by B. Buzan and R. Foot]

Indeed, if China is at odds with its neighbours then its position will be worse than that of Russia and India. In their immediate regions, those two have only to deal with powers much smaller than themselves. In China's region there are several very substantial powers whose antagonism would be a real burden. The importance of regional relations for a major power's global standing is easily shown by two extreme scenarios for China's future. In the first, China's development provides it with the strength and the identity to become the central hub of Asia, in the process largely displacing the US. It projects an acceptable political and economic image, and its neighbours bandwagon with it out of some combination of fear, prudence, admiration and hope for economic advantage. Its economy becomes the regional locomotive, and in political and military terms it is acknowledged as primus inter pares by Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states. Japan takes up a similar subordinate relationship with China to that it now has with the US, and China is able to use the regional institutions created by ASEAN rather as the US uses the Organization of American States. If the other Asian states fear to antagonize China, and don't balance against it, then China is both free to play a larger global role, and is insulated against pressure from the West. And if China succeeds in positioning itself at the centre of an Asian economy, then it can claim 'locomotive' status along with the US and the EU in the global economy. In the second scenario, China inspires fear in its neighbours. Japan's alliance with the US deepens, and India, Southeast Asia, Japan and possibly Russia coordinate their defences against China, probably with US support. Under the first set of conditions, China acquires a stable regional base which gives it both the status and the capability to play seriously on the global political stage. Under the second set of conditions, China may still be the biggest power in East Asia, but its ability to play on the global stage would be seriously curtailed. The task for this section is thus to examine the social and material forces in play and ask how they might support or block a move in either of these directions. Is it likely that China will acquire hegemony in East Asia, or is its rise to power more likely to produce US-backed regional balancing against it? I will examine the factors playing into this question on three levels: China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development; China's relations with its Asian neighbours; and its relationships with the US and the other great powers. China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development Debates about China's capability and prospects for development can be placed within a matrix formed by two variables: • Does China get stronger (because its economic development continues successfully) or weaker (because its development runs into obstacles, or triggers socio-political instability)? • Does China become a malign, aggressive, threatening force in international society (because it becomes hypernationalist or fascist), or does it become more benign and cooperative (because economic development brings internal democratization and liberalization)? If China's development falters and it becomes weak, then it will neither dominate its region nor project itself on to the global stage. Whether it is then politically benign or malign will be a much less pressing issue in terms of how others respond to it in the traditional politico-military security domain. What could happen in this scenario is that a breakdown in the socio-political order, perhaps triggered by economic or environmental troubles, might well trigger large-scale migrations, political fragmentations, or wider economic crises that would pose serious threats to China's neighbours. A major political collapse in China could also pose threats at the global level, via the scenario of a failed nuclear weapon state. But, if China becomes strong, then the malign or benign question matters a great deal. The benign and malign options could be alternative paths, or could occur in sequence, with a malign phase giving way to a benign one, as happened with Germany and Japan during their comparable phases of industrialization. The likelihood of just such a sequence was what underpinned Gerry's concern to promote constrainment.

## Community CP

### Community CP

#### Aff-specific text – the [gov of the country] should work with local communities to establish limits on marine resource extraction without prohibiting it.

#### Only the CP solves

Baragona 12 [(steve, journalist; cites Indiana University political science professor Elinor Ostrom) “Study: Giving Local Fishermen Control Prevents Overfishing” Voice of America April 05] AT

Saving threatened coral reef ecosystems may be best handled by the people who make their living from them, according to a recent study. In many tropical countries, overfishing by small-scale fishers threatens offshore reefs, which are some of the oceans’ most important ecosystems. The new study confirmed what a growing body of research has shown: giving local fishers more control over how, when and where to fish usually results in better incomes, more cooperation with the rules, and more fish on the reef. But not always. The new research also found out why these fisher-managed systems sometimes fail. Exponential decay Tropical coral reefs are fertile fishing grounds for some 200 million small-scale fishers around the world. But many of these reefs are in decline. Tim McClanahan with the Wildlife Conservation Society has followed the catch from one coastal fishing community in Kenya for more than a decade. “It was going down every year. It was just one of those beautiful exponential decay curves,” he says. The question was, what could they do to stop that decline before it crashed the whole reef ecosystem? Such a crash would not just be bad for the fish. The fishers who make their livelihoods from the reef would suffer as well. Central control Since no one owns the oceans, most countries put fisheries management in the hands of the central government. But it’s a complicated business, with a huge number of fishers, catching many different species, with a wide range of equipment, brought ashore in many different places. “Trying to manage that from an under-resourced ministry of fisheries in the capital city is basically an impossible task,” says Tim Daw at the University of East Anglia. Faraway authorities setting the rules but lacking the funds to enforce them are a major reason why fisheries around the world are in decline, he says. But Daw says that is changing. In the last decade or so, civil society groups and researchers have been helping fishing communities come together to set their own rules and enforcement mechanisms. “Rather than a centralized state actor trying to manage fisheries, it’s a cooperation between the state and the local people, with much more emphasis on the local people,” he says. Community rules Communities may decide to close off certain areas to fishing, for example, or restrict what kinds of equipment can be used. The Kenyan community McClanahan worked with decided to ban the use of very-fine-mesh nets that catch almost any kind of fish, large or small. “And sure enough, within months - six or seven months - the catch started to slowly rise, and it’s actually been rising since that happened,” McClanahan says. And as the catch rose, so did incomes. Getting everyone to follow the rules was not easy. But now the community elders tell him they will never go back. However, McClanahan says, there is more to the story.

#### Regional and community-based agreements best solve the tragedy of the commons. Government interference actively hinders effectiveness – scholarly consensus:

Ostrom et al 99 [Elinor Ostrom (Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change and Workshop in Political The- ory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University) Joanna Burger,2 Christopher B. Field,3 Richard B. Norgaard,4 David Policansky. “Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges.” Science VOL 284 (1999)] AJ

The empirical and theoretical research stim- ulated over the past 30 years by Garrett Har- din’s article has shown that tragedies of the commons are real, but not inevitable. Solving the dilemmas of sustainable use is neither easy nor error-free even for local resources. But a scholarly consensus is emerging re- garding the conditions most likely to stimu- late successful self-organized processes for local and regional CPRs (6, 26, 32). At- tributes of resource systems and their users affect the benefits and costs that users per- ceive. For users to see major benefits, re- source conditions must not have deteriorated to such an extent that the resource is useless, nor can the resource be so little used that few advantages result from organizing. Benefits are easier to assess when users have accurate knowledge of external boundaries and internal microenvironments and have reliable and valid indicators of resource conditions. When the flow of resources is relatively predictable, it is also easier to assess how diverse man- agement regimes will affect long-term bene- fits and costs. Users who depend on a resource for a major portion of their livelihood, and who have some autonomy to make their own ac- cess and harvesting rules, are more likely than others to perceive benefits from their own restrictions, but they need to share an image of how the resource system operates and how their actions affect each other and the resource. Further, users must be interested in the sustainability of the particular resource so that expected joint benefits will outweigh current costs. If users have some initial trust in others to keep promises, low-cost methods of monitoring and sanctioning can be devised. Previous organizational experience and local leadership reduces the users’ costs of coming to agreement and finding effective solutions for a particular environment. In all cases, individuals must overcome their ten- dency to evaluate their own benefits and costs more intensely than the total benefits and costs for a group. Collective-choice rules af- fect who is involved in deciding about future rules and how preferences will be aggregated. Thus, these rules affect the breadth of inter- ests represented and involved in making in- stitutional changes, and they affect decisions about which policy instruments are adopted (33). The Broader Social Setting Whether people are able to self-organize and manage CPRs also depends on the broader social setting within which they work. Na- tional governments can help or hinder local self-organization. “Higher” levels of govern- ment can facilitate the assembly of users of a CPR in organizational meetings, provide in- formation that helps identify the problem and possible solutions, and legitimize and help enforce agreements reached by local users. National governments can at times, however, hinder local self-organization by defending rights that lead to overuse or maintaining that the state has ultimate control over resources without actually monitoring and enforcing existing regulations. Participants are more likely to adopt ef- fective rules in macro-regimes that facilitate their efforts than in regimes that ignore re- source problems entirely or that presume that central authorities must make all decisions. If local authority is not formally recognized by larger regimes, it is difficult for users to establish enforceable rules. On the other hand, if rules are imposed by outsiders without consulting local participants, local users may engage in a game of “cops and robbers” with outside authorities. In many countries, two centuries of colonization followed by state-run development policy that affected some CPRs has produced great resistance to externally imposed institutions.

#### Process comes before product – the only way to create better policies is to bring the people impacted by decisions into the decision-making process – turns the aff solvency and makes policies more responsive to the needs of citizens

Barter 98 – PhD, Coordinator, Sustainable Transport Action Network for Asia and the Pacific A Rahman, UNCHS (Habitat) Regional Symposium on Urban Poverty in Asia, Transport and Urban Poverty in Asia: A Brief Introduction to the Key Issues, http://www.fukuoka.unhabitat.org/docs/occasional\_papers/project\_a/06/transport-barter-e.html

The Recife Declaration includes a strong emphasis on recognising the fundamental right of the poor to take part in decisions which impact on them. It states that the voices of the poor must be heard (United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat), 1996). Some governments and experts fear that an openness to participation will hinder decisive policy making. There is a traditional mistrust in transport planning of all community involvement, let alone involvement by the poorest people. However, experiences are showing that such involvement can be constructive and make public policies more likely to be well-considered and enforceable. Meaningful participation in transport planning decisions by stakeholders, with a special effort to hear those who are usually voiceless and powerless, can lead to workable solutions to otherwise intractable conflicts. Poor communities have demonstrated that they can be reasonable when treated fairly and sincerely but are very vulnerable and their range of choices is extremely limited. When consulted in a meaningful way, with the help of experienced NGOs, groups of low-income people have demonstrated the ability to state their interests, to appreciate many of the wider issues and to seek reasonable compromises. Documented cases that illustrate these points include negotiations involving the inhabitants of settlements along Mumbai railway lines and consultations with pedicab (cycle rickshaw) drivers in Dhaka about potential changes to their operating conditions (Gallagher, 1998; Patel and Sharma, 1997). This year a number of NGOs have championed the rights of low-income pedicab drivers in Java who are seeking the right to ply their trade in Jakarta after having been banned since 1989, and have managed to open up a process of negotiation and debate with the relevant authorities. The chances of success appear to be high. These good examples are unfortunately isolated and the documents include a realistic assessment of the enormous effort that will be required to make official agencies more receptive and consultative. The norm is that many communities have seen insincere consultations that merely seek to legitimise unfair actions that harm their communities and which have left them justifiably suspicious and cynical. Hearing the voices of the poor requires proactive effort from the relevant agencies. Non-governmental organisations and networks need to develop a much larger role in this proactive effort in the transport sector as they already have in other sectors, such as in shelter issues (International Forum on Urban Poverty, 1998; Patel and Sharma, 1997). Most of the NGOs and CBOs in Asia that assist poor communities to organise and empower themselves have not yet established strong capabilities to tackle transport issues and to make the connections between transport and other urgent issues for the poor, such as shelter, employment and basic services. The organisations that champion the interests of the poor in higher level policy debates have also sometimes missed the key transport issues that affect low-income people the most. Environmental organisations have taken up transport more often but sometimes in ways that are not sensitive to the needs of the poor. Civil society organisations that specifically champion the modes of transport used by the poor are generally non-existent or weak in most Asian cities (although there are exceptions). If the voices of the poor are to be heard more strongly in transport then decision-makers will need to become more receptive AND civil society will need to develop its capacity to tackle transport issues in a well informed way (and be assisted to do so) (Hook, 1998). One of the key aims of the SUSTRAN network is to help community groups and NGOs get access to the information and assistance that they need to demystify transport issues and to tackle them in a pro-poor way. Without broad-based consultation, the main voices that tend to be heard by government on transport issues are the well-organised and wealthy lobbies for car users, the trucking industry, the motor vehicle industry, the oil industry, and the infrastructure construction industry. Categories of actors and stakeholders in urban transport are numerous and their interactions complex (Dimitriou, 1992; Rimmer, 1986; Townsend, 1995). Transport is one field where public policy clearly does have a major impact upon the outcomes even in low-income settings (Allport, 1995; Barter, 1998, in preparation; Cervero, 1995; Hook and Replogle, 1996; Newman, 1993). Political processes and public participation must occur hand-in-hand with technical planning procedures. Participation is essential in order to balance the effects of market and government failures (Hook, 1998). Hearing alternative voices can also help to overcome the "wind-screen view" of transport problems by many urban transport decision makers. Most politicians, senior planners and transport engineers have little personal experience of using non-motorised transport or public transport as adults. This is particularly acute in cities where there is a strong polarisation between rich and poor. The transport planning professions are also highly male-dominated in most countries. This is a serious obstacle to a gender-aware approach.

#### Citizen participation in decision-making spills over to greater openness and improvements in the planning process

Willson 1 - Professor of Department of Urban and Regional Planning @ California State Polytechnic University Richard, “Assessing communicative rationality as a transportation planning paradigm,” Transportation, http://www.uvm.edu/~transctr/pdf/willson\_article.pdf

The effects of this approach are greater attention to ends (goals), better integration of means and ends, new forms of participation and learning, and enhanced democratic capacity. Because of the educational function of planning, planning documents and presentations do more than document technical analysis – they engage the public in thinking about fundamental questions, explore images, ideals and values, and open up the process to creative participation. Public participation is seen as a part of an ongoing learning process, not an episodic event prior to the adoption of a new plan. Example: The parking planning effort has multiple purposes: 1) to design and implement parking policies; 2) to promote learning about the ridership, fiscal, environmental and social equity goals of the agency; and 3) to build a deliberative capacity among decision-makers and community stakeholders for addressing other strategic transit issues. The planning process helps decision-makers, stakeholders and the public learn about how transit agency goals are realized in specific policies and informs the broader goals of the transportation agency and society. For example, one board member may see free surface parking as the impediment to economically feasible transit-oriented development while another might see it as a basic right of a commuter. The planning process helps them explain their perspectives, search for common ground and agree to tradeoffs. Similarly, discussion about the distributional consequences of alternative parking charges may lead to discussion of broader station access strategies, or even a discourse that redefines the mission of the organization. The parking issue is a way of developing the strategic plan of the organization and can be a catalyst for broader public debate about transportation pricing, transportation equity and the environment. Planning process. As shown in Figure 2, communicative transportation planning does not involve a linear progression from ends to means. Instead, it is an iterative process that transforms the decision environment and the participants themselves. Participants simultaneously consider means and ends. Communicative transportation planning emphasizes listening, conveying, interpreting, mediating and bridge-building between stakeholders – encouraging them to ease their commitment to pre-existing positions and to share interests and goals. It is open to and influences the larger context of societal values, public opinion, institutions and stakeholders. Consequently, communicative planning itself may develop or modify the planning process. Finally, communicative transportation planning encourages a continuous critique about the planning process and its effects. It draws attention to that process rather than using a cookbook-like set of procedural steps for planning.7 Accordingly, communicative rationality involves experimental approaches because developing the planning process is an explicit part of the planning activity.

## Case

### Tourism > Overfishing

#### Tourism is an alt cause that overwhelms aff solvency – overfishing is irrelevant

Butler 13 [(Rory, working at OBSERVER as a technician, graduated from the University of the West Indies, St Augustine, in the Editorial Department as a journalist) “Fisherman: ‘Overfishing is not the problem’” The Observer Jun 17] AT

Concern about overfishing is diverting attention from more serious issues affecting the health of fish stocks in Antigua & Barbuda, according to an experienced fisherman. Brent “Frankie”, who did not reveal his last name, said the declining health of “fish sanctuaries” such as McKinnon’s Pond has had a much greater impact on the marine ecosystem. The fisherman, who helps to run his family’s seafood restaurant ‘A Captain’s Tale’, admitted fishermen now have to go further out to sea in search of catches. “But that has nothing to do with us overfishing; it has to do with the hotels pumping their waste into the breeding ponds like McKinnon’s,” Frankie said. McKinnon’s Pond is the subject of a wastewater project funded by the Global Environment Fund (GEF). The pond was closed off from the sea several years ago and studies have found raw sewage and waste oil, which flows from neighbouring communities and nearby developments, deposited in the catchment.

### Solvency Indict

#### MPAs fail to protect biodiversity – 2 warrants.

Note – benthic=bottom of the seabed

Richardson et al 09 [Anthony Richardson (School of Physical Sciences, University of Queensland) et al. "Pelagic protected areas: the missing dimension in ocean conservation." Trends in ecology & evolution 24.7 (2009): 360-369] AJ

Recent years have seen a rapid increase in the implementation of marine protected areas (MPAs) for conservation in both national waters [19] and the high seas [22]. Although many of these MPAs include pelagic environ- ments, we believe these are largely inadequate for pelagic conservation for two reasons. First, many of these protected areas are designed to restrict threats to benthic environments such as mining or bottom trawling, and often fail to arrest exploitation of the associated pelagic environment (e.g. Huon Marine Reserve off southern Australia; http://www.environment.gov.au/coasts/mpa/southeast/ huon/management.html). Second, even in cases where pelagic waters are protected, this is often coincidental and not explicitly based on the occurrence of pelagic features. Such coincidental protection is inadequate, as benthic habitats are unlikely to be good surrogates for pelagic habitats. Although it is widely recognized that commitments for the establishment of protected areas under agreements, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity, extend to pelagic zones [19,23], few pelagic protected areas exist (Boxes 1,2).

### Solvency Defense Magnifier

#### Any solvency answers triggers a sunset clause that completely revokes the MPA

Agardy 3 [(TUNDI AGARDY, Sound Seas; PETER BRIDGEWATER, UNESCO Man and the Biosphere Program; MICHAEL P. CROSBY, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; JON DAY, Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority; PAUL K. DAYTON, Scripps Institution of Oceanography; RICHARD KENCHINGTON, Maritime Policy Centre, University of Wollongong; DAN LAFFOLEY, English Nature, Peterborough; PATRICK McCONNEY, Caribbean Conservation Association; PETER A. MURRAY, Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, Environment and Sustainable Development Unit, Castries, Saint Lucia; JOHN E. PARKS, Biological Resources Program, World Resources Institute, Washington; and LELEI PEAU, Department of Commerce, Government of American Samoa, Pago Pago, American Samoa, USA) “Dangerous targets? Unresolved issues and ideological clashes around marine protected areas” AQUATIC CONSERVATION: MARINE AND FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEMS, Aquatic Conserv: Mar. Freshw. Ecosyst Jan 12] AT

Denying uncertainty is a huge risk we cannot afford to take. When MPA advocates make sweeping statements about the benefits of MPAs, expectations are raised in user groups and put MPA cynics on their guard. Striving to meet these often unrealistically high expectations then puts unnecessary pressure on MPA managers, threatens the continued existence of these MPAs, and even endangers future MPA designations. The consequences are not just disappointments and bruised egos - in many cases in some parts of the world, sunset clauses are written into MPA legislation, requiring that certain targets (usually increases in fishery biomass) be reached within a certain timeframe lest the MPA be revoked, or at a minimum, deprived of its funding. While it is imperative that performance be strictly monitored in all MPAs, we should be wary of traps that unrealistic targets pose for conservation interests.

### Regional MPAs Turn

#### Turn – they trade off with regional MPAs

Lutchman 5 [(Indrani, Senior Fellow and Head of Fisheries Programme at UNEP) “Marine Protected Areas: Benefits and Costs for Islands” International Coral Reef Action Network, collaborative effort working to halt and reverse the decline in health of the world’s coral reefs, June 2005] AT

As island countries begin to scale up from individual MPAs to national and regional networks and systems, it may not be sufﬁcient to expand or replicate mechanisms that have worked at individual sites. Financing strategies at a network level will involve trade-offs, such as between income retention at speciﬁc sites versus pooling of resources for the network overall, or concentrating tourism impacts in particular areas in order to generate funds for conservation of more ‘pristine’ sites. Planners and policy makers will also need to explore system-wide mechanisms – e.g., endowments – and sources of funds that reﬂect resource uses and the beneﬁts that MPA networks can provide, for example to sustainable ﬁsheries management.26

#### Outweighs – A) National MPAs are worse than regional ones due to financing

Lutchman 5 [(Indrani, Senior Fellow and Head of Fisheries Programme at UNEP) “Marine Protected Areas: Benefits and Costs for Islands” International Coral Reef Action Network, collaborative effort working to halt and reverse the decline in health of the world’s coral reefs, June 2005] AT

Most MPAs suffer from chronic financial problems. No single source of financing is ever likely to reliably cover the long term costs of effectively managing MPAs, thus a portfolio approach is generally required. Yet few countries – even among the richest – have managed to define and establish an appropriate range of mechanisms that, together, provide long term sustainable financing for a single MPA, let alone a network. Specific guidance on sustainable MPA financing is available from a variety of easily accessible sources. A range of financing options is summarised in Table 1.40 Some mechanisms will likely operate at a local level and generate resources for only one park or one type of activity. Others will function at a national or network-wide level, necessitating transparent arrangements to allocate resources across various protected areas. Still others will not be mechanisms to generate resources, but instead are management approaches that lower costs and, at the same time, engender a greater sense of ownership for and participation in conservation and sustainable development activities by key stakeholders.

#### B) National MPAs are planned worse

Leisher 7 [(Craig Leisher, Pieter van Beukering, Lea M. Scherl) “Nature’s Investment Bank: How protected areas contribute to poverty reduction” This study was funded by The Nature Conservancy, the Australian Government Department of the Environment and Water Resources, and the Poverty Reduction and Environment Management Program at Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam] AT

Think small but integrated. The marine protected areas with the greatest contributions to poverty reduction were the two smallest. Navakavu and Apo Island are tiny marine protected areas within sight of the beneficiary villages. Both have low operating costs and high benefits and were planned in an integrated manner. In such sites, there are fewer stakeholders to consult, and the fish spillover from these marine protected areas is easier for local communities to see. This suggests that a network of smaller marine protected areas each affiliated with a local community may contribute more to poverty reduction than a single larger marine protected area. In fact, a network of smaller marine protected areas that are ecologically connected may have the greatest potential yet for both reducing coastal poverty and conserving near-shore marine biodiversity. These smaller marine protected areas could also potentially promote tourism together to achieve greater non-fishing incomes as well.

### Backlash Turn

MIGHT BE A DOUBLE TURN! MAKE SURE YOUR OTHER OFFENSE IS CASE SPECIFIC, OR READ THE COMMUNITY CP

#### MPAs fail and generate backlash that undermines more effective solutions – every solvency deficit triggers this and turns the whole case since it causes international roll-back

Agardy 3 [(TUNDI AGARDY, Sound Seas; PETER BRIDGEWATER, UNESCO Man and the Biosphere Program; MICHAEL P. CROSBY, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; JON DAY, Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority; PAUL K. DAYTON, Scripps Institution of Oceanography; RICHARD KENCHINGTON, Maritime Policy Centre, University of Wollongong; DAN LAFFOLEY, English Nature, Peterborough; PATRICK McCONNEY, Caribbean Conservation Association; PETER A. MURRAY, Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, Environment and Sustainable Development Unit, Castries, Saint Lucia; JOHN E. PARKS, Biological Resources Program, World Resources Institute, Washington; and LELEI PEAU, Department of Commerce, Government of American Samoa, Pago Pago, American Samoa, USA) “Dangerous targets? Unresolved issues and ideological clashes around marine protected areas” AQUATIC CONSERVATION: MARINE AND FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEMS, Aquatic Conserv: Mar. Freshw. Ecosyst Jan 12] AT

Sectors of society that once opposed such habitat protection have now begun to embrace their use as resulting beneﬁts for conservation and broader societal interests become more evident (Ward et al., 2001; Agardy, in press). In promoting MPAs it is important that there is a good understanding of the conservation science underlying marine protection in terms of the factual foundation and long-term implications. Ignoring this may lead resource managers and policymakers to make ill-informed decisions regarding MPAs, resulting in poor MPA design and performance. We are concerned that signiﬁcant polarization of views regarding diﬀerent MPA management approaches is occurring, leading to discord and potentially impeding the use of MPAs to conserve marine biodiversity. As with many popular trends, the fervor to proclaim sometimes untenable policy prescriptions, the tendency to decree as many MPAs as possible, an eagerness to do so without a clear understanding of many of the complexities or balanced framework required, and a zealous ‘one size ﬁts all’ approach may inadvertently impede success. A policy backlash against the popular use of marine protection tools may loom at the time when MPAs are needed most. That the broad applicability of the MPA tool has set the stage for diﬀering professional views in the marine conservation community may be seen as a curious paradox. Nonetheless the paradox exists, and these diﬀerences of opinion are not benign. If these diﬀerences are not addressed, the end result may well be confusion among decision makers, causing them to reject MPAs or use them in the wrong way. If at the same time decision makers dismiss other legitimate conservation approaches, it could well ultimately lead to a derailment of marine conservation eﬀorts altogether. Professional disagreement coupled with poorly designed, ad hoc use and marginal to unacceptable performance of MPAs threaten to limit marine protection worldwide.

#### Continues

Agardy 3 [(TUNDI AGARDY, Sound Seas; PETER BRIDGEWATER, UNESCO Man and the Biosphere Program; MICHAEL P. CROSBY, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; JON DAY, Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority; PAUL K. DAYTON, Scripps Institution of Oceanography; RICHARD KENCHINGTON, Maritime Policy Centre, University of Wollongong; DAN LAFFOLEY, English Nature, Peterborough; PATRICK McCONNEY, Caribbean Conservation Association; PETER A. MURRAY, Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, Environment and Sustainable Development Unit, Castries, Saint Lucia; JOHN E. PARKS, Biological Resources Program, World Resources Institute, Washington; and LELEI PEAU, Department of Commerce, Government of American Samoa, Pago Pago, American Samoa, USA) “Dangerous targets? Unresolved issues and ideological clashes around marine protected areas” AQUATIC CONSERVATION: MARINE AND FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEMS, Aquatic Conserv: Mar. Freshw. Ecosyst Jan 12] AT

Establishing target goals for MPAs that are based on best available information would certainly be useful for building momentum for improving MPA programmes around the world. However, though it is alluring to think that a single spatial target will truly describe the minimum area of no-take protection needed to maintain productivity and biodiversity (as in species assemblages) of any given ecosystem, it is probably disingenuous to make the claim. Studies of highly productive and dynamic temperate water systems like those of Georges Bank and the California Bight suggest that nearly three quarters of fish habitat area would need to be set aside as no-take in order to derive the kinds of fisheries management and biodiversity benefits that scientists advocating 20% no-take claim their formula will accrue (Parrish, 1999; National Research Council, 2001). A very real danger of blindly advocating the 20% minimum no-take target for all ecosystems and conditions is that such rigorously designed MPAs may not meet expectations – risking elements of the public and the decision makers who represent them abandoning support for MPAs altogether.

#### [CP] Only adaptive management solves

Agardy 3 [(TUNDI AGARDY, Sound Seas; PETER BRIDGEWATER, UNESCO Man and the Biosphere Program; MICHAEL P. CROSBY, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; JON DAY, Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority; PAUL K. DAYTON, Scripps Institution of Oceanography; RICHARD KENCHINGTON, Maritime Policy Centre, University of Wollongong; DAN LAFFOLEY, English Nature, Peterborough; PATRICK McCONNEY, Caribbean Conservation Association; PETER A. MURRAY, Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, Environment and Sustainable Development Unit, Castries, Saint Lucia; JOHN E. PARKS, Biological Resources Program, World Resources Institute, Washington; and LELEI PEAU, Department of Commerce, Government of American Samoa, Pago Pago, American Samoa, USA) “Dangerous targets? Unresolved issues and ideological clashes around marine protected areas” AQUATIC CONSERVATION: MARINE AND FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEMS, Aquatic Conserv: Mar. Freshw. Ecosyst Jan 12] AT

The broad spectrum of MPA management approaches (which include no-take areas) form a key element of the overall framework needed to manage resources for sustainable use, safeguarding ecosystem function and biodiversity and/or providing a framework for supporting uses of resources and space with a minimum of conflict. They can range from small closed areas or harvest refugia designated to protect a specific resource or habitat type, to extensive multiple-use MPA areas that integrate the management of many species, habitats and uses in a single, comprehensive plan. Like their terrestrial counterparts, MPAs provide not only for the protection of critical habitats and endangered species, but serve important roles in public education and outreach on the social, economic and ecological benefits of marine resource protection and in the actual safeguarding of certain economic, social and cultural aspects of human societies. By employing a framework for the application of adaptive management, MPAs can establish and maintain feedback loops between science and policy. Finally, multiple-use MPAs address the differing sets of objectives demanded by a wide variety of stakeholders or constituents, thereby providing a framework for resolving conflict among the users of marine and coastal ecosystem services. Yet the ideological divide that has emerged between and amongst some scientists, resource managers, and policymakers threatens to cast a shadow on how MPAs are viewed by society, and whether they achieve their full potential. The blanket assignment and advocacy of empirically unsubstantiated rules of thumb in marine protection provides dangerous targets for conservation science and may inflate expectations of end results, risking the abandonment of MPAs by decision makers as a management tool that was tried and failed. What is needed is clarity of definition, systematic testing of assumptions, and adaptive application so that the appropriate mix of marine resource management tools can be elucidated and undertaken depending upon the conditions that warrant them. While this may not be as easy to advocate with decision makers and donors, scientists nevertheless have a professional and ethical duty to map out those paths which are most likely to lead to improved understanding of the natural world, whether or not they be convenient, politically correct or publicly magnetic.

### Ruse Turn

#### MPAs are implemented poorly which crushes other solutions and creates a ruse of solvency

Agardy 3 [(TUNDI AGARDY, Sound Seas; PETER BRIDGEWATER, UNESCO Man and the Biosphere Program; MICHAEL P. CROSBY, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; JON DAY, Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority; PAUL K. DAYTON, Scripps Institution of Oceanography; RICHARD KENCHINGTON, Maritime Policy Centre, University of Wollongong; DAN LAFFOLEY, English Nature, Peterborough; PATRICK McCONNEY, Caribbean Conservation Association; PETER A. MURRAY, Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, Environment and Sustainable Development Unit, Castries, Saint Lucia; JOHN E. PARKS, Biological Resources Program, World Resources Institute, Washington; and LELEI PEAU, Department of Commerce, Government of American Samoa, Pago Pago, American Samoa, USA) “Dangerous targets? Unresolved issues and ideological clashes around marine protected areas” AQUATIC CONSERVATION: MARINE AND FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEMS, Aquatic Conserv: Mar. Freshw. Ecosyst Jan 12] AT

Adherence to strict minimum area targets of 20%, or any other figure, for all marine ecosystems will lead towards a dangerous tendency: creating a false sense of security that marine conservation issues are being dealt with adequately. A hypothetical situation may progress as follows: a mythical country’s new government regulations require an agency with jurisdiction over a highly threatened coastal area to set 20% of the area aside as a no-take MPA. The managing authority rushes to fulfill the target, imposing no take restrictions in a single no-take MPA in the remotest part of the area, where extractive activities are essentially non-existent anyway (explaining why a quick response was possible in the first place). Having achieved the target, the decision maker can pat themself on the back, congratulate the managing agency, and walk away from the real and persistent problems that remain: uncontrolled use in areas outside the 20% restricted area, use conflicts and animosity towards regulators, point and non-point source pollution, environmentally damaging coastal development and construction, etc. The result is a situation in which the 20% target has indeed been reached, and yet 80% of the ecosystem remains as threatened (or even worse off) than before the management measure was instituted. Slowly, over time, 80% of the ecosystem is destroyed and the 20% no-take MPA area is all that is left.

# Mangroves

## Poverty DA

### Specific Link Cards

#### Mangrove harvesting key to local subsistence and minimizing poverty

Walters 08 [Ethnobiology, socio-economics and management of mangrove forests: A review Bradley B. Walters a,\*, Patrik Ro¨nnba¨ck b, John M. Kovacs c, Beatrice Crona b, Syed Ainul Hussain d, Ruchi Badola d, Jurgenne H. Primavera e, Edward Barbier f, Farid Dahdouh-Guebas Aquatic Botany 89 (2008) 220–236] AJ

Non-timber forest products are recognized as important economic resources, particularly to rural, marginalized communities (Vedeld et al., 2004). Many coastal communities in the tropics are characterized by relative geographic isolation, chronic poverty and significant dependence on the harvest of marine and coastal resources for their livelihood (Kunstadter et al., 1986). The majority of people living in or near mangrove areas derive their principal income from fishing and related activities. The direct harvest of mangrove wood and plants is rarely a full-time occupation for them, but a great many rely on these products to meet subsistence needs for fuel and construction materials, and for others the harvest and sale of mangrove forest products is an important income supple- ment (Christensen, 1982; FAO, 1985, 1994; Kunstadter et al., 1986; Diop, 1993; Lacerda et al., 1993; Spalding et al., 1997; Glaser, 2003; Walters, 2005a; Lopez-Hoffman et al., 2006; Ro ̈ nnba ̈ ck et al., 2007a). The two most widespread uses of mangrove wood are for fuel and construction. Many common mangrove tree species, e.g., Rhizophora species produce wood that is dense, hard and often rich in tannins (FAO, 1994; Bandaranayake, 1998). Such wood burns long and hot, and so is highly attractive for making charcoal or consuming directly as firewood (Brown and Fischer, 1918; Chapman, 1976; Christensen, 1982, 1983b; Taylor, 1982; Bhat- tacharyya, 1990; Ewel et al., 1998a; Walters, 2005a; Dahdouh- Guebas et al., 2006a). The harvest of mangrove for fuelwood is widespread throughout the coastal tropics (Fig. 1A and D). In some countries, mangrove wood historically formed an important commercial fuel for industries like bakeries and clay-firing kilns, although this is less common today because of the ready availability of alternative fuels, like natural gas and electricity, and policies aimed at discouraging mangrove cutting (Lacerda et al., 1993; Naylor et al., 2002; Walters, 2003). Nonetheless, remote coastal communities in many parts of the tropics continue to depend heavily on mangrove wood for domestic fuelwood consumption, and commercial markets that sell mangrove charcoal to nearby towns and urban centers are not uncommon (Untawale, 1987; Walters and Burt, 1991; Alvarez-Leon, 1993; Allen et al., 2000; Dahdouh-Guebas et al., 2000b; Glaser, 2003). The qualities of strength and durability (including pest- and rot-resistance) also make mangrove wood well-suited for use in construction (Adegbehin, 1993; Bandaranayake, 1998; Kairo et al., 2002; Walters, 2005a). Yet, the typically short and contorted growth form of tree stems of common genera such as Avicennia and Sonneratia renders them of limited value for large, commercial-sized lumber. The extraction of construction wood from mangroves is thus limited mostly to domestic consumption and sale of small-size posts to targeted local and regional markets (Fig. 1C). Mangrove wood is widely used in coastal communities for residential construction (posts, beams, roofing, fencing) and to make fish traps/weirs (Adegbehin, 1993; Alvarez-Leon, 1993; Rasolofo, 1997; Ewel et al., 1998a; Semesi, 1998; Kovacs, 1999; Primavera et al., 2004; Walters, 2004). Fronds from the mangrove ‘‘nipa’’ palm (Nypa fruticans (Thunb.) Wurmb.) are particularly valued in Southeast Asia for use in roofing and as thatch in walls and floor mats (Aksornkoae et al., 1986; Fong, 1992; Basit, 1995; Spalding et al., 1997; Walters, 2005a). Mangrove wood is also used in some countries for building boats, furniture, wharf pilings, telegraph poles, construction scaffolding, railway girders and mine timbers (Walsh, 1977; Mainoya et al., 1986; Adegbehin, 1993; Bandaranayake, 1998; Primavera et al., 2004; Lopez-Hoffman et al., 2006). In addition to wood for fuel and construction, mangrove forest trees are also widely valued for their bark (used in tanning and dyes) and wood fiber (to make rayon and paper); as sources of animal fodder, vegetable foods, and diverse traditional medicines and toxicants (see Bandaranayake, 1998, 2002 for a reviews); and as habitats for honey bees and hunted wildlife (see Table 1; Fig. 1G).

#### Prefer on empirics – non timber forest products are key to local subsistence and fighting poverty.

Stanley et al 12 [Stanley, Denise, Robert Voeks, and Leaa Short. "Is Non-Timber Forest Product Harvest Sustainable in the Less Developed World? A Systematic Review of the Recent Economic and Ecological Literature." Ethnobiology and Conservation 1 (2012)] AJ

Assessment of recent studies of non-timber forest products (2000-2010) in the tropical and subtropical world suggests that these extractive activities are overall ecologically and economically sustainable under current or practical conditions. This is the case in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. A considerable majority of studies report that current levels and intensities of harvest do not threaten the ability of individuals and populations to replace themselves, nor is the ecological integrity of the relevant ecosystems threatened. Researchers were less sanguine regarding the impacts of extractive activities on associated community members, such as removal of food sources for frugivorous birds and mammals. They also report complementary negative community effects, such as the local extinction of large mammals due to overhunting by palm heart extractors (Matos and Bovi 2002) or unsustainable agricultural practices and timber removal during non-gathering periods of Brazil nuts (Escobar and Aldana 2003). Most researchers acknowledge the challenges associated with assessing ecological sustainability in a fixed temporal setting while conditions and feedbacks, such as ecological dynamics and supply and demand, are ever-evolving. Such acknowledgement requires nuanced assessments weighing the potential ecological threats to and associated with NTFP extraction. In this vein, positive sustainable impact assessments most typically propose management strategies or practices that, if implemented, could maximize the benefits of NTFP extraction while providing or maximizing ecological conservation and associated benefits. What researchers know about the relative sustainability of NTFP harvest for this review period is geographically contingent. Much more is known about the ecological consequences of extractivism in Latin America than in Asia or Africa. And within these regions, a few countries have received abundant research attention, such as Brazil, Bolivia, Benin, South Africa, India and Nepal. But because so many less developed countries are not represented by a single study, our conclusions regarding ecological sustainability of NTFP harvest must be taken with caution. Nevertheless, the fact that many of the features associated with NTFP extraction identified in this review were quite similar to those reported by Ticktin (2004) in her review of the 1990s literature suggests both that these studies represent a reasonably good barometer of current extractive patterns and that there is considerable continuity of harvest characteristics over time. Thus, most studies continue to be carried out on the ecological consequences of NTFP harvest on plant populations and individuals. Research at the community and ecosystem level continues to receive much less attention. Trees and palms are investigated far more frequently than other life forms, and they both supply multiple harvestable products. Nearly all research is directed at the extraction of seeds/fruit/nuts, leaves, and meristem (especially palm heart) harvest. The ecological effects of lianas, epiphytes and mushroom harvest are almost never investigated in the tropics and subtropics. In regards to financial returns, our review suggests that NTFP collection represents an attractive option for keeping gatherers out of poverty. Earnings represent an economically justifiable use of gatherer time, except in the very poorest countries of East Asia. This could be due to the overall degree of poverty there (mean household annual incomes are usually less than USD$1000 per capita/year). In wealthier less-developed countries, such as several in Latin America, overall yearly mean incomes are higher, so it is more likely that NTFP gathering will elevate people above the international poverty line standard. These regional differences are important since going rural wage rates have long been higher in Latin America. Vedeld et al. (2004) found the highest overall NTFP incomes (across meta-analysis case studies) in Latin America (USD$5,676 PPP) with the lowest in East Africa (USD$1697 PPP). And Ruiz-Perez et al. (2004) report USD$10.25/day in Latin America against USD$5.62 per day in Africa.

### Turns Coastal Flooding

#### Poverty increase vulnerability to coastal flooding

Adelekan 9 [(Ibidun, Dr Department of Geography University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria) “VULNERABILITY OF POOR URBAN COASTAL COMMUNITIES TO CLIMATE CHANGE IN LAGOS, NIGERIA” Vulnerability of Poor Urban Coastal Communities to Climate Change in Lagos, Nigeria Fifth Urban Research Symposium 2009] AT

Coastal towns are by far the most developed of Africa‟s urban areas and by implication, have a high concentration of residential, industrial, commercial, educational and military facilities (UN- Habitat, 2008). Urban development has however been indicated to be a large creator of risk for much of the urban population, most especially the urban poor who live in more vulnerable physical and human environments. Sea-level rise will have significant impacts on coastal areas of Africa, especially on its coastal megacities, because of the concentration of poor populations in potentially hazardous areas that are more vulnerable to such changes (Klein et al., 2002; Nicholls, 2004). The urban poor face a worsening situation as the effects of climate change including floods arising from increasing frequency of storm surges, and heavy rainfall of long duration or high intensity become more severe.

## CP

### Text + Essentials

#### Text: All relevant aff actors will protect mangroves as a voluntary environmental agreement, offering regulated parties positive incentives for environmental protection.

Coglianese and Borck 09 [Borck, Jonathan C., and Cary Coglianese. "Voluntary environmental programs: assessing their effectiveness." Annual Review of Environment and Resources 34 (2009): 305-324] AJ

VEPs are perhaps most readily characterized by what they are not: mandatory regulations. Most major environmental regulations emerged in the 1970s and early 1980s (22, 23). For example, during the 1970s the U.S. Congress adopted or substantially modified all of its most prominent environmental laws, including the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Resource Con- servation and Recovery Act (24). Environmental regulations developed under laws like these have either placed limits on the pollution that regulated entities are allowed to release into the environment or have controlled the behavior of these entities, requiring them to obtain permits, install pollution control equipment, or follow hazardous waste disposal protocols. By the 1980s, critics argued that these con- ventional regulations were too rigid, costly, and adversarial. Economists have noted that, be- cause such regulations dictate the behavior of regulated entities, facilities often have no flex- ibility or incentive to find cheaper, more inno- vative ways to achieve environmental objectives (25). It is generally accepted that governmental efforts to enforce compliance with these regu- lations often produced adversarial relationships between regulators and regulated facilities, im- peding the development of trust and the nego- tiation of mutually agreeable solutions to envi- ronmental problems (22, 26–29). Alternative forms of regulation have been proposed to ameliorate the problems with tra- ditional forms of regulation (30). Performance- based regulation, for example, gives regu- lated entities flexibility in their behavior as long as they meet stated performance lim- its (31). Market-based forms of regulation, such as emissions trading, offer still further flexibility, as they allow entities to average their performance across facilities or over time (25, 32). Unlike performance-based regulation, market-based regulation gives some entities a positive incentive to reduce their environmen- tal impacts below the desired average level, so as to trade or bank the additional reductions (25, 32). Notwithstanding their flexibility, both performance-based and market-based forms of regulation still require each entity to pollute no more than its legally applicable performance limit or the level of pollution specified by the tradable permits it possesses. That is, failure to meet this specified level makes the entity subject to the imposition of fines or other penalties. By contrast, VEPs—sometimes referred to as voluntary environmental agreements (33)— neither impose mandatory limits nor require specific forms of behavior. As such, they offer yet another alternative to traditional forms of regulation. VEPs establish positive incentives to encourage businesses and other organizations to address environmental issues that are not subject to regulation or to reduce their regulated environmental impacts to well below the levels permitted by law (34). Unlike regulations—whether traditional or market based—they do not rely on built-in sanctions as a force for motivating environmental improvements.

#### Competition: Mutual Exclusivity

#### Mechanisms: VEPs work through positive incentives rather than jail or fines, so a permutation would necessarily shift aff implementation of the plan

#### Net benefits

### Net Benefit – Environment

#### The CP solves environmental protection better than the aff by allowing company flexibility in adoption of legislation.

Segerson and Miceli 98 [Kathleen Segerson and Thomas J. Miceli (Department of Economics, University of Connecticut,). “Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Good or Bad News for Environmental Protection?” JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT 36, 109-130. 1998] AJ

This article has developed a simple model of interaction between a regulator and a polluting firm that can be used to determine whether a voluntary agreement to reduce pollution is likely to be successfully negotiated, and, if so, what the equilibrium level of abatement under the agreement would be under alternative assumptions regarding the allocation of bargaining power between the two parties. The results suggest that, given the potential savings under a voluntary agreement, such an agreement will always be the equilibrium outcome of the interaction between the regulator and the firm, even when the firm is not offered a subsidy. However, the agreed upon level of abatement will depend upon Ži. the allocation of bargaining power between the regulator and the firm, Žii. the magnitude of the background threat, and Žiii. the social cost of funds. In particular, when the regulator has all of the bargaining power, it is possible that the equilibrium level of abatement under a VA is a first best level. In this case, the level of abatement undertaken voluntarily will exceed the level that might have been imposed legislatively, implying supercompliance. The possibility of such an outcome is more likely when the legislative threat is strong, as, for example, when a voluntary agreement exempts a firm from mandatory requirements under existing legislation Žso that p 􏰋 1.. This could explain the supercompliance sought under the EPA’s Project XL.31

#### Empirically verified – comparative studies confirm

Husted et al 13 [Henriques, Irene (Professor of Sustainability and Economics, Schulich School of Business, York University), Bryan W. Husted (Erivan K. Haub Chair in Business and Sustainability at the Schulich School of Business, York University), and Ivan Montiel (Assistant Professor of Corporate Sustainability, Loyola Mary- mount University). "Spillover Effects of Voluntary Environmental Programs on Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Lessons from Mexico." Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 32, No. 2, 296–322 (2013)] AJ

We hypothesize that the design attributes of VEPs, specifically the stringency of standards and the strength of sanctions, are likely to reduce both targeted and untargeted environmental emissions. We find that certification with Clean Industry is related to higher levels of targeted and untargeted environmental performance, while ISO 14001 showed no sign of improvement. These results provide support for our hypotheses relating the design of VEPs to reductions in both targeted emissions and untargeted GHG emissions. Our results contribute to the existing public policy and management literatures in three ways. First, we draw upon club theory and knowledge spillovers as a frame- work to highlight what matters in the design of VEPs for both targeted and untar- geted emissions. Second, we go beyond the many single VEP studies in the literature by comparing the environmental performance of two VEPs—one with stringent standards and sanctions and one with less stringent standards sanctions—and show that standards and sanctions do matter. Finally, we find that VEPs with stringent standards and sanctions not only benefit targeted environmental performance, but untargeted performance as well. Consequently, a well-designed VEP can have sub- stantial positive spillover effects for the environment.

### Net Benefit - Knowledge Spillover

#### Since companies know their own operations better than the state, VEPs better spur innovation through the “knowledge spillover effect.”

Husted et al 13 [Henriques, Irene (Professor of Sustainability and Economics, Schulich School of Business, York University), Bryan W. Husted (Erivan K. Haub Chair in Business and Sustainability at the Schulich School of Business, York University), and Ivan Montiel (Assistant Professor of Corporate Sustainability, Loyola Mary- mount University). "Spillover Effects of Voluntary Environmental Programs on Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Lessons from Mexico." Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 32, No. 2, 296–322 (2013)] AJ

Similarly, knowledge spillovers in the development and deployment of environmental resources and capabilities can produce the unintended consequence of improving untargeted emissions. Porter and van der Linde (1995) identify numerous cases where environmental product and process innovations stimulate improvements in other desirable environmental attributes. Among these cases, they describe specifically how compliance with strict environmental standards can also decrease energy consumption, which reduces GHG emissions. Applying the logic of knowledge spillovers to VEPs is relatively straightforward. VEPs with more stringent targets and sanctions are more likely than other programs to enable firms to develop new capabilities and processes because firms are volun- tarily choosing a certification program that encourages substantive adoption. The firm that substantively adopts the VEP tends to have a better understanding of its own production processes and, as a result, is more likely to assimilate and apply information to improve its processes (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), which will generate positive spillovers for untargeted activities. For example, if substantive adoption of a VEP requires the acquisition of capabilities in pollution prevention or product stewardship, the very same actions that reduce targeted emissions such as nitrous oxide (N2O) or dioxins can result in greater energy efficiency and a consequent reduction in GHG emissions such as carbon dioxide (CO2) or methane (CH4). The more stringent VEP will enable its members to generate and benefit from these positive spillover effects. Spillovers for untargeted behavior will be markedly less for members of less stringent programs because of the lack of sanctions and less credible reputation, which reduces incentives to substantively adopt and invest in improvements that would lead to the development of capabilities that would improve untargeted GHG emissions.

### Net Benefit – Econ

#### VEPs maximize output and market stability by allowing firms to be flexible – that solves the aff and actively improves economic growth.

Khanna 01 [Khanna, Madhu (University of Illinois). "Non‐mandatory approaches to environmental protection." Journal of economic surveys 15.3 (2001): 291-324] AJ

Voluntary agreements on an aggregate abatement target between an industry and a regulator allow flexibility in the allocation of abatement burden among firms within the industry. Glachant 􏰀1999) analyzes differences in transactions costs, under a voluntary and a mandatory policy 􏰀taxes or standards), due to the need to collect information to allocate this burden efficiently. Under an emissions standard policy, the regulator needs to collect information about private pollution abatement costs to set efficient non-uniform standards. Under a voluntary agreement, firms have to collect information not only about their own abatement costs but also those of other firms and incur computation costs to define their bargaining strategy. In contrast, taxes are a decentralized scheme in which firms choose their abatement levels individually in response to the price signal and firms do not need to communicate with each other or the regulator. Glachant 􏰀1999) suggests that when there is informational asymmetry and the number of firms is large, a voluntary approach is more costly than either a standards or a tax policy. It requires more intensive inter-firm communication and generates higher inter- firm rivalry since each firm's desire to reduce its abatement implies a higher level for other firms. However, when there is shared uncertainty about generic pollution abatement costs among all firms and firms are few and relatively homogeneous, voluntary approaches could be efficient because they facilitate collective learning more easily than a standard or a tax policy. Blackman and Boyd 􏰀1999) focus on a different type of cost-efficiency that arises in the form of lower variable costs of production due to the flexibility provided by a tailored voluntary program, such as Project XL, that sets firm- specific emission standards that are assumed to be stricter but less costly than existing command and control standards. A firm participates if these cost-savings are larger than the additional fixed costs of transactions imposed by participation in the voluntary agreement. Blackman and Boyd 􏰀1999) show that participation by a monopoly unambiguously increases welfare because it results in larger production, due to lower marginal variable cost of production, and thus greater consumer surplus and monopoly profits 􏰀due to the individual rationality constraint and participation constraint). However, when a Cournot duopoly exists, offering the opportunity to participate to only one of the two firms increases the participating firm's output and market share but this occurs to some extent at the expense of the other firm. While aggregate industry output increases and consumers are better off with the tailored regulation, the net impact on producers' surplus is positive only if the tailored regulation shifts production from a firm with a low profit margin to a firm with a high profit margin. The analysis suggests that a tailored regulation can be welfare improving if it is targeted towards more profitable firms. Promoting the diffusion of the program across all firms reduces incentives for participation since it reduces the competitive advantage gained by participants.

## A2 Case

ADD GENERAL MANGROVES DEFENSE

### A2 BioD

#### Mangrove populations are resilient – History and biology show.

Alongi 2008 [(Daniel, Australian Institute of Marine Science) “Mangrove forests: Resilience, protection from tsunamis, and responses to global climate change” [Estuarine, Coastal and Shelf Science](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/02727714) [Volume 76, Issue 1](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/02727714/76/1), 1 January 2008, Pages 1–13] DD

This review assesses the degree of resilience of mangrove forests to large, infrequent disturbance (tsunamis) and their role in coastal protection, and to chronic disturbance events (climate change) and the future of mangroves in the face of global change. From a geological perspective, **mangroves come and go at considerable speed** with the current distribution of forests a legacy of the Holocene, **having undergone** almost **chronic disturbance as a result of fluctuations in sea-level. Mangroves have demonstrated considerable resilience** over timescales commensurate with shoreline evolution**. This notion is supported by evidence that soil accretion rates in mangrove forests are currently keeping pace with mean sea-level rise. Further support for their resilience comes from patterns of recovery from natural disturbances** (storms, hurricanes) which coupled with key life history traits, suggest pioneer-phase characteristics.

### A2 Solves Coastal Flooding

### A2 Protects Fisheries

### Solvency

#### Alt causes

Wetlands International [“Mangrove forests”] AT

Globally, half of all mangrove forests have been lost since the mid-twentieth century, with one-fifth since 1980 (Spalding et al. 2010). Conversion into shrimp farms causes 25% of the total destruction, according to UNEP (Botkin and Keller, 2003), happening mostly in Southeast Asia and Latin America. Other drivers of mangrove destruction are wood extraction, climate change and industrial development such as harbours and tourism.